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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the issue of authentication and privacy in mobile Web ser- 
vices. The work in this thesis builds on GSM and UMTS security framework 
to develop security protocols for mobile Web services environment. The thesis 
initially highlights some core principles of designing security protocols in such 
environment. The next two chapters look at the core technologies and building 
blocks in Web services systems and the core security features in mobile networks 
mainly GSM and UMTS. Registration and authentication were identified as se- 
curity issues in federated systems. Proposed solutions were developed utilizing 
XML security mechanisms with SIM card security in GSM environment to ad- 
dress these issues. Also a novel system was proposed in which it is possible for a 
mobile user to securely authenticate and have full anonymity as far as the service 
providers are concerned; however it is possible for a trusted authority to reveal 
the identity of the user if he or she is suspected of illegal activities. The next 
section analyze in detail the Generic Authentication Architecture from 3GPP. 
Combining SAML with the Generic Authentication Architecture, we propose a 
novel "generic mobile Web service platform" for M-Commerce. Various solutions 
have been proposed to address privacy concern in distributed networks; the Plat- 
form for Privacy Preferences is one of the popular proposal, though it has many 
desirable features, it is not easy to enforce it. We argue that this limitation can 
be managed in federated system such as the Liberty Alliance framework. In the 
final chapter we make the case for using timestamp based authentication protocol 
in mobile Web service on the ground of efficiency gain. 
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Introduction 
Web services are becoming a model on which to build distributed Internet ap- 
plications. These services predicate a set of standards that provide a simple and 
consistent way to access the functionality of diverse systems via the World Wide 
Web. Web services are new type of middleware for distributed computing. How- 
ever, it is different from other middleware as it is; simpler, standards based, and 
more loosely coupled technology. It is because of the nature of Web services all 
middleware needs strong security practices. Web services are not just being used 
to integrate internal systems, but they also integrate data sources from outside 
the organization. 
Since the early 1990s there has been a huge growth in wireless networks, be- 
cause of this flexibility to both network operators and users. This has provided 
the users with not only "anytime, anywhere" network access, but also the freedom 
of roaming while networking. One of the major concerns in wireless networking 
is security. Although most of security threats against the wired network (e. g. 
threats against the TCP/IP stack) are equally applicable in wireless networks, 
a number of additional vulnerabilities makes wireless network more challenging 
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to secure. Such challenges includes, open wireless access medium, limited band- 
width, and system complexity. 
Use of identity federation standards can increase security and lower risk by 
enabling an organization to identify and authenticate a user once, and then use 
that identity information across multiple systems, including external partner web 
sites. It can improve privacy compliance by allowing the user to control what 
information is shared, or by limiting the amount of information shared. 
The notion of identity federation is extremely broad, and also evolving. It 
could involve user-to-user, user-to-application as well as application-to-application 
use-case scenarios at both the browser tier as well as the web services or SOA 
(service-oriented architecture) tier. Federated environment is used in Web ser- 
vices, where Single Sign On (SSO) concept plays an important role in building 
federated systems. 
All the above topics play different roles when considering mobile Web services 
security system. Each chapter in this thesis is dedicated to one or more of these 
topics. The following section describes the structure of this thesis. 
0.1 Motivation 
Web Services Security is still in the process of being defined. Web Services look 
to be a useful paradigm for service access in mobile environments, but mobile 
environments have their own particular characteristics and requirements. As a 
result, it may be appropriate to look at Web Services security in the particular 
context of mobile networks to see if any additional features are required and also 
to see if solutions designed for fixed networks are still feasible in a mobile context. 
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Hence; the aim of this thesis is to investigate security systems to try use the best 
of both worlds to address security issues in mobile Web services environment. 
This thesis looks at how to apply and/or utilize security features in wireless 
systems (mainly General System for Mobile communications (GSM) and Univer- 
sal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)), to secure mobile Web services 
systems and applications. 
0.2 Aims and Objectives 
The main aims and objectives of this research are driven from the motivation 
section earlier. These are outlined as follows: 
" 
To identify the limitations/weakness of current Web services security tech- 
nologies/techniques when applied in GSM/UMTS environment. 
9 To identify the limitations/weakness of current security system in GSM/UMTS 
technology, to be addressed when developing Mobile Web services system. 
" Propose novel protocols to address the issues of authentications and privacy 
in mobile web services environment. 
" 
Design and build prototype to test the various techniques and protocols 
developed by this research. 
0.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured into six chapters and a conclusion section; 
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0.3 Structure of the Thesis 
In chapter one we review some core principles for designing security proto- 
cols. The chapter describes best practices and highlights core security techniques. 
We also list key security threats that must be considered when designing such 
protocols. These security design principles are used throughout the thesis. 
Chapter two looks at Web services security. The chapter start by defining the 
basic building blocks of Web services such as XML and SOAP. This is followed 
by a review of the most used security technologies in Web services. WS-Security 
and common Web services security considerations are also discussed here. 
Mobile security technologies are discussed in chapter three, specifically GSM 
and UMTS systems; the chapter mainly focus on the security features and limi- 
tations of both systems. 
Chapter four looks at issues of federated system, after reviewing related work 
we identified that registration and authentication in addition to protecting user 
privacy as key security issues in federated environments. We propose various 
solutions and develop novel protocol that using GSM security to tackle the issue 
of protecting user's anonymity in mobile Web services environment. 
The challenges of portable identity is one of the big challenges in mobile Web 
services, in chapter five we first review in some details SAML, which is a tech- 
nology that was developed to address this issue of exchange authentication and 
authorization credentials across different security domains. And after reviewing 
related work. 
Chapter six also looks at the issue of privacy in mobile Web services in some 
details. After reviewing some of the current technology standards and related 
work in the area. We identify the Platform for Privacy Preferences as key in 
helping to protect user's privacy. Though it has many desirable features, it is not 
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easy to enforce P3P policy in distributed system. We argue that this limitation 
can be managed in federated system such as the Liberty Alliance framework. We 
propose a system to enable privacy with P3P and Liberty Alliance. 
In chapter seven we make the case for using timestamp based authentication 
protocol in mobile Web service on the ground of efficiency gain. After analyzing 
some of the limitations and issues such as clock synchronization, and trusted 
clock's and related work. We how timestamp based authentication can be used 
in mobile Web services. 
Finally a conclusion is given, summarizing this research and identifies some 
challenges and direction for further research. 
0.4 Publications and main contribution 
This thesis contains previous research that has been published in the proceedings 
of a number of refereed conferences, as follows. 
9 Weerasinghe, D., Elmufti, K., Rajarajan, M. and Rakocevic, V. (2007) 
Securing electronic health records with novel mobile encryption schemes, 
Int. J. Electronic Healthcare, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 395416. 
" Dasun Weerasinghe, Kalid Elmufti, Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, Veselin Rako- 
cevic. The International Workshop on Security and Privacy in Mobile 
HealthCare, "XML Security based Access Control for Healthcare Informa- 
tion in Mobile Environment, Innsbruck, Austria, November 29 
- 
December 
1,2006. 
" 
John A. MacDonald, Kalid Elmufti, Dasun Weerasinghe, M Rajarajan, 
5 
0.4 Publications and main contribution 
Veselin Rakocevic, Sanowar Khan. Proceedings for The 4th IEEE European 
Conference on Web Services, "A Web Services Shopping Mall for Mobile 
Users, 4-6 December 2006, Pages 99-108. 
" 
Kalid Elmufti, Dasun Weerasinghe, M Rajarajan, Veselin Rakocevic, Sanowar 
Khan. 2nd International Conference on Pervasive Computing Technologies 
for Healthcare 2008, workshop "Connectivity, Mobility and Patients' Com- 
fort (CMPC)" Timestamp Authentication Protocol for Remote Monitoring 
in eHealth, Tampere, Finland, Jan 29th, 2008. 
" 
Kalid Elmufti, John A. MacDonald, Dasun Weerasinghe, M Rajarajan, 
Veselin Rakocevic, Sanowar Khan. The International Journal of Informa- 
tion Security "Mobile Web Services Authentication using SAML and 3GPP 
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture. (under review) 
" 
Kalid Elmufti, M Rajarajan, Veselin Rakocevic, Sanowar Khan. Interna- 
tional Journal of Mobile Communication, "GSM for mobile Single Sign-On 
to protect user privacy 
. 
(To be published 2008) 
" 
Kalid Elmufti, Dasun Weerasinghe, M Rajarajan, Veselin Rakocevic, Sanowar 
Khan. The International Workshop on Security and Privacy in Mobile 
HealthCare, "Privacy in Mobile Web Services eHealth, Innsbruck 
, 
Austria 
, 
November 29 
- 
December 1,2006. 
" K. Elmufti and C. J. Mitchell, "GSM for mobile SSO to protect user pri- 
vacy", presented at WEWoRC 2005, The Western European Workshop on 
Research in Cryptology, Leuven 
, 
Belgium, July 2005. 
" 
Kalid Elmufti, M Rajarajan, Veselin Rakocevic, Sanowar Khan, PREP 
6 
0.4 Publications and main contribution 
2005. "Authentication protocol for an M-Commerce application using OA- 
SIS SOAP message security standard, Nottingham 
, 
UK 
. 
April 2005. 
7 
Chapter 
Protocol Design and 
considerations 
1.1 Introduction 
Cryptography has been used throughout the history of civilizations to protect 
secret messages. Though the techniques changed overtime, the core requirement 
has not changed [1]; how to send a message from A to B without anyone else 
able to discover the message. For a long time cryptography was mainly used 
by governments, military, and to some extent business/financial communities. It 
was not of a major concern to the average people. With the developments of the 
digital age and the growth of the Internet, however, many people started looking 
to cryptography to protect their privacy and important data, and cryptography 
became of greater importance. 
This Chapter analyzes the main cryptographic techniques used throughout 
the Thesis. It also analyzes the design principles and the methodologies used to 
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develop the security protocols in the Thesis. Section 1.4 discusses the major 
security challenges and how to verify the credibility of our design, and finally the 
Chapter lists some of the main security threats in the domain of Web services. 
1.2 Terminology and Definitions 
The following is an informal introduction and an overview of definitions to some 
of the well established techniques used in digital cryptography. The following 
terminologies and definitions are used throughout the Thesis. [1,2] present a 
more detailed introduction. 
1.2.1 Random Numbers and Nonce 
Random Number or Nonce can be defined as a finite sequence of bits that is used 
only once within a given context. A nonce is a value used not more than once 
for the same purpose. Nonces are used to protect from a reply attack. Generally, 
they are introduced in cryptographic protocols to provide freshness. The random 
numbers used as nonces have to be hard to guess. However, a simple type of a 
nonce could be a counter where the parties involved would keep track of all the 
integers used. Another popular type of nonce is a timestamp. a Timestamp can 
be used to limit the period of validity of the message. 
The security of many cryptographic systems depends upon the generation of 
unpredictable quantities such as the secret key in DES [3] or the public/private 
key pair in RSA [4]. The quantities generated must be of sufficient size and be ran- 
dom in the sense that the probability of any particular value being selected must 
9 
1.2 Terminology and Definitions 
be sufficiently small to preclude an adversary from gaining advantage through 
optimizing a search strategy based on such probability. 
1.2.2 Key Derivation Functions 
Key derivation functions are used to derive cryptographic keys, usually from 
secret values such as passwords or other cryptographic keys. A Key derivation 
function can also be used to ensure that the derived keys have other desirable 
properties, such as avoiding "weak keys" in some specific encryption systems. 
Another common use is in deriving session keys from long term secret key such 
as in GSM using the A8 derivation function [5]. 
1.2.3 Encryption 
Encryption is the process of transforming information to make it unreadable to 
anyone except those possessing special knowledge, also known as a key. The mes- 
sage in its human readable form is referred to as plaintext (P). The process of 
transforming or hiding this message is known as encryption (e), and the resulting 
message is known as ciphertext (C). The encryption function e operates on P to 
produce C: 
e(P)=C 
The reverse process is known as description (d), where the decryption func- 
tion d operates on C to produce P: 
10 
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d(C)=P 
The processes of encryption and decryption are achieved through the use of 
cryptographic algorithms also known as ciphers. All modern ciphers use a key 
(K), where the value of this key affects the cryptographic algorithms: 
e(K, P)=C 
d(K, C)=P (1.1) 
There are two types of encryption depending on how the cryptographic key(s) 
axe used: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption 
Symmetric encryption 
The distinguish feature of symmetric encryption is that only one key is used for 
both encryption and decryption processes, and this key must is shared between 
the sender and the receiver. There are many techniques for deploying symmetric 
encryption. The one most frequently used is known as block cipher. A block 
cipher algorithm takes a block of plaintext and a secret key and produces block 
ciphertext. The decryption will take the ciphertext with the same secret key to 
reproduce the plaintext. Some of the most used block ciphers are the Data En- 
cryption Standard (DES) [3] and triple DES, the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [6], and the KASUMI cipher algorithm [7] which is important in a mobile 
context. Stream cipher is another important type of symmetric encryption. It 
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is different from block cipher in that it encrypts data bit by bit. Stream cipher 
uses what's known as keystream generator which takes a secret key as the input 
and generates a pseudo random sequence of bits as the output. This sequence is 
EXORed with the plaintext bit sequence to produce the ciphertext. The same 
process is repated for the decryption. An example of stream cipher is the A5 
algorithm used in GSM [8]. 
Asymmetric encryption 
The main issue with symmetric encryption is key distribution, since the sender 
and the receiver must share a common key. This is possible with a small number 
of users and in closed environments but in large distributed networks, such as the 
Internet, this is a major issue. The problem was addressed in 1970s by Whitfield 
Diffie and Martin Hellman with their Diffie-Hellman cryptographic system [4], 
the start of asymmetric cryptography. Also known as public key cryptography, 
it is a process where each user gets a pair of keys, called the `public key' and 
`private key' (or `secret key'). The public key is published while the private key 
is never revealed. In the encryption, the recipient's public key is used to encrypt 
the plaintext and the recipient's private key is used to decrypt the ciphertext. 
The most know public key algorithm is the RSA scheme [4]. Its important to 
note that, although asymmetric encryption solves the issue of key distribution 
effecting symmetric encryption, managing these key pairs is not an easy task. 
Furthermore, asymmetric encryption tends to be much more computationally 
intensive than symmetric encryption [9] and this can be an issue for devices with 
limited computing power such as mobile phones. 
12 
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1.2.4 Hash Functions 
A hash function (h) takes a message of any length and gives an output of a short 
fixed length value known as digest (d), such that for a message (m): 
d=h(m) 
The main property of any hash function is that it must be a one-way function, that 
is its infeasible to obtain the message m from the digest d. Another important 
property of hash functions is that they are usually efficient to compute. Hash 
functions are used to protect the integrity of messages, so after computing the 
digest the recipient can check the integrity of the message received by recomputing 
the digest and compare the two digests. Typically this is done using the Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). The MAC is computed by encrypting the digest 
with a secret key so then the MAC can be attached to the message and sent to 
the recipient, who then needs to recompute the MAC and compare it with the 
one attached to the received message to verify its integrity. Hash functions are 
also used in digital signature. 
1.2.5 Digital Signature 
A digital signature of a message is an output of a mathematical process that 
is dependent on some secret known only to the signer, and, additionally, on 
the content of the message being signed. The process of generating the digital 
signature is very much like the generating MAC. The main difference is that a 
private key (instead of a symmetric secret key)is used, which has a corresponding 
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public key that the recipient possesses. 
Signatures must be verifiable; and this is possible by anyone possessing the 
signer's public key. In MAC, the verification process is just recomputing the 
MAC, however in digital signature a special verification function is used, which 
takes as input the signature, the message, and the public key, the output is a 
boolean indication as to whether the signature is valid or not. If a dispute arises 
as to whether a party signed a document (e. g. a lying signer, or a fraudulent 
claimant), an unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter equitably, 
without requiring access to the signers secret information. 
Digital signatures have many applications in information security, including 
authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation. One of the most significant 
applications of digital signatures is the certification of public keys in large net- 
works. Certification is a means for a trusted third party to bind the identity of a 
user to a public key, so that at some later time, other entities can authenticate a 
public key without assistance from a trusted third paxty [2]. 
1.3 Design Principles and Methodology 
In later chapters we propose novel security protocols and schemes. The design 
principles of these protocols are defined in this section. However, the main pur- 
pose of proposing these protocols is to demonstrate and introduce new concepts 
in mobile Web services security, in particular for authentication and privacy pur- 
poses. Therefore, there was no need to use formal methodologies to prove the 
accuracy of these protocols, but on the other hand we wanted our proposed pro- 
tocol to be reasonably secure and to address most of the known security issues. 
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For these reasons we found the design principles presented in "Prudent Engineer- 
ing Practice for Cryptographic Protocols" [10] by Abadi and Needham, and "A 
Logic of Authentication" [11] by Burrows and Abadi and Needham, very relevant 
and suitable to be used as general guides for our protocol design principles and 
methodology. 
1.3.1 Notation and Naming 
" 
Each entity used in the proposed protocols is referred to it by its descriptive 
name (e. g. Mobile Device or Service Provider) to encapsulate some of its 
characteristic such device limitation or level of trust. 
" 
The mobile device sometime is referred to as the `User' as a reference that 
the end user is using the mobile device. 
" 
The signature on data X using private key K is written sK (X) 
. 
" 
In asymmetric encryption algorithm, the encryption of data X using public 
key P is written ep (X) 
. 
" 
In symmetric encryption algorithm, the encryption of data X using secret 
key K is written eK(X). 
1.3.2 Assumptions 
The following are assumed true throughout the Thesis. There are other specific 
assumptions which are presented in the relevant sections. 
" 
Security Algorithms: all standard security algorithms used in our protocols 
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are assumed to be `secure' and they operate as expected, unless otherwise 
stated. 
9 All entities/principals know exactly how the cryptographic algorithms in 
use work. 
" 
Mobile Operators are trusted: all Mobile Operators (also referred to as Net- 
work Operators) are trusted by all other elements who interact with them 
directly or indirectly. The trust here indicates that the Mobile Operators 
will act as expected and that their system can't be compromised. 
9 Mobile Operators Clock: it is assumed that the Mobile Operators run 
trusted clock, whose time can not be changed by anyone other than the 
operators. 
9 The terms Encryption/Decryption, Signature/Verification are used in their 
basic definitions as described in the previous section, and that no special 
characteristics is required unless otherwise specified. 
" 
All mobile devices have limited memory storage and computing power, al- 
though enough it is possible to run PKI on them [9], we try to avoid it as 
much as possible. 
9 In our security analysis we assume the existence of a malicious entity, an 
attacker or a hacker, who can monitor the network traffic, create fake mes- 
sages and introduce them in the traffic. 
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1.3.3 Core Principles 
The security protocols proposed in this thesis present new mechanisms on how to 
develop security protocols which provide means of authentication and protection 
of user privacy in the context of Mobile Web services. While when developing 
these protocols we have addressed other security concerns such as confidentiality, 
integrity, and non-repudiation, it is by no mean comprehensive and other impor- 
tant security threats such as denial of service and social engineering were not 
considered in details. The protocols developed are considered suitable for many 
applications, such as M-Commerce, and health care however more testing is rec- 
ommended before deploying in real applications; as they have not been tested in 
real systems. 
There have been many proposals and formalisms on how to design crypto- 
graphic protocols, although sometimes useful, these formalisms do not of them- 
selves suggest design rules and hence they are not directly beneficial in preventing 
trouble [10]. since the aim of this work was mainly to demonstrate the possibil- 
ities of integrating Mobile and Web services systems and how can this improve 
security; we have found the methodology and the design principles presented 
in "Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols" [10] by Martin 
Abadi and Roger Needham are the most suitable for our purposes. The following 
is a summary of main principles from [10] related to our designs: 
Principle 1 Every message should say what it means; the interpretation of the 
message should depend only on its content. It should be possible to write 
down a straightforward English sentence describing the content though if 
there is a suitable formalism available that is good too. In other words, the 
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messages in the protocols only depend on the information presented in the 
protocol or already in the possession of the recipient. 
Principle 2 The conditions for a message to be acted upon should be clearly set 
out so that someone reviewing a design may see whether they are acceptable 
or not. 
Principle 3 If the identity of an entity or a principal is essential to the meaning 
of a message, it is prudent to mention the principal's name explicitly in 
the message. This principle is of greater importance in our proposed secu- 
rity protocols, as there are general assumptions associated with the various 
entities or principals for example the Mobile Operator is always a trusted 
entity or that the Mobile Device has limited capability in terms or memory 
storage or computing power. For that reason we used naming notation that 
distinguishes each entity for the others. 
Principle 4 Be clear about why encryption is being done. Encryption is not 
wholly cheap, and not asking precisely why it is being done can lead to 
redundancy. Encryption is not synonymous with security, and its improper 
use can lead to errors. 
Principle 5 When a principal signs material that has already been encrypted, it 
should not be inferred that the principal knows the content of the message. 
On the other hand, it is proper to infer that the principal that signs a 
message and then encrypts it for privacy knows the content of the message. 
Principle 6 Be clear what properties you are assuming about nonces. What may 
do for ensuring temporal succession may not do for ensuring association and 
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perhaps association is best established by other means. This is also true 
when using random numbers or timestamps. 
Principle 7 If timestamps are used as freshness guarantees by reference to ab- 
solute time, then the difference between local clocks at various machines 
must be much less than the allowable age of a message deemed to be valid. 
Principle 8 The protocol designer should know which trust relations his pro- 
tocol depends on, and why the dependence is necessary. The reasons for 
particular trust relations being acceptable should be explicit though they 
will be founded on judgment and policy rather than on logic. 
1.4 Protocols Security threat Analysis 
While it is a matter of current research to devise a satisfactory list of properties 
for defining secure protocols in the context of modern distributed networks, all 
of these properties implicitly assume the existence of a malicious entity, who can 
monitor and effect the network traffic. While history tells us that security was 
already an important issue in ancient times [1], now in this digital age the problem 
is on much bigger scale. 
The vast majority of security protocols for computer networks are based on 
cryptography. These are sequences of messages, possibly encrypted, exchanged 
between different entities in order to make their subsequent communication se- 
cure. Messages include entity names, cryptographic keys, random numbers, 
timestamps, concatenations of those components and ciphertexts obtained from 
them. Each protocol attempts to achieve certain goals at the time of its comple- 
tion, namely the set of properties that define security. 
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In the following subsections we list the main categories of possible security 
threats. 
1.4.1 Entities Security 
It is assumed at the start of any proposed protocol that all devices used in the 
system are free from any malicious programs such as viruses or back-doors (unless 
specified). Since the beginning of computer networks viruses and other malicious 
programs have been developed to exploit these network entities or network de- 
vices. There are many techniques to attack such device. Such techniques includes; 
infecting network devices with viroses, modifying or stopping certain softwares 
from behaving properly, installing worms to spread viruses, installing trojan horse 
and back-doors to monitor device activities and open protected ports [121. 
This is not different in mobile phones. Most current generation of mobile 
phones have the ability to download `code' such as ring tones, personal organiser, 
or a game. This code needs to interact with the device operational system to 
execute it; if someone can hide a virus inside these codes it can easily infect such 
devices [13]. The subject of entities security is out of the scope of this Thesis. 
1.4.2 Communication Security 
Because of the nature of the protocol security design, communication security 
analysis is very important, and most of the security analysis of the proposed 
protocols in this Thesis is based on communication security. There are two types 
of communication attacks: passive attacks and active attacks. 
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Passive attack 
In this type of attack the attacker is just monitoring the network traffic using 
techniques such as footprinting and scanning [12]. The main aim of passive 
attacks is to gather information. Sometimes, this information is very valuable by 
itself (for example just knowing that A is talking to B could be of significance). 
Alternatively, the information can be used later to launch active attack. 
Passive attacks are very hard to protect against. This is made even harder 
in mobile networks where most of the network traffic is travelling on air, easy for 
anyone to intercept. 
Passive attacks are of major concerns when trying to protect user privacy. An 
attacker capable of monitoring network traffic could compromise the user's pri- 
vacy. Digital cryptography plays important part to protect against such attacks. 
Some data, however, (e. g. packet headers) can't be encrypted for routing reasons 
and other techniques must be used to protect user privacy, such as changing the 
user identity. 
Active attack 
There is a wide range of attacks that can be classified as active attacks, varying 
from guessing a password, replay attack, denial of service, and many others [12). 
In active attacks, the attacker will `actively' interact with the system to expose 
its weaknesses or to cause some damage. Different types of attacks have different 
level of risks depending on the system and/or the application of concern, therefore 
it is important when developing/reviewing security requirements that they are 
aligned with the system or the application main objectives. 
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In this Thesis the focus is on security of communication protocols, prevention 
or limitation of attacks that could compromise authentication, confidentiality, 
and integrity of the system in addition to improving user privacy. There are 
many techniques to compromise weaknesses in security protocols, some if the 
common techniques includes: 
Security Keys One of the biggest challenge of any security protocols is the man- 
agement of security keys, from keeping these keys secret to key distribution 
of symmetric keys. Also to make sure that keys are not used after their 
lifetime. 
Mutual Authentication This is when only one entity is required to authenti- 
cated itself to the other entity, though it is not a requirement by itself in 
many communication protocol, many serious attacks exploit this property 
that exist in many protocols such as the "false base station attack" in GSM 
networks [141. 
Timestamps and other nonces In appropriate use of timestamps and nonces 
such as sequence numbers can exploit the system to replay attacks. 
Security Algorithms Some serious security attacks exploit some weaknesses in 
security algorithms that are used in the various cryptographic operations. 
Care must be taken on selecting which algorithm to be used when developing 
security solution. Though the issue of security algorithm is an important 
one, it is out of the scop of this thesis, and only few references will be 
mentioned on this topic. 
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1.4.3 Privacy Considerations 
The scope of digital privacy is very big, and it is a very difficult challenge to 
protect against all possibilities. For example for some users all what they care 
about is that none knows their financial data. Other users may not want to reveal 
their true identity online, and in more special cases such as in the military they 
may not want anyone to know that they are having a communication at all. 
There are different levels of privacy protection, Garg and Wilkes [15] have 
classified privacy into four categories as follows: 
Level 0: None No privacy security enabled, anyone with proper monitoring 
equipment could monitor the communication. 
Level 1: Equivalent to wireline Here some level of protection is available and 
is harder to launch than level 0, such as using simple username/passowrd 
protection. 
Level 2: Commercially secure The need for privacy in such application is 
obvious and cryptography is very likely to be used to protect the confiden- 
tiality of such communications, at level 2 more sophisticated cryptographic 
techniques would be used to protect the data privacy and also the use of 
some privacy protection protocol such as P3P. 
Level 3: Military and governments secure The highest level of possible pri- 
vacy and security protection, because of the sensitivity of information in 
such applications. 
The main issue in digital privacy is that in many cases it works against se- 
curity. A common example could be in healthcare, in a scenario where a user 
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would like to access his healthcare records online. In this case the user needs to 
give his true identity to the healthcare authentication server to obtain a user- 
name/passowrd to access the system. Even though this action was meant to 
provide only the user with secure authentication, the fact that he gives his de- 
tails online and these security credentials are stored in a remote server bring a 
risk to his privacy. 
One of the most common techniques to exploit user privacy is by monitor- 
ing user's `identity'. As mentioned earlier in distributed network environments 
(e. g. Web services environment) protecting user privacy is not easy, therefore 
guaranteeing identity pseudonymity, such that the identity does not include any 
personally identifying information is a desirable property. Though total `unlinka- 
bility' may be feasible in theory it may not be possible (or desirable) in practice. 
Protecting personal information is harder to do if for example the user expecting 
physical goods as the user address is required, in the other hand this could be 
possible when providing goods in digital format. 
1.5 Summary 
There is a clear need to protect digital communications. This is usually achieved 
through secure communication protocols. In this chapter we listed the main 
definitions and terminologies used in this Thesis and reviewed key cryptographic 
technologies. A list of assumptions with core design principles were presented 
which are used throughout the thesis, and finally a an overview of protocol threat 
analysis and security consideration for Web services were given. 
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Web Services Security 
2.1 Introduction 
Web Services were developed to improve the functionalities of web applications by 
providing seamless integration of systems and services and an increased number 
of service options. Web Services gained a lot of momentum since the term was 
introduced in 2000. Many software vendors have started to produce various Web 
services products, each with their own adopted definition of what is meant by the 
term Web Service. Currently the most adopted definition is the one defined by 
the Web Service Architecture working group of the World Wide Web Consortium 
[161: "A Web Service is a software system designed to support interpretable 
machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in 
a machine processable format specifically WSDL. Other systems interact with 
the Web Service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, 
typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with 
other Web-related standards". 
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To a business person, Web Service is mainly about integration; integrating 
application functionality within an organization or integrating applications be- 
tween business partners. From a technical perspective Web services is trying to 
address the fundamental challenge of distributed computing. A Web Service is 
nothing more than a collection of one or more related operations that are acces- 
sible over a network and are described by a Service description. What is new in 
Web services is that they combine the loosely coupled component-based approach 
to software development using open standards to achieve ubiquitously deployed 
infrastructure capabilities. 
The industry is embracing and implementing the Web services model mainly 
to reduce cost, ensure compliance, and increase security. However, this will never 
be realized unless they are proven to be reliable, available and have the appro- 
priate level of security. 
As the Internet has developed into an internationally accepted basis for e- 
commerce it has seen an evolution of security practices and challenges [17]. This 
accounts for the exponential growth of hackers, virus developer, and others types 
of attacks. Web services uses web technologies, which results in the fact that 
many of the potential attacks against web sites are of concern for web services. 
The security issues that apply to the Web Services are similar to those in 
other technology solutions and systems; the main difference is that in the Web 
services organizations must focus on building secure application from ground up 
to protect their data in storage and transit. This chapter looks at the building 
blocks of Web services and the main technologies and standards used to secure 
Web services. 
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2.2 Web Services Basics 
The concepts behind Web services are complex [18], and many people disagree 
about what Web services are and what they mean to the computing industry. 
However most agree that a Web Service is any piece of software that makes 
itself available over the Internet and uses a standardized XML messaging system. 
Because all communication is in XML, Web services are not tied to any one 
operating system or programming language. Another definition of Web services 
[19] is: "Web services are self-contained, self-describing XML based software 
components, they provide architecture for distributed loosely coupled services 
that can be published, located and invoked remotely over Internet protocols, by 
services clients written in a different language". 
Web services is built using four building blocks; XML, SOAP, UDDI, and 
WSDL. The following subsections look at these building blocks. 
2.2.1 XML 
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) was defined by the W3C as an open stan- 
dard technology, and it became W3C Recommendation in 1998. XML defines 
a standard way to structure information for describing, storing and exchanging 
data via Web services. There are no predefined semantics and because of that the 
definition of data must be agreed in advance between the communicating parties. 
The XML specifications defined by the W3C in [20] specify the XML syntax 
that all XML documents must follows. These documents that follows the correct 
syntax are known as well formed XML documents. An XML document optionally 
can reference another document that defines the XML document structure (known 
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as Document Type Definition (DTD) or Schema), if the XML document adheres 
to the structure defined in the DTD/Schema then the XML document becomes 
valid. 
Web services uses XML. The following is a set of XML technologies that are 
the foundation of Web services [16]: 
. 
XML Instances: the rules for creating syntactically correct XML docu- 
ments. 
41 XML Schema: a standard that enables detailed validation of XML docu- 
ments as well as the specification of XML datatypes. 
" 
XML Namespaces: definitions of the mechanisms for combining XML from 
multiple sources in a single document. 
9 XML processing: the core architecture and mechanisms of creating, parsing, 
and manipulating XML documents from programming languages as well as 
mapping Java data structures to XML. 
Note: the above axe not only XML technologies exist, other technologies such 
as XPointer/Xlink, Resource Definition Framework, XPath are less relevant to 
Web services and was not introduced. Other technologies such as XML Signature 
and XML Encryption will be discussed in more details later on. 
2.2.2 SOAP 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is one of the most common standards 
used to deliver Web services. Initially developed by representatives from De- 
velopMentor, Userland Software and Microsoft [18], now SOAP 1.2 is a W3C 
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Recommendation [21]. SOAP was created as a way to transport XML from one 
computer to another via a number of standard transport protocols. SOAP is de- 
fined using XML, and it provides a simple consistent and extensible mechanism 
that allows one application to send an XML message to another. 
SOAP provides ail envelope into which an XML message is placed. This en- 
velope is just a container to hold XML data. the idea is for SOAP to create 
a uniform container that can then he carried by a variety of transports. The 
SOAP model separates between infrastructure processing and application pro- 
cessing [22]. Figure 2.1 shows the basic structure of a SOAP message. 
Figure 2.1: Basic SOAP structure 
The SOAP envelope contains: 
" 
SOAP Header: contains information about the SOAP message. This infor- 
mation is used to manage or secure the package. 
" 
SOAP Body: contains the message payload. This information is being sent 
29 
2.2 Web Services Basics 
from one application to another. It could be a full document or a description 
of remote procedure call information. 
SOAP is very important as it is the industry standard for cross platform XML 
distributed computing, providing: 
is A mechanism for defining the unit of communication. 
9A processing model. 
"A mechanism for error handling. 
" 
An extensibility model. 
"A flexible mechanism for data representation. 
9A protocol binding framework. 
2.2.3 WSDL 
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) defines a standard way to de- 
scribe and publish the format and protocols of Web Services; The WSDL defines 
what the input and output structure will be for a Web services, and that will 
define what is expected to see in the payload. WSDL is used to describe the 
message syntax associated with the invocation and response of a Web Service. 
WSDL is a W3C Note since March 2001 [23]. WSDL description describes three 
fundamental properties of a Web Service [16]: 
" 
What a Service does: the operations the Service provides, and the data 
needed to invoke them. 
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9 How a Service is accessed: details of the data formats and protocols neces- 
sary to access the Service's operations. 
. 
There a services is located: details of the protocol specific network address, 
such as URL. 
WSDL is defined in XML. The WSDL schema defines several major elements 
in the language: 
9 portType: A Web Service's abstract interface definition where each child 
operation element defines an abstract method signature. 
. message: Defines the format of the message, or a set of parameters referred 
to by the method signatures. 
" types: Defines the collection of all the datatypes used in the Web services 
as referenced by various message part elements. 
. 
binding: Contains details of how the elements in an abstract interface are 
converted into a concrete representation in a particular combination of data 
formats and protocols 
9 prot: Expresses how a binding is deployed at a particular network endpoint. 
" 
Service: A named collection of ports. 
2.2.4 UDDI 
The Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) enables developers 
and businesses to publish and locate Web services on the network. It stores 
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WSDL files which define Web services interfaces by defining and implementing a 
registry for finding Web services. This Web services registry is communicated by 
SOAP and is intended to act as a search engine for services. Web services will use 
UDDI to publish services and the Web Service client will use the UDDI registry 
to obtain location, description and binding information from WSDL files stored 
in the registry. The purpose of UDDI is to facilitate Service discovery both at 
design time and dynamically at runtime. UDDI version 3 became an OASIS 
Standard in February 2005 [24]. 
There are two primary types of UDDI registries: public and private. The 
public registry is referred to as the UDDI Business Registry (UBR). The private 
registry is more widely used and usually has a specific purpose. 
2.2.5 Web Services Driving Committees 
There is a wide diversification in the businesses and technical committees that 
are driving standards for Web services. In fact one of the main reasons for the 
success of Web services is the joint effort from the business and technical world 
to standardize Web services. The following is a list with the main organizations 
and committees: 
" W3C: The World Wide Web Consortium. Its main goals are to provide 
standards that keep the Internet accessible, easy to use, secure, innova- 
tive, and to encourage the expansion and increase of creativity in web site 
development. (www. w3c. org) 
" 
IETF: The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a large open interna- 
tional community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers 
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concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth 
operation of the Internet (www. ietf. org) 
" 
OASIS-Open. org: The Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards is a non-profitable global consortium dedicated to 
web standard. WS-Security is an OASIS standard. 
" 
WebServices. org: An organization that was formed to gather information 
regarding Web services, and is dedicated to provide these information in an 
organized, unbiased manner. (www. webservice. org) 
. 
Web Services Architect: An organization that is dedicated to gather infor- 
mation about Web services. They provide technical reports specifically re- 
garding the architecture that supports web services. (www. webservicesarchitect. com) 
2.3 Web Service Security Basics 
No new technologies were invented to secure Web services. Instead, existing 
security technologies were proposed to be applied for message level security [211. 
This section analysis the main technologies used to secure Web services systems. 
2.3.1 XML Digital Signature 
Digital Signature provides the key functionality needed to promote the trusted 
exchange of data between web services. The specifications for digital signature in 
the XML environment were developed by a joint project between the W3C and 
the IETF [25]. XML Signature is a core foundation for Web services security and 
it was built on top of digital signature technology. 
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The ability to digitally sign a document is not a new concept and many 
methodologies can be used to apply digital signatures to a whole XML document 
such as RSA Public Key Cryptography Standard. However, what XML digital 
signature specifications allow is the ability to sign only specific portions of a 
document and to be able to attach multiple signatures that apply to different 
portions of the same XML document. 
In XML signature the signature is not directly applied to the original or the 
digest form of the data. Instead the digital content or contents to be signed are 
first digested and placed in an XML element. This element is then digested and 
cryptographically signed. 
The digital signature is represented in XML and is identified by the root 
<Signature> element. There are four ways of relating the data objects and their 
XML signature: 
" 
Enveloping signature: the data object is embedded within the XML signa- 
ture, and the <Signature> element becomes the parent of the local data 
object. 
" 
Enveloped signature: the data object embeds the XML signature within 
itself, and the <Signature> element becomes the child of the original data 
object. 
" 
Detached signature: the data object resides within the same XML document 
containing the XML signature. The <Signature> element is a sibling of the 
original data object. 
9 Detached signature and external reference: the data object resides external 
to the document containing the XML signature The <Signature> element 
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carries a reference to the external original data object [17,25]. 
Issues with XML signature 
One issue with digital signature in general is that both the signature and the val- 
idation must occur on the same bits. The validation of a simple ASCII text could 
fail because for example there are three different end-of-line sequences. If the line 
ending sequence of the signed text changes form the one convention to another, 
the validation would fail. The XML Signature working group has recommended 
three specific principles when using Transforms with XML Signature: 
" 
Only What Is Signed Is Secure 
" 
Only What Is Seen Should be Signed 
. 
See What Is Signed 
As the original data may change after the signature has been created, and 
the `old' signature may still be valid. In addition, the generation of an XML 
signature involves many processing steps and many algorithms. The strength 
of a signature depends on the weakest among the chain of the processing steps. 
There are possibilities to introduce unplanned behaviour of algorithms, such as 
excessive memory requirements by passing wrong parameters, which could be a 
major issue in mobile web services applications where mobile devices used could 
have limited memory capabilities [25]. 
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2.3.2 XML Encryption 
XML Encryption was developed by the W3C XML Encryption work group [26] 
to define a standard mechanism for encrypting XML entities. 
The main goal of XML Encryption is to ensure end-to-end confidentiality 
of messages. XML Encryption allows for different parts of a document to be 
encrypted with different keys and therefore to be seen by different recipients. 
One of the main goals to develop XML Encryption was to be able to encrypt 
specific parts of a document. Another goal was to apply multiple encryptions to 
different parts of the same document. 
Additional important part of the XML encryption specifications was the XML 
representation of encrypted data. This is specially important for web services as 
WS standard protocols such as SOAP and WSDL are based on their use of XML 
format and therefore it was important to represent the encrypted content in XML 
format. The encrypted data in XML format is identified by an <EncryptedData> 
element or by an <EncryptedKey> element. The <EncryptedData> element is 
used to represent any encrypted content other than the encryption key, which is 
represented by the <EncryptedKey> element. 
Issues and security considerations with XML Encryption 
It is possible to introduce cryptographic vulnerabilities when combining XML 
encryption and signatures, this is because the digest value of the encrypted 
signed document will still appear in clear text in a<... : Reference> child of the 
<...: Signature> element, which may reveal information over encryption data [17]. 
Furthermore, the XML Encryption specifications permits recursive process- 
ing. For example an EncryptedKey may depend on another EncryptedKey, which 
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in turn may depend on another EncryptedKey and so on. That could lead to a 
denial of Service vulnerability. 
2.3.3 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is the XML based security standard created to enable portable identities 
and the assertion of these identities. SAML is used to exchange authentication 
and authorization credentials across different security domains. Because SAML 
is XML-based it is not tied to any transport protocol or platform, also it is not 
dependent on any central certificate authority to issue certificates and this is very 
important in web services environment. 
SAML V1.0 became an OASIS standard in November 2002. SAML V1.1 fol- 
lowed in September 2003 and has seen significant success, gaining momentum in 
financial services, higher education, government, and other industry segments. 
SAML has been broadly implemented by all major Web access management ven- 
dors. SAML support also appears in major application server products and is 
commonly found among Web services management and security vendors. SAML 
V2.0 builds on that success. 
SAML V2.0 unifies the building blocks of federated identity in SAML V1.1, 
and was developed by the Security Services Technical Committee of OASIS. The 
SAML V2.0 OASIS Standard specification set was approved on 15 March 2005 
[27]. 
A more detailed description of SAML including its main components, the 
motivation behind SAML, and some design issues will be discussed in chapter 
five when dealing with federated environment. 
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2.4 WS-Security 
In April 2002 three software giants; Microsoft, IBM, and VeriSign submitted a 
proposal for Web Services Security Roadmap [28] to OASIS; since then the OASIS 
Web Services Security Technical Committee have used this Roadmap to define a 
specification for WS-Security and to form the necessary technical foundation for 
higher level security services. 
WS-Security is an overarching conceptual model that abstracts different se- 
curity technologies into "claims" and "tokens". The WS-Security standard is 
a specification specifically created for using various security technologies in the 
context of a SOAP message [22]. 
Developed by OASIS, WS-Security defines a SOAP extensions providing qual- 
ity of protection through message integrity, message confidentiality, and message 
authentication [29]. WS-Security targets the problem of securing the Web Service 
message itself; this is different for example than SSL/TLS which creates a secure 
pipe between two servers though which messages travel. 
WS-Security mechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of secu- 
rity models and encryption technologies. The WS-Security mechanisms provides 
a general mechanism for associating security tokens with messages. The specifi- 
cation does not require a specific type of security token. It is designed to support 
multiple security token formats. WS-Security describes how to encode binary 
security tokens. The specification describes how to encode X. 509 certificates and 
Kerberos tickets. Additionally, it also describes how to include opaque encrypted 
keys. The WS-Security specification defines an end to end security framework 
that provides support for intermediary security processing. Message integrity 
38 
2.4 WS-Security 
is provided using XML Signature in conjunction with security tokens to ensure 
that messages are transmitted without modifications. The integrity mechanisms 
can support multiple signatures, possibly by multiple actors. The techniques 
are extensible such that they can support additional signature formats. Message 
confidentiality is granted by using XML Encryption in conjunction with security 
tokens to keep portions of SOAP messages confidential. The encryption mecha- 
nisms can support operations by multiple actors. 
WS-Security is a foundational technology for a set of follow-on Web services 
security standards [22]: 
. 
WS-Policy: Defines how to express capability and constraints of security 
policy 
" 
WS-Trust: Describes the model for establishing both direct and broker 
trust relationships. 
" 
WS-Privacy: Enables users to state privacy preferences and Web services 
to state privacy preferences and Web services to state and implement pri- 
vacy practices 
. 
WS-SecureConversation: Describe how to manage and authenticate 
message exchanges between parties 
" 
WS-Federation: Describe how to manage and broker the trust relation- 
ships in a heterogenous federated environment. 
" WS-Authorization: Defines how Web Services manage authorization data 
and policies. 
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Figure 2.2 shows the Web Service security framework. WS-Security defines 
a SOAP security header that provide a common format for security in a SOAP 
message. There are three major elements make up a SOAP security header: 
security tokens, XML Encryption, and XML Signature. 
Figure 2.2: The Web Service security framework 
The security tokens are pieces of information used for authentication or au- 
thorization. The current standard is WS-Security 1.1 [29] which consists of seven 
documents: item WS-Security Core Specification 1.1, Usernarne Token Profile 
1.1, X. 509 Token Profile 1.1, SAML Token Profile 1.1, Kerberos Token Profile 
1.1, Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile 1.1, and SOAP with at- 
tachments (SWA) Profile I. I. 
2.5 Security considerations for Web Services 
A Web service can be defined as a middleware that uses the web infrastructure. 
It integrates applications inside and outside the organization. Distributed com- 
puting has always had a challenging set of security issues. 
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There axe many security challenges for adopting Web services. At the highest 
level, the objective is to create an environment, where message level transactions 
and business processes can be conducted securely in an end-to-end fashion. There 
is a need to ensure that messages are secured during transit, with or without the 
presence of intermediaries. Also there could be a need to ensure the security of 
the data in storage. The requirements for providing end-to-end security for Web 
services are summarized in the following subsections. 
2.5.1 Authentication Mechanisms 
Authentication is needed in order to verify the identities of the requester and 
provider agents. In some cases, the use of mutual authentication may be needed 
(as highlighted in the active attacks section) since the participants may not nec- 
essarily be directly connected. For example the participants might be the ini- 
tial requester and an intermediary. Depending on the security policy it may 
be possible to authenticate the requester, the receiver or to mandate the use of 
mutual authentication. Several methods can be used to authenticate services. 
Techniques include: passwords, one time pass and certificates. Password-based 
authentication must use strong passwords. Password authentication alone may 
be insufficient. Based on vulnerability assessment it may be necessary to com- 
bine password authentication with other authentication and authorization process 
such as certificates, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [4] (in later chapters we 
proposed novel mechanisms based on GSM/UMTS security). 
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2.5.2 Authorization 
Authorization is needed in order to control access to resources. Once authen- 
ticated, authorization mechanisms control the requester access to appropriate 
system resources. There should be controlled access to systems and their com- 
ponents. Policy determines the access rights of a requester. The principle of the 
least privileged access should be used when access rights are given to a requester. 
2.5.3 Data Integrity and Data Confidentiality 
Data integrity techniques ensure that information has not been altered, or mod- 
ified during transmission without detection. Data confidentiality ensures that 
the data is only accessible by the intended parties. Data encryption and digi- 
tal signature techniques can be used for this purpose. Confidentiality protection 
techniques plays important roles in assisting to protect user privacy. 
2.5.4 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation is a security service that protects a party to a transaction against 
false denial of the occurrence of that transaction by another party. Non-repudiation 
technologies provide evidence about the occurrence of transactions that that may 
be used by a third party to resolve disagreement. The same techniques could be 
used to protect against reply attacks. 
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2.5.5 End-to-End Integrity and Confidentiality of Mes- 
sages 
The integrity and confidentiality of messages must be ensured even in the presence 
of intermediaries and may be even when the data is in storage. 
2.6 Summary 
Web Service play an important part in the development and integration of ad- 
vanced electronic solutions. In this chapter we introduced the importance of Web 
services and briefly described the main building blocks of a Web Service. 
One of the core part for the success of any Web Service system is security. 
In this chapter we reviewed the main security technologies used to secure Web 
services such as XML Encryption and XML Signature among others. We also 
looked at WS-Security which the standard and the foundation for securing Web 
services. 
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Mobile Network Security 
3.1 Introduction 
The growth of the mobile telecommunication system industry in the last 15 years 
has been extraordinary, and it does not look like that this growth will stop soon. 
Having said that, the development of the mobile telecommunication system is not 
without its challenges. Other than the communication engineering issues (e. g. 
sending and receiving of calls and data) there have been two main challenges to 
the telecommunication industry: the privacy of the conversation and the billing 
accuracy [15]. 
Many mobile phones available today have enough memory and process power 
to be able to access the Internet. Having said that, mobile phones are restricted 
with their screen display area and the network link is considerably slower and more 
expensive than that available to a user of the fixed Internet. As the number of 
people owning such devices increases an entire industry is developing the concept 
of mobile commerce or M-Commerce. 
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Mobile commerce is currently mainly used for the sale of simple `Value Added 
Services' (VAS) such as: mobile phone ring-tones and games, although as 3G/UMTS 
services roll out it is increasingly used to enable payment for location-based ser- 
vices such as maps, as well as video and audio content. 
Financial Institutions such as banks see mobile commerce as offering new 
channels of service to customers as well as offering them new and innovative 
products. These financial institutions are working to design and implement new 
applications that will offer mobile payment and mobile brokering. The travel in- 
dustry, realizing the possible benefits of m-commerce, is working on technologies 
that will take care of travel arrangements, update customers on flight status, no- 
tify them when this information changes and will offer to make new arrangements 
based on preset user preferences requiring no input from the user. 
This chapter reviews in some detail the security mechanisms of popular mobile 
telecom systems, namely the GSM and the UMTS systems; and highlight some 
of their security issues. In later chapters we examine the integration of these 
systems in the Web services environment. 
Since many of the mobile phones used are based on the General System 
for Mobile communications (GSM) [30], users can take advantages of some of 
the unique security features of the GSM system, in particular the use of the 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The following sections in this chapter will 
look into related security features in more details. 
The main idea behind the GSM specification was to define several open inter- 
faces, which determine the standardized components of the GSM system [31]. The 
great difference between 1G and 2G is the presence of a data transfer possibility; 
basic GSM offers 9.6 kb/s symmetric data connection between the network and 
45 
3.1 Introduction 
the terminal. However; this was still slow and various modules and specifications 
were developed to increase the data transfer rate, in which saw the evolution of 
GSM to The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). 
During the migration path from GSM to UMTS, an intermediate phase is 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), also known as 2.5G technology. In GPRS, 
the existing GSM Radio Access Network (RAN) is augmented with packet-switching 
capabilities for data services, and a new packet-switched core network (PS-CN) 
is added in parallel to the legacy circuit-switched core network (CS-CN) to carry 
data traffic. This GSM/GPRS RAN, the PS-CN are later on connected to the 
new UMTS RAN (UTRAN) which is based on WCDMA (Wide Code Division 
Multiple Access). 
Because in wireless network data travels in air anyone can capture this data 
weather it is a voice or other type of data. To protect the security and privacy 
of any wireless system there is a set of requirements that should be considered 
when designing such systems [15]: 
" 
Privacy requirements: includes the privacy of the call setup information 
(e. g. calling number or service requested), privacy of speech, privacy öf 
data, privacy of user identification, privacy of calling patterns and privacy 
of user location. 
" 
Theft resistance requirement: this covers issues such as clone resistant de- 
sign, installation and repair fraud, and unique user ID. 
" 
Radio system requirements: because of the nature of mobile system they 
are subject to; multi-path fading, interference, jamming and various handoff 
issues. 
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9 Physical requirements: such as equipment installation, cabling, physical 
access to servers and control system. 
" 
Software requirements: this include general software updates, security patches, 
and optimization and control software. 
" 
Law enforcement requirements: different countries have different set of tele- 
com enforcement requirement, such that operators must record some calls 
for sometime, sharing of information, privacy policy, and the cryptographic 
algorithm used. 
3.2 The General System for Mobile communi- 
cations 
The General System for Mobile communications (GSM) dates back to 1982 when 
the Group Special Mobile was established within the European Conference Post 
and Telecommunication Administrations, Now GSM has over one billion sub- 
scribers world wide and still expanding [32]. In this section we review the GSM 
architecture focusing on the security features provided by the GSM system, and 
highlight some of the main security challenges of the system. 
3.2.1 Overview of the GSM Architecture 
The GSM Architecture consists of subsystems which are required to support 
the services and functionality of the GSM system. The basic subsystem are: 
Base Station subsystem (BSS), Network and Switching Subsystem (NSS), and 
Operational Subsystem (OSS) [15]. 
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The BSS manages and provides transmission paths between the mobile sta- 
tions (MSs) and the NSS. The NSS has the responsibility of managing communi- 
cations and connecting MSs. The OSS is a service provider to control the MSs, 
BSS, and NSS. The following subsections provide more information about the 
GSM subsystem entities. 
Mobile Station 
Mobile Station (MS), also known as User Equipment (UE), allows the subscriber 
to access the GSM network. The MS consists of two parts: the device which 
contain both the hardware and the software of the MS, and the Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) which contains terminal/user-specific data which act as a smart 
care. The SIM is issued by the Network Operator after subscription. 
Each MS has some unique identities, such as the International Mobile Equip- 
ment Identity (IMEI) and the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). 
The IMSI is set inside the SIM. 
Network and Switching Subsystem 
The Network and Switching Subsystem (NSS) is the main switching that provide 
a function of the GSM network. It manages the communication between the GSM 
and other network users. The NSS contains two sets of subscribers databases; 
the Home Location Register (HLR) and the Visitor Location Register (VLR). 
Also in the NSS is the Authentication Center (AuC) and the Equipment Identity 
Register (EIR) which are key to the system security. 
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3.2.2 GSM security features 
One of the main contributors to the success of GSM was a very good set of 
security features. The main security features which can be found in [5] are: 
9 Subscriber identity confidentiality. 
. 
Subscriber identity authentication. 
" 
User data confidentiality on physical connections. 
" 
Connectionless user data confidentiality. 
" 
Signalling information element confidentiality. 
The GSM security provides three main mechanisms; a cryptographic authen- 
tication to verify subscription using challenge/response authentication protocol; 
radio interface encryption to prevent eavesdropping using symmetric stream ci- 
pher; and helps to provide user anonymity by allocation and use of temporary 
identities. 
As it was mentioned the GSM subscriber is uniquely identified by the IMSI, 
also each subscriber holds authentication key K,, which is kept securely in the 
SIM. The AuC also has a copy of K;. The concept of the GSM authentication 
and encryption schemes is that this sensitive information is never transmitted over 
the radio channel. The following sections describe each of the security features 
of the GSM system. 
Only the subscriber identity confidentiality and the subscriber identity au- 
thentication are described because of their relevance to our research. Good de- 
scription of the other features can be found in [5]. 
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Subscriber identity (IMSI) confidentiality 
The aim of this function is to protect the identity of the subscriber from intercep- 
tor of the mobile traffic. Therefore, the IMSI should not be transmitted in clear 
text. To achieve this, the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) was 
developed to identify the subscriber over the radio path. The TMSI is updated 
frequently (at every location update). 
Subscriber identity (IMSI) authentication 
The GSM network authenticates the identity of the user (IMSI or TMSI) using 
a challenge-response mechanism, which is performed in the following steps, and 
presented in Figure 3.1: 
1. A 128 bit random number (RAND) is sent to the MS. 
2. The MS computes the 32-bit signed response (SRES), based on the en- 
cryption of the RAND using the authentication algorithm (A3) using the 
subscriber authentication key K. 
SRES=A3K; (RAND) 
Where A3K(X), refers to the output of the algorithm A3 using input key K 
and input data X. At the same time, the MS computes the encryption key 
KK using the A8 algorithm such that: 
KC=A8Ki (RAND) 
3. The MS sends SRES to the GSM network. 
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4. The network operator repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the 
subscriber. 
GSM Authentication and Session 
Key Generation 
HLR/AuC 
MS/SIM RAND 
A3 AS 
A3 AS 
RES 
RES Kc 
Figure 3.1: GSM Authentication and Session Key Generation 
The key Ki is stored in the SIM and in the AuC, therefore Kti will never be 
transmitted. Instead, all the calculations are processed within the SIM. 
3.2.3 GSM security algorithms 
This section gives an overview of the three main security algorithms used in the 
GSM system, namely A3, AS, and A5. 
The Authentication algorithm A3 
The A3 algorithm can be described as one-way hash function that takes two 128 
bits inputs, which are the RAND and the secret key Kti and generates a 32 bits 
output which is the SRES. 
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The most used algorithm among GSM operators is known as COMP128. The 
COMP128 takes the two inputs RAND and KK, and generate a 128-bit output. 
The SRES is formed from the first 32 bits of the 128 bits. 
The Ciphering key generating algorithm A8 
GSM uses the A8 algorithm to generate the session key K. The A8 takes two 
inputs and generates an output which is the 64-bit & In practice COMP128 
is used to generate both the SRES response and the K,. As stated above, the 
SRES is formed from the first 32 bits of the 128-bit output. The session key K, 
is formed of the last 54 bits of the 128-bit output with ten zero bits appended to 
complete the 64-bit key. 
Though the key length is 64 bits they key space is effectively 54 bits, which 
arguably reduces the strength of the key. Both the A8 and the A3 algorithms are 
stored in the SIM. 
The Ciphering Algorithm A5 
The A5 is an encryption algorithm, which works in three modes, the unencrypted 
mode A5/0, and the A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms to secure the data. Both the A5/1 
and A5/2 are considered to be fairly weak. This has led to the development of 
the A5/3 [81 by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP. 
3.2.4 Security challenges with GSM 
Though security is one of the main strength of GSM, the system does have some 
security weaknesses. The main security issues are considered in this section. 
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GSM algorithms security consideration 
The following are some of the main issues regarding the Algorithms used in GSM 
security: 
. 
The GSM cipher algorithms are not published as part of the standard, which 
lead to the criticism from the research and the academic communities. 
9 In the COMP-128 algorithm, carefully chosen values for the input RAND 
will provide enough information to determine the KK in relatively small 
number of attempts [33] [34]. 
. 
The way COMP-128 has been implemented, it reduces the key length of 
the ciphering key KK form 64 bits to 54 bits as the 10 least significant bits 
are fixed to zeros; this is a reduction of a factor of 1024. 
The false base station attack 
In the GSM standard only the MS is required to authenticate to the base station 
(BS), the BS is not required to authenticate itself to the MS. This enable an attack 
to accomplish the false BS attack by imitating BS. The attacker would page the 
mobile phone, either using its IMSI or TMSI. If the mobile phone was paged by 
its TMSI, the IMSI can easily be found out by sending the phone the IDENTITY 
REQUEST command (to which the phone must respond at any time). 
Following this, the attacker can keep choosing R. ANDs to exploit the COMP 128 
algorithm flaws and can keep submitting them to the phone via the AUTHENTI- 
CATION REQUEST messages (imitating a legitimate network asking the phone 
to authenticate itself); the phone simply returns the SRES. The attacker could 
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then repeat the authentication requests many times, collecting the SRESes until 
he/she has gained enough information to learn the K. 
Once the K; and IMSI are known the attacker can impersonate that user, 
and make and receive calls in their name. It can also be used to eavesdrop, since 
RANDs from a legitimate network to a legitimate user can be monitored, and 
thus combined with the known Ki can be used to determine the K,, used for the 
encryption. 
There are few other possible attacks resulting from false base station attack, 
which are described well in [141. 
SIM cloning attack 
The GSM SIM card can be cloned [34]; this will lead to two possible scenarios. 
The first is when attacker uses the SIM card pretending to be the legitimate 
user. The second is when the attacker exploits the weakness in the COMP-128 
algorithm to extract the secrete key Ki. 
3.3 The Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System 
As the need to improve the service of 2G/2.5G mobile systems a lot of effort 
was put to develop the Third Generation (3G) of mobile phone systems. The 
main idea behind 3G is to prepare a universal infrastructure able to carry exist- 
ing and also future services [35]. The infrastructure should be designed so that 
technology changes and evolution can be adapted to the network without causing 
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uncertainties in the existing services using the current network structure. Dif- 
ferent parts of the world have adopted different technologies, In Europe 3G has 
become UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System), following the Eu- 
ropean Telecommunications Institute (ETSI) perspective. This is now developed 
by the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP). The 3GPP defined the very first version 
of the European-style UMTS network by the official name 3GPP System Release 
99 [31]. 
A simplified version of the UMTS network architecture is described in Fig- 
ure 3.2, the UTRAN is divided into subsystems, each consisting of one radio 
network controller (RNC) connected to several base transceiver stations (BS). 
The BSs maintain the air interface in the cells, while the RNC controls the radio 
connections with the mobile station and the wired interface to the CN. 
. 
The 
PS-CN embeds several elements: SGSN, GGSN, and multiple information servers. 
The information servers play an important role in the control plane in 2.5G/3G 
networks. The MS (also known as the mobile device MD)embeds two compo- 
nents that are physically and logically distinct: a software/hardware terminal 
(e. g. mobile phone) and a subscriber identity module (SIM), which is a tamper- 
resistant smart card storing a unique identifier and associated secret keys. The 
UMTS SIM (USIM) is capable of internal processing, and cryptographic algo- 
rithms involved in authentication are executed directly on it. The secret keys in 
the USIM are known to the home AuC (located in the core network), and a trust 
relationship is in place between the USIM and the AuC. 
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3.3.1 UMTS Security Threats 
As in GSM one of the big security threats is eavesdropping on the radio link, 
as the USIM is typically associated to a single subscriber, eavesdropping the 
signaling messages may reveal the subscriber's identity and location, which could 
compromising the user privacy beyond the content of the data communication. 
Because of the complex architecture of the UMTS network various possible 
attacks against the network are possible: 
" 
Attacks from the Internet: a successful attack on the Internet element of 
the CN could have big impact on then network. It is possible for a TCP/IP 
attack to be attempted against the MS and/or some internal IP-based ele- 
ment. This could be damaging because: the radio capacity is limited and is 
shared which could effect the services for all MSs in the same cell. Also be- 
cause many UMTS users may be billed per volume, thus unsolicited traffic 
can cause billing problems. 
" 
Attacks on the GGSN: since the terminals communicate with the internal 
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CN elements with IP-based protocol stack. Malicious traffic like intrusion 
attempts from a terminal might aim at crashing or taking control over some 
internal element [36]. 
" 
Distributed DoS (DDoS): that send massive amount of IP packets from the 
terminal side (e. g. TCP SYN), aiming at overloading the network elements 
or other terminal. 
Though the above attacks are possible in practice however, a single misbehav- 
ing MS cannot impose a critical load unless hitting a server loophole or triggering 
a cascade of failures. This is due to the large resource between the CN and the 
MSs, and the limited power of the MS [35]. A possible way for an attacker to 
overcome the issue the limited power of the MS is to group a large pool of MSs 
and attempt a large scale DDoS. The DDoS can be launched using malicious code 
(e. g. viruses, worms), an example of such malicious codes is already exist (e. g. 
Cabir [37] malware, and Mosquito [38] malware). However, its more difficult to 
infect viruses or worms in 3G networks than in the Internet because of: The MSs 
makers present high degree of platform heterogeneity that makes it harder for 
malicious code to spread over a very large set of MSs; users are often charge per 
volume and will take more care when detecting unsolicited activities. 
3.3.2 UMTS security features 
UMTS security model has been built upon the GSM security model, The UMTS 
security features are specified in TS 33.102 [39], which is part of the 3GPP release 
99. 
The UMTS security system consists of various elements each playing a role 
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to achieve the required level of security. These elements are: a mobile station MS 
which contains a removable UMTS-SIM (USIM) which will handle authentication 
and session key establishment at the user side, a Radio Network Control (RNC) 
which is used together with the MS to handle encipherment; in addition the 
network integrity functionality will be located in the RNC, and an AuC in the 
Home Environment (HE) which stores the long-term cryptographic keys of the 
user and will produce authentication information which it forwards to the Visitor 
Location Register (VLR) in the Serving Network (SN). 
As UMTS adopted the GSM security model, there was a need to address the 
security challenges in GSM, such challenges with the cipher algorithm and the 
`false base station attack' [33] which we highlighted in section 2.2.4. The following 
is a summary of these security enhancements [401: 
" 
New integrity mechanism are added to protect critical signalling information 
on the radio interface 
. 
Enhanced authentication protocol provides mutual authentication and fresh- 
ness of cipher/integrity keys 
" 
Stronger algorithm using longer key 
" 
Encryption terminates in the radio network controller rather than the base 
station 
" 
Some protection of signalling between network nodes 
Security in the UMTS network is based on three security principles, which 
are described in some details in the following subsections. The complete list of 
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the UMTS security can be found in [39]. We only review the security features 
relevant to our research. 
3.3.3 Authentication and Key Agreement protocol 
The Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (AKA) performs authentication 
and session key distribution [41] in UMTS networks. The AKA is a challenge 
response mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography. This allows the network 
to authenticate the user and also allows the user to authenticate the network 
(this was not available in GSM). AKA is performed when one the following events 
happen: 
" Registration of a user in a Serving Network. 
9 After a service request. 
" 
Location Update Request. 
9 Attach Request. 
9 Detach request. 
9 Connection re-establishment request. 
There are three main parties communicating in the AKA protocol: the AuC, 
the Visitor Location Register (VLR), and the user Universal Subscriber Identity 
Module (USIM). There is one secret key K which is shared between the AuC and 
the USIM. The AKA operate as follows: 
1. A shared secret K is established beforehand between the SIM and the AuC. 
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2. The AuC produces an authentication vector AV based on the shared secret 
K and a sequence number (SQN). The AV contains RAND, authentication 
token (AUTN), expected response (XRES), integrity key (IK), and confi- 
dentiality key (CK). The AV is then downloaded to a server. 
3. The server creates an authentication request, which contains the RAND 
and AUTN; the authentication request is then delivered to the client. 
4. The client verifies the AUTN with the SIM using its own shared secret K 
and the SQN. If successful the client produces an authentication response 
RES, using the shared secret K and RAND, RES is then delivered to the 
server. 
5. The server compares the client authentication response RES with the ex- 
pected response XRES. If they match, the user has been successfully au- 
thenticated, and the session keys IK and CK can be used for protecting 
further communication between the client and the server. 
In total five one-way functions are used to compute the authentication vector. 
These functions are denoted fl, f 2, f 3, f4 and f5. The first differs from the 
other four in the number of input parameters, taking four input parameters: 
master key K, random number RAND, sequence number (SQN) and, finally, an 
administrative Authentication Management Field (AMF). The other functions (f2 
to f 5) only take K and RAND as inputs. The ETSI have developed a common 
cryptographic core engine to compute fl-f5 [42], the result was the MILENAGE 
framework [43] which is block cipher with 128-bit blocks under control of a 128-bit 
key. The MILENAGE framework is based on the Rijdael block cipher because it 
has good performance on platforms with limited computing resources [42). 
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The Figure 3.3 outlines the main process of the AKA protocol. Note that 
the VLR was omitted from the diagram for simplicity. 
UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement 
HLR/AuC 
MS/SIM RAND, AUT 
3Q algorithms 
3G algorithms 
RES IK CK AUTN RES 
Figure 3.3: Over view of the UMTS AKA protocol 
The AKA protocol is a strong protocol and it has been tested [41], however 
there are few issues with the AKA protocol which include the following: 
" 
Synchronization Failure: this is caused if the client detect that the sequence 
numbers between the client and the server have fallen out of sync. In this 
case, the client needs to produce a synchronization parameter AUTN, using 
the shared secret K and the the client sequence number SQN [39]. 
" 
Securing the SIM: the AKA protocol assumes that the SIM application 
resides in a tamper resistant smart card; as no interfaces is allowed to 
access the long term secret. 
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3.3.4 Integrity In UMTS 
The purpose of integrity protection is to authenticate individual control messages. 
This is important since a separate authentication procedure only assures the iden- 
tities of the communicating parties at the time of authentication. Integrity allows 
the protection of the content of a signaling message from being manipulated. The 
threats against integrity can include: 
" 
Manipulation of transmitted data: Intruders may manipulate data trans- 
mitted over all reachable interfaces. 
" 
Manipulation of stored data: Intruders may manipulate data that are stored 
on the system entities, in the terminal or stored by the USIM. 
" 
Manipulation by masquerading: Intruders may masquerade as a communi- 
cation participants and thereby manipulate data on any interface. 
For various reasons UMTS networks must be able to instruct the MS to use 
an unciphered connection. To protect against man-in-the-middle attack the user 
must be able to verify instruction from the network to establish an unciphered 
connection [33], and this is why integrity should be made mandatory in UMTS. 
The integrity protection in UMTS is implemented between the Radio network 
controller (RNC) and the MS. Therefore, IK must be distributed from the AuC 
to the RNC; The IK is part of an authentication vector which is sent to the VLR 
from the AuC following an authentication data request. To facilitate subsequent 
authentications, up to 5 authentication vectors are sent for each request. The 
IK is sent from the VLR to the RNC as part of a message called security mode 
command. 
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The integrity protection mechanism is based on the concept of a MAC. This 
is a oneway function that is controlled by the secret key IK. The function is 
denoted by f9 [44] and its output is MAC-I: a 32-bit random-looking bit string. 
The MAC-I is appended to each RRC message and is also generated and checked 
at the receiving end. Any change in input parameters are known to influence the 
MAC-I in unpredictable ways [31,45]. This algorithm takes five inputs: 
" The 128 bits integrity key IK. 
9A 32 bits integrity sequence number (COUNT-1). 
"A 32 bits random value generated by the radio network controller (FRESH). 
9A direction identifier (DIRECTION). 
" 
The radio resource control (RRC) signalling message content (MESSAGE). 
The output is a 32-bit message authentication code (MAC-I) computed by the 
sender for data integrity. The MAC-I will then be appended to the RRC message 
when sent over the radio access link. The receiver will verify the message by 
computing the expected MAC-I (XMAC-I) on the message received. 
3.3.5 Confidentiality in UMTS 
The UMTS encryption mechanism is based on a stream cipher concept between 
the MS and the RNC. This is an improvement from the GSM system which only 
encrypted data between the MS and the BS. Confidentiality is very important 
in UMTS as it protect from various threats such as: eavesdropping on user traf- 
fic, signalling or control data on the radio interface; passive traffic analysis, in 
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which intruders may observe the time, rate, length, sources or destinations of 
messages on the radio interface to obtain access to information; or confidentiality 
of authentication data in the USIM. 
The core of the encryption mechanism is the mask generation algorithm that 
is denoted as function f8 [44,45], which is used to encrypt plain text. This block 
cipher transforms 64-bit input to 64-bit output. Transformation is controlled by 
the 128-bit CK which are generated by the AKA procedure [31], The f8 takes five 
inputs: 
. 
The 128 bits cipher key CK. 
"A 32 bits time dependent input COUNT-C. 
" 
The bearer identity BEARER. 
. 
The direction of transmission DIRECTION. 
9 The length of the required key stream LENGTH. 
The output will be the key stream block KEYSTREAM, which is used to 
encrypt the input plaintext block PLAINTEXT to produce the output ciphertext 
block CIPHERTEXT. A ciphering indicator is also present in the MS to indicate 
to the user whether encryption is applied or not. Note that although the use of 
ciphering is highly recommended it is still optional for the UMTS network. 
The 3GPP has defined an algorithm called KASUMI [7], which can be used 
in two different modes, one is the confidentiality mode to construct f8 and the 
other is the integrity mode to construct f9. 
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3.4 Summary 
The growth in M-Commerce is picking up pace very fast; however one of the main 
issues is security. Therefore it make sense to try to see if current security features 
provided by the current mobile network infrastructure can be used in improv- 
ing/developing security solutions for M-Commerce applications. In this chapter 
we reviewed the GSM and UMTS security models, we looked at the operational 
mechanism of the various security algorithm used and described possible security 
vulnerabilities in both systems. 
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Chapter 
Federated System Authentication 
in Mobile Environment 
4.1 Introduction 
A common way nowadays when booking a holiday is to go to a favorite airline's 
web site, log in with username and password, enter authentication information 
and book the reservation. Then you remember you are going to need a car, so you 
search for a car rental site, log in again with a different user name and password, 
and reserve your car. Then a similar process at the hotel's Web site, log in with 
yet another user name and password, and book your room. 
Because of the above there some issues when using Username/Password for 
authentication, such as: using easy to guess passwords (e. g people names), or 
using short passwords (less than 8 characters) which makes it easy target to 
dictionary attacks, or worse still to writing the password down and having them 
next to their computers, and also using the same password for many different 
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applications [46]. 
Wouldn't it be easier if you could login to one site and then be authenti- 
cated at associated sites? Single Sign On (SSO) tries to solve some of the issues 
regarding username/password authentications described above. 
Mobile commerce or M-Commerce is growing fast due to the increased func- 
tionality available in modern mobile devices. Service providers can now provide 
a wide range of services such as as Vodafone Live! which allow users to download 
digital content or allowing users to buy goods using their mobile devices such 
. 
However, one of the key issues for M-Commerce applications is the protection 
of user privacy, such as personal details, financial data or even user behaviour 
(e. g. shopping habits). Theoretically it is possible to have systems with full 
anonymity [47], although such systems may not be desirable as it could lead to 
increased misuse of the system. 
Single Sign-On systems are suitable to Web services environment, and can 
be a secure mechanism to authenticate users to various Web services. However, 
authenticating the users to the Identity Provider (IdP) or Authentication Server 
(AS) is challenging and usually it is the weakest point in the system as it de- 
pends on human interaction such as remembering username/password. On the 
other hand, GSM/UMTS network deploys strong "smart card" authentication 
mechanism as described in chapter three, and since many people these days have 
mobile phones (using GSM/UMTS technology) it make sense to try to integrate 
the two systems to improve security and provide better user experience. In the 
next section we propose a protocol that combines SSO systems with some of the 
GSM security features to secure M-Commerce system. 
The ultimate goal of identity federation is to enable users of one domain to 
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securely access data or systems of another domain seamlessly, and without the 
need for completely redundant user administration. Identity federation comes 
in many flavors, including user-controlled or user-centric scenarios, as well as 
enterprise controlled or B2B scenarios. 
In this chapter we investigate and propose Web service based protocol solu- 
tions to address such issues. 
4.2 Authentication and The Concept of Identity 
The concept of identity has had a long history in social science analysis. When 
discussing identity, there remains a considerable lack of clarity as to the focus of 
debate [481. The concept of Identity is not easy to defined, as to how an individual 
(or an entity) is represented in a system and how that individual can prove that 
the information in the system refers back to him has a profound impact on system 
use [49,50]. 
In our research the focus is more on a particular case where a user would 
like to access different service providers with the same or different identities. 
Our focus is to investigate how much information should be linked to the user 
identifier(s) to allow the service providers to deliver the required service without 
compromising the user security or privacy. In many cases there is a need for 
a trusted third party to be involved in the process to assist with the identity 
management and to balance the associated security/ privacy risk 
. 
The service provider may or may not know the identity of the user to whom 
they are providing service the [51]; depending on the service this may not be 
important, for example the service provider providing general news. However, the 
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identity of the user could be of some importance when some level of authentication 
is required, but what if the service provider did not directly authenticated the 
user? The answer to this question is that it depends on the service provided. To 
explain further, let us consider the following three real life scenarios: 
The Cafe Scenario: 
A man goes to his local cafe and asks for a coffee with milk and no sugar. The 
coffee-maker makes the coffee and the user pays and gets the coffee. The next 
day again the same man comes to the cafe and asks for a coffee with milk and no 
sugar, he keeps doing this for few days. The next time he came to the cafe, the 
coffee-maker provides the `customized coffee' without asking! The point is that 
it is possible in some services/application to provide customized service without 
knowing the true identity of the user. 
The Car rental Scenario: 
To rent a car you need to provide some kind of identification, such as driving 
licence. The car rental company are not interested in the full details of the iden- 
tity of the person who is hiring the car; they are only interested to know that 
this person can legally hire the car and is able to pay. This information can be 
provided by a trusted third party such as the DVLA in the UK. In this case a 
service can be provided without giving away the full details of the user identity 
through the aid of a trusted third party. 
The Bank Scenario: 
If someone is trying to withdraw a large sum of money from their personal account 
from a bank, very likely they will be asked to provide more than one form of 
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identifications and to answer some security questions before releasing the money. 
Because of the sensitivity of the service provided the user need to provide their 
for identity to the service providers. 
It is possible, regardless of whether an account exists for the user at the service 
provider, for an identification to be established between the service provider and 
the identity provider based upon the direct authentication of the user by the 
identity provider and the user's account with that identity provider [511. 
A user identifier can be a unique string of digits, or a user name, or commonly 
on the Internet an email address. From a security point view it is important to 
choose the right user identifier within the context in which it will be used. To use 
the same user identifier within one domain may not be an issue; however, to use 
the same user identifier across multiple domains could compromise user privacy. 
This particular feature is addressed in the Liberty Alliance framework through 
the creation of "opaque privacy protect name identifier" [52-54] 
4.3 Federated System with Single Sign-On 
SSO is a mechanism whereby a single action of user authentication can permit a 
user to access many services providers (SPs). This is typically done through an 
"Authentication Server" (AS), also known as Identity Provider (IdP) [55]. There 
are different SSO systems, however they generally require a User to authenticate 
itself to an AS/IdP to obtain access to the SPs. The process of authentication 
varies from system to system; overall there are two main SSO schemes, the first is 
where a strong trust relationship exist between the user and the IdP, the second 
scheme is where the trust relationship exists between the IdP and the SPs. 
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4.3.1 SSO based on User-IdP trust relation 
In this scheme the IdP manages the user-SP authentication credentials, in such 
a way that a separate user authentication occurs every time the user is logged 
into an SP as shown in Figure 4.1. For this, the IdP needs to have a database 
for each user with a list of all the SPs the user has a relation with and their 
authentication credentials. For this reason, a trusted relation between the user 
and the IdP is a must. Therefore, the registration process must be managed 
very carefully to ensure secure authentication at later stages. From a business 
perspective this is a very desirable model as it will allow the user to access all 
of his/her accounts (i. e. enabling personalized marketing and promotion) with a 
single authentication process. 
Figure 4.1: SSO model based on User-IdP trust 
4.3.2 SSO based on IdP-SPs trust relation 
This scheme requires the IdP to have an established relationship with all SPs that 
are part of the SSO system as shown in Figure 4.2. This relationship requires a 
level of trust that is typically supported by a contractual arrangement. The main 
feature of this scheme that makes it different from the previous scheme is that the 
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only authentication process that involves the user occurs between the user and the 
IdP; SPs are notified of the authentication status of the user via authentication 
assertions. These are statements that contain the user's SSO identity and his/her 
authentication status at the IdP. 
SP1 
ýCSP2 User IdP 
SP3 
sPn 
Trust Relationship 
Figure 4.2: SSO model based on SP-IdP trust 
4.3.3 Examples of SSO schemes 
This section provides an overview of the three well-known SSO schemes: Microsoft 
Passport, Kerberos, and the Liberty Alliance model. 
Microsoft Passport 
Microsoft Passport [56] is a web-based SSO service that has been offered by Mi- 
crosoft since 1999. The Microsoft Passport provides authentication services for 
Passport-enabled sites called `participating sites'. A centralized Passport server 
is the only IdP in the Passport model and contains users' authentication creden- 
tials and the associated unique global identifier called Passport Unique Identifier 
(PUID). Cookies play a major role in the Passport architecture [56] where the 
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Passport server stores and reads identity information in the form of session and 
browser cookies stored securely at a client side. 
Users register with the IdP by supplying a valid e-mail address and a password 
(or, if they register from a mobile phone, their phone number and a Personal 
Identification Number). Additional profile information, such as address, date of 
birth and credit card details, may also be stored in their passport accounts. SPs 
that wish to join the scheme need to sign a contractual agreement with Microsoft 
and share a secret key with the AS. SSL/TLS channels are required between 
the user and the passport server (and optionally between user and SP), and an 
appropriate PKI must also be in place. 
Kerberos 
Kerberos [57] is an authentication system. It provides evidence of a principals 
identity. A principal is generally either a user or a particular service on some 
machine. Kerberos is a single security domain, or realm, consisting of a set of 
users, an Authentication Server, a `Ticket Granting Server' and a set of relying 
SPs [58]. The Authentication Server and the Ticket Granting Server can be com- 
bined into a single entity called the `Kerberos server'. The security infrastructure 
of Kerberos relies solely on symmetric cryptography; every user and every SP 
share a long-term secret key with the AS. All secret keys are used to perform an 
encryption operation. A detailed description of Kerberos can be found in [57]. 
Kerberos is suitable for supporting authentication, authorization, and con- 
fidentiality within a network or small set of networks [591. Encryption in the 
implementation of Kerberos mainly uses the data encryption standard (DES). It 
is a property of DES that if a ciphertext is decrypted with the same key used 
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to encrypt it, the plaintext appears. If different encryption keys are used for 
encryption and decryption, or if the ciphertext is modified, the result will be 
unintelligible, and the checksum in the Kerberos message will not match the 
data. This combination of encryption and the checksum provides integrity and 
confidentiality for encrypted Kerberos messages. 
Some new versions of Kerberos start using PKI, which could make it easier 
to deploy in Internet applications. Though Kerberos has been around for some 
time it has some known limitations which were discussed in [59,601. 
The Liberty Alliance 
The Liberty Alliance [521 is a consortium of over 140 companies who recently 
developed a set of open specifications for web-based SSO [52,53,611. The spec- 
ifications use the Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML), a platform- 
independent framework for exchanging authentication and authorization infor- 
mation. Liberty is based on the notion of `Circles of Trust ' which are formed 
by trusted ASs and sets of relying SPs. The AS/SP trust relationship has to be 
supported by contractual agreements outside the scope of the specifications. 
According to the specifications, users first authenticate themselves to the AS, 
which subsequently conveys authentication assertions to the relying SPs. The 
assertions contain `name identifiers' that allow SPs to differentiate between users. 
For any given user, the AS has to use a distinct identifier with each SP in the 
trust circle. 
The SSO name identifiers must be constructed using pseudo-random values 
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that have no discernible correspondence with the Principal's identifier (e. g. user- 
name) at the Identity Provider (also known as AS); SSO identities are therefore 
potentially unlinkable. This unlinkability, however, can be compromised in a 
number of ways. Firstly, as the AS knows all the user identifiers, SPs could col- 
lude with the AS to link the pseudonyms of a user. Secondly, SPs may be able 
to correlate SSO identities based on the user network addresses. 
Thirdly, profile information that individual SPs may maintain (such as shop- 
ping habits, telephone numbers or credit card details) can also be used to link 
identifiers. Although this last point lies outside the scope of a user authentica- 
tion scheme, the specifications acknowledge that, for the time being, the only 
protection is for the users to be cautious when they choose service providers and 
understand their privacy policies. 
The Liberty Protocols and Schema Specification define generic requirements 
for the protocols for conveying assertion requests and responses between parties. 
Concrete protocol bindings are only specified in the context of a Liberty pro- 
file. All currently specified profiles rely on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [62] protocol to provide secure channels between 
parties. Hence, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) must be in place. 
The Liberty system provides flexibility and scalability without the need for 
one single IdP/AS and for that we think it is very suitable to be deployed in the 
Web services environment. 
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4.4 Related Work 
A substantial research effort exists on developing solutions for authentication 
and payment solutions for mobile commerce systems. These solutions range 
from a simple WAP connection between a mobile device and a server using user- 
name/password [63,641 to adding a second dedicated chip for authentication and 
payment to the mobile device as introduced by Japan NTT DoCoMo [65], and 
pure Java security application [66]. 
One of the key areas of research related to SSO is the Cross-domain identity 
management such as the Liberty Alliances specifications and Microsoft Passport. 
In [67,68], the author looks at the users privacy issues in the Liberty Alliance, 
and highlight some ambiguities and propose privacy policy together with a few 
changes to the Liberty processing rules. 
The SSO is the key platform for many distributed systems. It is typically 
accomplished by the creation of cryptographic token based on initial manual 
authentication by the user (e. g. entering a password). This token can be utilized 
to authenticate subsequent actions. Creating instances of such tokens allows for 
delegation to services on remote systems. In [69] suggest that it may be difficult to 
modify a particular legacy application to utilize an authentication scheme other 
than username/password. While the existing protocols such as Kerberos [58] and 
X. 509 [70] provide such capability, the author highlights that in order to use 
a protocol of this type, all processes involved must understand and utilize the 
technologys protocol. This could be an issue in the Web services environment. A 
reference to that was provided by the author in [69]. An interesting approach to 
solve the problem was proposed in [69], where a "session password" is introduced. 
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These session password are short-lived passwords transmitted in place of a user's 
private password. 
One of the things holding back the widespread use of cross-domain Services 
Oriented Architecture is the delay in reaching consensus on how to secure the 
service between different organizations [71,72]. Solutions to address these issues 
can be achieved using federated identity management framework (which is widely 
adopted in Web services [51)). The work in [73) suggests that important limita- 
tion exists with federated identity management systems, especially in associating 
access policies with a given identity when crossing organizational boundaries. The 
authors suggest to use federated access management instead, where the request 
conveys the authorization information instead of or in addition to the requesters 
identity. Though proposal in [73] is interesting and is built on top of the current 
standards [21,74], the proposal is using these standards in a way not referred 
to by the standards committees and further work is needed to insure that these 
standards were not misused. 
The work in [75] addresses the issue of scalability in WS-* specification. The 
work looks at the authentication issue of messages exchanges in large scale de- 
centralized systems, composed by different authentication domains. The authors 
argue that there are scalability and flexibility limitations due to the fact that the 
acquirement of the identity claims requires online interactions with security token 
services, which introduces communication overhead and creates performance bot- 
tlenecks. The services policies, containing its requirements, must directly point 
to the issuing security token services, limiting the flexibility of the trust relations. 
One of the earlier research on anonymous credentials were presented in [76], 
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where the author considers a situations where a user wants to interact in un- 
linkable roles with different organizations and nevertheless transfer certified at- 
tributes between these organizations. 
While there is an increasing number of published research work in the field 
[47,77-821, there is still a distinct absence of published solutions for this problem, 
with majority of related solutions covering Web Services SSO. In [77] the model of 
an authentication and authorization infrastructure supporting single sign-on and 
federations of trust on the basis of Web Services has been demonstrated. In order 
to reach this aim, the work focuses on the design of an authentication protocol 
closely related to the Kerberos protocol. Although this work gives a general au- 
thentication framework for Web services it does not take into account the mobile 
environment. The mobile environment is addressed, among others, in [78,79]. 
Both of these works provide GSM for SSO solutions and show similarities to the 
concept presented in this Thesis. These solutions, however, require direct com- 
munication between the User and the service provider, and also require sending 
of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) unencrypted, which po- 
tentially compromises the privacy of the User. In these two papers the authors 
assume the ability to gain access to the session key which is the property of the 
mobile operators, and its unlikely that the operators will give a direct access to 
its security properties to third party service providers. The work proposed in [47] 
addresses the issue of user anonymity. However, the proposed work makes in- 
tensive use of certificates at the client side (i. e. user), which can be an issue in 
mobile environment, as discussed in more detail in this paper. In addition to these 
proposals, [81] analyses IP-based services security architecture for wireless and 
public domain networks, especially where Web services are brought into play, 
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and [82] proposes an architecture and conceptual security model for enterprise 
level mobile networks. 
4.5 Verification, Validation and Formal Meth- 
ods 
In all engineering designs it is desirable to be able to verify and validate the 
design before going into production stage, the aim is to save time and production 
cost. Another important goal of any verification/validation process is to try to 
find any error, inaccuracy, or system limitation in the system in order to fix them 
at the design stage. 
Verification and validation are the process to check that the system/product 
meets its specification. Validation is concerning with building the right solution; 
were validation is concerning building the product/solution right. Within the 
context of software development, [83] suggest that the ultimate goal of the ver- 
ification and validations process is to "establish confidence that the software is 
fit for purpose", the level of confidence vary, depending on the system's purpose, 
such as software function or user expectation. There are two complementary 
approaches to system checking and analysis: 
a Static verification and validation: where no need to run the software on 
a computer, this is done by software inspection or peer reviews to check 
system representation such as the requirement documents, design diagrams, 
and the program source code. 
" 
Dynamic verification and validation: this involves software testing to run 
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the implementation of the software with test data to examine the output 
and operational behavior. 
4.5.1 Formal Methods 
Formal methods is the mathematical representation of the software, they are 
concerned with the mathematical analysis of the software specification. The aim is 
to formally verify that one representation of the system is semantically equivalent 
to another representation. Mathematical arguments are used to formally verify 
that code of a software system is consistent with its specification. 
The use of formal verification may reveal potential inconsistencies or system 
flows that may not be easily discovered without running the software. However; 
as the system size increase, the cost of formal verification will increase greatly. 
Because of that many analysis think that formal verification is not cost effective 
[83], and that similar level of guarantees can be achieved by inspection and system 
testing. In addition, formal verification does not guarantee that the software will 
be reliable in practical use. This is very true in large distributed systems, such as 
Web services, where formal specification may not reflect the real requirement of 
system users. This is also true when the system consists of many interconnected 
application and services, where a change in one particular application may lead 
to fundamental change in the overall system behavior. 
As described in chapter one, many of the security protocols nowadays de- 
pends on cryptography. These cryptographic protocols were designed to secure 
against various attacks on the network. Over the years many security protocols 
were developed and many were found vulnerable to attacks that do not require 
to compromise, they underling cryptographic algorithms, but rather manipulate 
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the messages in the protocols to compromise confidentiality, integrity, or to gain 
some other advantages. This has lead to the development of formal description 
methods to understand these security protocols. One of the earlier proposals for 
formal method for describing and analyzing authentication protocols was intro- 
duced in the late 1980's by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham on what is known as 
the BAN logic. The aim of the logic of authentication is to formally describe 
the knowledge and the beliefs of the entities involved in authentication while 
analyzing the protocols step by step [11]. 
The BAN logic proposes a formal method to describe authentication pro- 
tocols, by listing the source, the destination, and the contents symbolically, is 
replaced with logical formulas. The aim is describe all the information in a par- 
ticular step in the protocol with this logical formula, this process is referred to 
as the 'idealization' of the protocol. The beliefs of the entities or the principals 
are annotated with assertions on the idealized protocol. The protocols is then 
analyzed step by step using a set of inference rules [11]. 
Another proposal described by C. Meadows [84] describes another common 
approaches to this is by using "state machines". The protocol is translated into 
another executable formalism, which allows its simulation in presence of an ag- 
gressive intruder. The intruder is allowed to "randomly" perform actions such 
as intercepting communications and forging messages. By an exhaustive search 
one can establish if the protocol is flawed or not (its important to note that this 
will depend on what "exhaustive search" will include, as it will depend on the 
experience/knowledge of the system designer). Another interesting proposal is 
the NRL protocol analyzer [85], the NRL protocol Analyzer is a prototype spe- 
cial purpose verification tool, written in Prolog, which has been developed for the 
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analysis of cryptographic protocols that are used to authenticate principals and 
services and distribute keys in a network. Many solutions have been employed, 
ranging from human intervention to the use of approximations. 
Longley and Rigby [86) proposes the use of a rule based system that trans- 
forms goals into sub goals and can constantly continue this process. The rule 
based scheme is used to build a tree, in which each node represents a data item, 
and the children of a node represent those data items that are required for the 
knowledge of the data represented by the father node. In this way, they can 
construct a tree, in which the root node represents the data required by the at- 
tacker for an attack (e. g., a cryptographic key), and the leaves represent those 
data items that are required to know the root item. This tool allows the user to 
interact with the system. The user can determine whether a data can or cannot 
be found by the attacker. If the data is judged to be accessible, this information 
can be inserted into the system, and the generation of the tree can proceed. 
4.5.2 Security Assessment 
Security is becoming critical factor in most of current software system as these 
systems are in one way or another are connected to the Internet, such as for 
user access or system updates. This becomes more essential in Web services were 
system interconnection is the norm. The ability to assess/analyze that a system 
can resist against different types of attacks is not easy [87]. It is difficult to assess 
system security as most of security requirement are "shall not" requirement [83], 
as they specify what should not happen instead of required system functionality. 
That makes it hard to define or check these unwanted behaviors. 
Even if a system has been deployed for years, it is impossible to prove that 
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a system does not do something, irrespective of the amount of testing [83], se- 
curity vulnerabilities may still exist in the system. However, security analysis 
and assessment is a must to check system security. There are four approaches to 
security assessment: 
" 
Experienced based verification/validation: here the system is checked against 
known attacks; usually security checklist is prepared to assist with this pro- 
cess. 
9 Tool based validation: this is valid with some applications or systems, when 
a common functionality is deployed in a system. Examples of such tools 
are password checkers that are used to check for weak password. 
" 
Tiger teams: this is where a team is set to attack the system with the aim 
to discover its weakness or to find new ways to compromise the system. 
This is a very effective approach if the team experienced in system hacking. 
" 
Formal verification: a system can be verified against a formal security spec- 
ification. However, security formal verification is not commonly used. As 
it is hard for an end user of a system to verify its security. Methods are 
developed for industrial security validation for software products [88] which 
gives an industrial security certification. However, such certification is only 
applicable to individual product or system. When the product or system 
is used in conjunction with other uncertified systems (e. g. in Web services) 
the overall system security can not be assessed. 
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4.5.3 Concluding remarks on formal methods verification 
There has been great amount of work on formal methods in computer security, in- 
cluding the logics of authentication which has seen many improvements. However, 
great challenges still exist in particular the formalization of a general authenti- 
cation protocol. An important weakness of designing security protocols lies in 
the formalization process [89], because of ambiguities and of the difficulties in 
formalizing, its not easy to define what the actual goals of a protocol are. This 
simplification which usually takes place when formally describing authentication 
protocol does take the logic away from the real world. 
In the following sections of this thesis we propose some novel security pro- 
tocols which address different mobile Web services challenges. Experience based 
validation/verification approach together with the protocol design principles pre- 
sented in chapter one was the chosen methodology for verifying our proposed 
protocols. The experienced based approach was chosen over formal methods as 
we believe it's more applicable, due to the limitation of formal methods in large 
distributed environment such as mobile Web services, as discussed in this section. 
4.6 Security in Federated Systems 
SSO systems simplify user interaction with service providers. However, security 
will always be one of the key issues that any SSO system must address to gain 
user confidence. Several key security issues have to be identified and these are 
listed in this section. Some of these issues are very specific to certain types of 
SSO systems, while others are more general due to the nature of the SSO model. 
The main issues include: 
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" 
The centralization issue: Most SSO models depend on a central point 
that all parties trust (i. e. IdP or the AS). From a security point of view 
this is a potential single point of failure; if the security of the IdP can be 
broken, the security of the whole system will be effected. 
" 
UserName/Password dependence: Most SSO systems will require the 
user to have a username/password to access the system (e. g. such as in 
Kerberos and MS Passport). This is not effective against password guessing 
attacks; if a user chooses a poor password, then an attacker guessing that 
password can impersonate the user. 
" 
The registration Process: In many SSO systems less consideration is 
given to the security of the registration process; this is of great importance 
especially in SSO models where the IdP stores users-SPs access information, 
and where the SPs need to give a customized services based on these access 
information. 
9 Reply attack: This happens when an attacker tries to resend the messages; 
to gain access for example. 
" 
Timing attack: The aim of this attack is to reveal the user identity or to 
understand user behaviour by monitoring the network traffic. This attack 
can be serious if not many users using the system or the IdP doesn't change 
the "User Identity" regularly. A solution to this is to increase the time 
intervals between receiving and sending another message at the User and/or 
IdP side. 
9 Tradeoffs between usability and security: In particular we refer to the 
work load on the user; such as how often should the session key be changed? 
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this problem becomes more serious in mobile Web services applications 
because of the computing limitation of mobile devices. 
In the following subsections we propose a methodology to address some of the 
above issues in particular we look at the registration challenge. We first define 
the environment in which we apply our proposed solutions. 
4.6.1 Environment Architecture 
The concept of the system is to allow a user to securely access all his/her online 
services, with one login, as well as the option to register with new services. The 
System consists of the following three entities: 
9 User: the end user who wants access to a service provider. 
" 
Service Provider: an entity selling goods or services to the User. 
" 
Identity Provider: a third party providing SSO functionality to the system. 
The system follows a strict protocol in which a series of SOAP messages 
are sent between the entities of the system to facilitate for the registration and 
authentication process of the system; in addition the following requirements must 
be met prior to the use of the protocol. 
9 All parties have agreed on a specific signature algorithm. The signature of 
data X using secret key K is written 8K(X). 
" 
All parties have agreed on an asymmetric encryption algorithm, for which 
the encryption of data X using public key P is written ep(X). 
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" 
All parties have encryption key pairs for encryption scheme 
, 
and all the 
parties possess a trusted copy of the public key of the other two parties. 
9 All parties have asymmetric key pair for a signature scheme 
, 
and all parties 
possess a trusted copy of the public key of the other two parties. 
The following two sections will demonstrate our proposed protocol in both 
the registration and the authentication stages. 
4.7 Registration Process and Mechanism 
Registration is a crucial stage in any access control system, as any security breach 
at this stage could have serious consequences on the system [46] (e. g. if someone 
manages to fake or steal someone else's identity). 
We are here considering the special case where a User wants to register with 
an IdP, that he/she has an account with. So that when the User is authenticated 
to the IdP he/she can access their private account at the SP. 
At the initial stage of the registration process, the user register with the IdP; 
for that the user sends his/her authentication credentials (e. g. user name and 
passwords) to the IdP. These credentials will be used for the future login to the 
IdP. The message that contains the credentials is encrypted with the IdP pub- 
lic key (PKIdp) for confidentiality and digitally signed by the user private key 
(SKu9... ) to protect the integrity of the message. 
Message 1 User 
-* 
IdP: sSKu, er 
(ePKIdP(Authentication Credentials)) 
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The IdP needs to verify the message, to add the user credentials to its 
database and assign a unique "User Identifier" to the user. 
The service provider (SP) also needs to register with the IdP to join the SSO 
system. The SPs follow the same registration procedure as the user, there also 
may be some kind of contractual agreement. Once the SP is registered with the 
IdP, the SP will also be assigned a unique "SP Identifier". 
For a user to access any of the SPs through the IdP, he/she needs to regis- 
ter his/her `account' with the SP at the IdP. The concept behind this is to be 
able to link the user Identity at the IdP with the user Identity at the SP. The 
registration process commences with the user login to the IdP using the user 
authentication credentials. The user then requests to register with an SP (this 
SP must be registered with the same IdP). It is not necessary for the user to 
be externally registered with the SP system. Upon receiving the user request, 
the IdP sends a "Registration Token" to both the user and the SP. Registration 
Token is encrypted with the SP public key (PKsp) and signed by the IdP. 
Message 2 IdP 
-º 
User: sSK, dp (epj S (Registration Token )) 
Message 3 User 
-º 
SP: sSKU, 
er 
(ePKsp(Registration Token)) 
Following that, the user logs in to the SP if he/she has an account with 
the SP, otherwise the user can create an account with this SP; then the user 
must show that he/she possesses the Registration Token obtained from the IdP. 
If the login and the validation of the Registration Token are successful, the SP 
authorizes the particular registration token to the IdP by sending it with a "user 
Identifier" (e. g. user name) at the SP system. The SP will sign the message 
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before sending it to the IdP to ensure the integrity of the message. Note that to 
improve user privacy the SP should not pass the true user Identifiers to the IdP, 
rather it should produce a reference to it and send it to the IdP. An overview of 
this process is illustrated in Figure 4.3 
Message 4 SP 
-p IdP: ssKs, ((registration token), user Identifier at the SP) 
CüentLogin (username, password) 
ST: String 
--------------------------------- 
r 
CAentRegisterSP ( ST, spname) 
Check ST & spnam. 
SubmltClientST ( regislrstlonTOken : String) 
rspistrationlDAdd (repisvetionTOken ST + spneme) 
SPID + registrationToken: String 
---------------------------------- 
ClieMRegisterlDP tusaneme, password, registretionToken) 
! 
Lfff 
useriD : Int 
Authentkatbn Failed 
-1 OB ertw 2 
status : tnt 
Figure 4.3: User's SP registration with the IdP 
(ntpishetionToken) 
Caeck O6 ''j 
Auth notate user I 
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Once the authorization reaches the IdP it saves the user's "user Identifier" 
with SP in a database and this completes the registration process, Figure 4.4 
gives an overview of the registration process. 
(3) Registration Token 
IdP SP 
(5) User Login True/False 
(2) Registration Token 
(1) Request to register with SP (4) Registration Token, usemame, password 
User 
Figure 4.4: Registration process 
4.8 Authentication Process and Mechanism 
The authentication process starts with the user authenticating at the IdP using 
his/her authentication credentials usually a username and password. If this is 
successful, the IdP generates a "Security Token" and sends it back to the user. 
This Security Token will be used for the rest of the session when communicating 
with the IdP. The "Security Token" contains a timestamp and a `token lifetime' 
after which the token will become invalid. The user's username and password are 
encrypted by the IdP's public key PKjdp and signed by the user's private key 
SKuser to protect the message confidentiality and integrity. In response the user 
will receive the Security Token which will be encrypted with User public key and 
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signed with IdP private key. 
Message 1 User 
--> IdP: ssKU, CT 
(epKIdP(username, password)) 
Message 2 IdP 
-> 
User: ssKldP (epKuaer(Security Token)) 
To access an SP the user sends the SP name (SPID) with the security token 
to the IdP; if the security token is valid and user has registered with the requested 
SP, the IdP generates a User Token to be used only with the intended SP, and 
sends to the user. Both messages are secured such that: 
Message 3 User 
-+ IdP: ssKU, er 
(ePK,, 
p (Security Token AND SPID)) 
Message 4 IdP 
--> User: sSK,,, (epxu, er(User Token)) 
When the user approaches the SP with the User Token, the SP will forward 
the User Token to the IdP for validation. If the User Token has been successfully 
validated, the SP saves it in its database under the user's username, so next time 
when the user makes a request under the same User Token, the SP can validate 
it from the record in its database. The User Token has a defined lifetime after 
which the token becomes invalid, the login process is illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
The following is how the various messages have been secured: 
Message 5 User 
-º 
SP: SSKU, er 
(ePKS (User Token)) // Access request 
Message 6 SP 
- 
IdP: 8SKSP (ePK, dl (User Token)) // Validation request 
Message 7 IdP 
-º 
SP: ssx, dp (ePKsp(AccessResponse)) 
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Message 8 SP 
-º 
User: sSKsp (AccessResponse) 
(5) User Token Valid / Invalid [_IdP 
SP 
(4) User Token 
(6) Service Response 
(2) User Token 
(t) Request to Access SP, Security Token 
3) Service Russt, User Token 
User 
Figure 4.5: User Authentication 
Global Logout 
Also known as Single Logout, is provided by the system, such that once the user 
request to logout from the system, the IdP informs all the SPs to logout this user 
by setting the `User Tokens' invalid. If the user requests global logout from an SP, 
the SP sends the logout request to the IdP. This request then informs all the SPs 
that the user has active sessions with, and sets all the User Tokens issued for this 
user to be invalid. In the case of the Liberty Alliance a Single Logout framework 
provides synchronized session logout functionality across all sessions that were 
authenticated by a particular identity provider in Federated Systems [51,90]. 
Single Sign-On systems are suitable for the Web services environment, and can 
be a secure mechanism to authenticate users to various Web services. However, 
authenticating the users to the IdP or AS is challenging and usually is the weakest 
point in the system as it depends on human interaction such as remembering 
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username/password. On the other hand, GSM/UMTS network deploys strong 
"smart card" authentication mechanism as described in chapter four, and since 
many people these days have mobile phones (using GSM/UMTS technology) it 
make sense to try to integrate the two systems to improve security and provide 
better user experience. Next I propose a protocol that combines SSO systems 
with some of the GSM security features to secure M-Commerce system. 
4.9 Privacy and Anonymity in Federated Sys- 
tem with GSM 
In this section we propose a novel system in which it is possible for a mobile user 
to securely authenticate and have full anonymity as far as the service providers 
are concerned. A feature of the system is that it is possible for a trusted authority 
to reveal the identity of the user if he or she is suspected of illegal activities. 
A typical scenario is when a mobile user wants to download music or to book 
a train ticket using his/her mobile phone. To do that the user will login to the 
trusted third party server (e. g. the Network Operator) from which he will be able 
to access different service providers securely, confidentially and without the need 
to remember any username/password for any of these services providers. The 
system is built on top of the SSO architecture similar to the one presented by the 
Liberty Alliance; specifically we refer to the SSO work in [91]. 
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4.9.1 System Architecture 
The system consists of three players: Mobile Stations, Service Providers, and 
GSM Network Operators. The User operates a Mobile Station (MS) and wishes 
to access services provided by a service provider via a mobile network provided 
by a Network Operator (NO). The NO also provides a SSO service for the MS, 
and acts as an `Anonymity Revocation Authority' to reveal the MS identity in 
some scenarios. Finally, the Service Provider (SP) provides services to the MS. 
It is assumed that the NO is trusted by the MS not to reveal the User's 
true identity to any third parties, except in specified circumstances. It is further 
assumed that the NO has an asymmetric key pair for a signature scheme and the 
MS and the SP possess a trusted copy of the public key PKNO. 
It is also assumed that the MS is equipped with a SIM or connected to a 
SIM card, which shares a secret key with the NO, in line with the GSM security 
standards [92,93]. 
In reality the secret key will be stored in a protected database in an Authen- 
tication Center which belongs to the NO; for simplicity we refer to the NO as the 
holder of the secret key, as the NO will also be managing the SSO system. 
Figure 4.6 gives an overview of how the different players interact with each 
other, where the MS authenticates to the SSO system in the NO before accessing 
the services provided by the SP. 
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Figure 4.6: Proposed Architecture 
4.9.2 The Protocol and System requirements 
The main idea behind the system is that the user binds the secret key shared with 
its GSM network operator to a random ID. This ID acts as the user identifier 
with the service providers, and the only way to link this random identifier to 
the user is by knowing the secret key shared by the user and the GSM network 
operator. 
The protocol description is divided into two parts. The `Normal Scenario' 
which describes the operations required to allow the User to access the SPs with 
total anonymity, and the `Revocation scenario' which describes how the NO can 
reveal the User identity if needed. 
The following conditions must be met prior to the use of the protocol. 
9 All parties need to agree on a specific signature algorithm. The signature 
of data X using secret key K is written as sK(X). 
" 
The NO has an encryption key pair for encryption scheme 
, 
and both the 
MS and the SPs possess a trusted copy of the public key PKNO. 
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" 
The MS is equipped with a SIM or connected to a SIM card, which shares 
a secret key Ki with the NO, and supports the GSM security standards. 
" 
The MS needs to generate a distinct signature key pair for each SP (PK5p 
is the public key for SP, and SKSp is the private key for SP ). The public 
key does not have to be certified. 
" 
The MS and its NO have agreed on a symmetric encryption algorithm which 
can use a secret key derived using the GSM A8 key derivation algorithm. 
The encryption of data X using secret key K is written as eK (X ). 
9 The NO and SP have agreed on an asymmetric encryption algorithm, for 
which the encryption of data X using public key P is written ep(X). 
. 
This protocol will work on top of other communication protocols (UMTS, 
GSM, etc) and therefore all parties should be able to communicate with 
each other. 
4.9.3 The Normal scenario 
The following steps describes the interaction between the MS, the NO and the 
SP. 
1. The MS authenticates to the NO using regular GSM authentication, and 
then authenticates to the NO SSO system, e. g. using user name and pass- 
word, to be able to request access to an SP. 
2. The NO generates a random challenge (RAND) and sends it to the MS. 
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3. The MS generates a Security Token, consisting of two parts: the MS ID 
which is a random string to be used as the MS identifier, and a `Revoca- 
tion Parameter' which can be used to reveal the MS identity to a trusted 
authority, if needed. The Security Token (ST) is generated as follows: 
(a) The MS uses RAND and the long term secret key Ki (stored in the 
SIM) to compute a secret session key K, as follows: Kc = A8K; (RAND), 
where A8 is a network specific key derivation function used by the GSM 
system [9,92,93]. 
(b) The MS will generate the distinct signature key pair for each SP, public 
key PKsp will act as the MS ID, and the private key will be bound 
to the true identity of the MS(as described below). This key will be 
different for every SP. 
NOTE: For a higher level of user privacy, it is possible to generate a 
different key pair every time a service is requested, even if it is for the 
same SP. As a result the SP will be unable to link two different acts 
of the same user, for example what products the same MS is buying. 
(c) The MS generates the Revocation Parameter (RP) by signing a mes- 
sage m with the private key SKsp and then symmetrically encrypting 
the signed message with the session key KK, such that, RP=ex0(ssK (m)), 
where m is a short message containing the MS IMSI and RAND, used 
to re-generate K. 
(d) MS will create the Security Token (ST) shown in Figure 4.7, which 
will include the following attributes: 
" 
MS ID, which will be the public key used only with a particular 
SP, i. e. the MS ID = PKsp. 
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. 
The Revocation Parameter (RP) 
Figure 4.7: Overview of the Security Token 
4. The MS sends its request to the NO, including the Security Token. 
5. The NO checks the request from the MS. This is done as follows (as illus- 
trated in Figure 4.8): 
(a) The NO uses the secret key Ki associated with the MS IMSI and the 
random challenge RAND that has been sent to the MS to generate m, 
which consists of IMSI and RAND, and to generate the secret session 
key K, (For this reason the NO needs to store the RAND it sent to 
the MS previously in the protocol. ) 
(b) The NO will first decrypt the R. P obtained from the security token 
using K, (that it has just generated) and verify the signature on rn, 
using PKsp, obtained from the security token. The NO will then 
compare the two values of m(i. e. the one it has just generated and the 
one recovered from the RP) and if they are equal it confirms that the 
MS has used the same RAND that the NO sent. 
6. If this check is successful the NO will create a Revocation Attribute (RA) 
by adding the RP to m (which consists of the MS IMSI and RAND) and 
encrypt the new m' (which consists of the MS IMSI, RAND, and RP) with 
the NO public key, i. e. RA =epKN, o (m'). 
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Figure 4.8: Security token verification process 
7. Using its SSO system such as [52] the NO forwards the MS request to the 
SP using PKsp as the MS ID. Attached to the message will be the RA. It 
is assumed that the NO is trusted to send the correct RA to the intended 
SP. 
8. As the user been authenticated using the SSO system, the SP will deliver 
the service requested by the user, as shown in step 5 in Figure 4.9. 
MS NO/SSO SP 
1-Re Service 
2- RAND 
Create ST 
3- ST, PK, 
L74- 
eq Service(PK. sl,, RA 
RA 
Validation 
-Provide Service 
Figure 4.9: Normal scenario overview 
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4.9.4 The Revocation scenario 
If a particular user is suspected of illegal activities, the MS identity can be revealed 
as follows: 
1. The SP forwards the public key PKSP (i. e. MS ID) and the Revocation 
Attribute (RA) to the NO. 
2. The NO uses its private key to decrypt the Revocation Attribute (RA) 
to get m', then it uses the secret key Ki associated with MS IMSI and the 
random challenge RAND (contained in m') to re-generate the secret session 
key K. 
3. The NO decrypts RP using KK and check the integrity of m using PKSp 
from the RP. If successful (i. e. the decryption and the integrity check) will 
indicate that owner of this public key PKSP is the same as the owner of the 
secret key KK who is linked to IMSI number, and therefore the user identity 
can be revealed. 
4.9.5 Threat analysis 
Security analysis of communication protocols is not a straightforward process and 
it very much depends of the objectives required. The threat analysis presented 
in this section are based on the discussion given in chapter 3, and in particular 
the analysis follows the principles presented in [10,94]. 
Potential attacks on the proposed system axe considered in this section, and 
are divided into two parts. The "User Privacy" analysis discusses the possible 
attacks that could compromise user privacy. The second part, "Other Attacks", 
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considers other possible threats to the system which are not directly related to 
the user privacy. 
User Privacy 
These are possible attack scenarios that can potentially damage user privacy. 
Attack on the communication links 
A network eavesdropper who captures any of the communication messages in the 
system will not be able to gain access to the information about the user as all 
the user related data are encrypted. 
Attack on the MS 
If the secret key Ki can be extracted from the SIM, either by stealing or cloning 
the SIM, the attacker can claim to be the subscriber to the NO; however this 
is unlikely to be a major threat to the proposed system as the user needs to 
authenticate to the SSO system by another authentication mechanism, most likely 
using username/ password mechanism. 
Attack on the Network Operator/Anonymity Revocation Authority 
It was pointed out earlier that the NO is trusted by the MS not to reveal the 
user's true identity to any third parties, except in specified circumstances. But 
as in most SSO schemes if an attacker breaks into the NO, the system will fail 
as it is the `single point of failure'. If successful, the attacker could read all the 
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user private data. However the NOs are highly secure against most attacks and 
therefore the likelihood of such failure is very small. 
Attack on the Service Provider 
If an attacker manages to get access to the SP system or even of the SP itself tries 
to gain information about the user it will not be able to do so, because the user 
is known to the SP by a random ID with no link to user true identity. To gain 
any information from the RA the SP needs the NO private key which it doesn't 
have. 
Timing attack 
The aim of this attack is to reveal the user identity by monitoring the network 
traffic. The MS makes a request to access some service and after a short period 
of time (after receiving the RAND and sending the ST) the NO sends a message 
to a SP, an eavesdropper who is monitoring the network traffic can conclude with 
some probability that this User is trying to access this SP, and if the system 
at that time has limited number of users, the eavesdropper can make the same 
conclusion with higher probability. This eavesdropper could be a dishonest SP, 
who wants to know more about its competitor business. Possible solution is to 
increase the time between the receiving and sending of another message at the 
MS and/or the NO side. This could increase the possibility that the NO will 
make more contact with many SPs, which will make it more difficult to conclude 
which user is trying to contact which SP with some certainty. 
Other attacks 
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These are other possible attacks on the system that are not directly linked to 
the privacy of the user. 
Attack on communication links 
An attacker may not be able to read the messages sent in the system, but it is still 
possible that he/she can modify the network traffic. If for example that attacker 
manages to modify message 2 in Figure 4.9 (i. e. the RAND sent from NO to 
MS), the system will fail. Therefore integrity protection is fundamental to the 
operation of such a system. This problem can be overcome with the use of some 
established techniques such as SSL/TLS with client/server certificates [17]. 
Replay attack 
A dishonest SP could impersonate to be the NO to another SP, by capturing 
message 3 in Figure 4.9 (i. e. the Security Token sent from MS to NO) and later 
replaying the message after creating its Revocation Attribute (RA) to another 
SP. The effect of such attack may not be great, but it could be damaging in 
certain applications. 
4.10 Summary 
Federated environment is used in Web services, Single Sign On do play an impor- 
tant role in building federated system. In this chapter we reviewed SSO systems 
in some details in particular the issue of trust between the various entities in the 
systems and the concept of trust. 
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Improving security is one of the SSO systems objectives. This chapter high- 
lighted some of the main security challenges, in particular during the registration 
and authentication process and we have proposed mechanisms to address these 
concerns. 
User anonymity is an issue in such systems, and the GSM security features 
can help in protecting user privacy as demonstrated by our novel protocol. The 
aim of the proposed protocol was not to provide total anonymity to the user 
as this may be misused in M-Commerce applications, therefore the aim was to 
provide total anonymity from the point of view of the services providers only. It 
was described how this can be achieved through the use of some GSM security 
features in combination with a digital signature scheme for SSO system, with the 
assumption that the mobile network operators are the trusted entities. 
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Chapter 
Secure Authentication for Mobile 
Web Services 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented Single Sign On as aa way to improve the overall 
security of interworking systems such as Web services, by securing the authenti- 
cation process. The management and the handling of the security credentials is 
a major concern in the developments of the security system 
. 
This is in fact part of a bigger challenge known as the "challenge of portable 
identity". Web services increasingly cross organizational boundaries, yet there is 
no standard way to convey security attributes about individuals from one organi- 
zation to another, especially in terms of how individuals or entities are identified 
and how permissions for access to resources are specified. 
Web Services use SOAP to connect machines and applications. However; 
when two entities with different trust models want to interact, SOAP has no 
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standardized and interpretable way to communicate their security properties to 
establish trust. One of the proposed solutions is the Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML). SAML is used to exchange authentication and authorization 
credentials across different security domains, which we will address in more details 
in the this chapter. 
Another interesting technology for authentication services is the Generic Au- 
thentication Architecture (GAA) [95], it is part of the 3GPP UMTS framework 
and, can play an important role together with SSO systems to improve the se- 
curity for Mobile Web services applications. In the second part of this chapter 
we propose an novel architecture which integrate the Liberty Alliance Federation 
system with UMTS GAA. 
5.2 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is an XML based security standard created to enable portable identities 
and the assertion of these identities. SAML is used to exchange authentication 
and authorization credentials across different security domains. As SAML is XML 
based its not tied to any transport or platform, also it is not depended on any 
central certificate authority to issue certificates and this is very important in the 
Web services environment. 
SAML V1.0 became an OASIS standard in November 2002. SAML V1.1 
followed in September 2003 and has seen significant success, gaining momentum 
in financial services, higher education, government, and other industry segments. 
SAML has been implemented by all major Web access management vendors. 
SAML support also appears in major application server products and is commonly 
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found among Web services management and security vendors. SAML V2.0 builds 
on that success. 
SAML V2.0 unifies the building blocks of the federated identity in SAML 
V1.1, and was developed by the Security Services Technical Committee of OASIS. 
The SAML V2.0 OASIS Standard specification set was approved on 15 March 
2005 [27]. 
5.2.1 Motivation for SAML 
Securing identity is fundamental for Web services security, and as the identity of 
valid users must move around when information moves from one trust domain 
to another, and the fact that Web services will be used to cross trust domains 
makes portable trust an important requirement for Web services security. 
One of the biggest challenges for Web services is that of user authentication, 
and single sign-on across a number of federated systems [17]. As proposed by 
the Liberty Alliance [52], SAML provides distributed authorization and feder- 
ated identity management, and does not impose a centralized, decentralized, or 
federated infrastructure or solution, but instead facilitates the communication of 
authentication, authorization, and attribute information. 
5.2.2 The SAML Specification 
There are four main components of SAML. They are: 
. 
Assertion: an XML schema and definition for security assertion. 
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" 
Request and response protocol: an XML schema and definition for a re- 
quest/response protocol. 
" 
Binding: rules on using assertion with standard transport and messaging 
frameworks. 
" 
Profiles: the rules for embedding, extracting and integrating. 
The assertion can convey information about authentication acts performed 
by subject, attributes of subjects, and authorization decisions about whether 
subject are allowed to access certain resources. The protocol defines an agreed 
way of asking for and receiving information. Binding define how SAML messages 
are communicated over standard transport and messaging protocols. For exam- 
ple, a SAML SOAP binding describes how SAML request and response message 
exchanges are mapped into SOAP message exchange. This is illustrated in Fig- 
ure 5.1 below. Full details of SAML specifications can be found in [27,74,96,97] 
. 
5.2.3 Operation of SAML 
SAML assertion are encoded in a common XML schema, which includes basic 
information and the claims the requestor is making, for example "I claim to be 
John". The basic information specifies a unique identifier used for the assertion 
name, date and time of issuance, and the time interval for which the assertion is 
valid. Here is a simple SAML assertion 
<saml: Assertion> 
MajorVersion= "1" Minor Version= "0" 
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Figure 5.1: An Overview of SAML components 
AssertionlD= "138.40.160.163" 
Issuer= "City. ac. uk" 
Issuerlnstance= "2006-10-30T09: 50: OOGMT" 
<sainl: Conditions 
NotBefore= "2006-10-30TO9: 50: OOGMT" 
NotAfter= "2006-10-30T09: 59: OOGMT"/> 
<saml: AuthenticationStatement 
AuthenticationMethod= "password" 
Authenticationlnstant= "2006-10-90T09: 50: OOGMT"/> 
<saml: Subject> 
<saml: Nameldentifier 
SecurityDomain= ""Lab. city. ac. uk" 
Name= "John"/> 
</saml: Subject> 
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</saml: AuthenticationStatement> 
</saml: Assertion> 
The claims are made to an authority who returns another assertion, for ex- 
ample, "I vouch for the fact that this is John". An assertion may be dependent 
on additional information from a validation service, therefore an assertion may 
contain conditions and advice elements. SAML assertions are submitted to au- 
thentication and authorization authorities; these SAML authorities are trusted 
third parties such as certificate authorities (CA). 
The Figures 5.2,5.3 illustrate the structure of SAML assertion and the SAML 
SOAP/HTTP binding. 
Figure 5.2: SAML assertion structure 
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Figure 5.3: SAML with SOAP/HTTP binding 
SAML and WS-Security 
WS-Security is a collection of specifications and requirements to secure Web ser- 
vices started by Microsoft, IBM, and VeriSign. WS-Security is mainly a security 
extension to SOAP [21]. It specifies SAML assertions as one of the types of 
security token it supports in the SOAP header [22]. 
The WS-Security profile of SAML is based on a single interaction between 
a sender and a receiver. The sender is a Web service consumer who obtains 
SAML assertions, these assertions are added to a SOAP message destined for 
the receiver (e. g. a Web service provider). SAML assertion is attached to SOAP 
using WS-Security by placing the assertion elements or references to assertions 
inside a <wsse: Security> header. 
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SAML and The Liberty Alliance 
The Liberty Alliance presented provides the specification of the federated identity 
infrastructure that allows the user to create a circle of trust with the user affiliates, 
by developing a set of standards that allow the user to use SAML authentication 
assertion across multiple security domains. 
The problem that the Liberty Alliance is set to solve is the `identity problem'. 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is an issue if Web service users need to 
re-authenticate each time they visit a different Web service. One of the proposed 
solutions is the Web service portal, where a Web service links all the back-end 
resources of different Web service providers into a Web front end. Microsoft 
. 
Net 
Passport [56] follows this model. This model has some drawbacks as it puts too 
much control in the hands of one provider. As detailed in chapter 4. 
The alternative to the portal solution is the federated identity which is basi- 
cally shared authentication. The way this works is: a user will login to one Web 
service, then when the user would like to visit a different Web service, the second 
Web service can rely on the work done by the first Web service. How the two 
Web services establish this shared identity is known as "identity federation" 
. 
The 
specification of this process is one of the main objectives of the Liberty Alliance. 
Liberty uses SAML to transport a set of SAML assertions between Web services 
to create a circle of trust. 
SAML in Mobile Web services 
Mobile devices may offer a more constrained environment for the identity manage- 
ment than do other devices such as personal computers on an enterprise network. 
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SAML defines one specific profile for mobile environments, which enables the 
transmission of an artifact using WAP/WML [98]. 
The SAML Implementation Guidelines document [99], suggests some mobile 
specific implementation considerations: 
" 
Use of the radio resource: In some mobile environments, radio bandwidth 
may be restricted or costly. 
9 Reliability/Latency: Mobile devices may have poor network connectivity 
over a radio link. 
" 
Ease of deployment: To enable handset usage of the SAML profiles may 
in some cases require the deployment of handsets that utilize additional or 
improved software. 
9 Presence of SIM card: GSM-based networks make use of the Subscriber 
Identity Module (SIM) card. Such cards may provide enhanced security for 
identity-based transactions. This is also true with USIM in UMTS. 
" 
Network roaming: Mobile roaming business agreements established between 
network operators provide an important basis for trust between SAML 
providers. 
" 
Link security: WAP 1. x does not allow for secure, encrypted links at the 
transport layer between a mobile device and a service provider. WAP 2.0 
introduced TLS which does allow for such links. 
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5.3 Related Work 
The different characteristics of wireless networks require looking at the threat 
differently. An interesting approach for looking at security threats are presented 
in [100], where the author considers threat from two points of view: the insider 
and the outsider. The type of threats that should be considered for such environ- 
ment includes: traffic analysis; passive and active eavesdropping; unauthorized 
access; man-in-the-middle attack; session highjacking; and replay attacks. The 
author concludes with counter measure for the above threats by implementing 
four security components: mutual authentication; encryption for the payload; 
strong integrity measures; and firewall. 
In the other hand when developing a security for a Web services architec- 
ture, there are many Web services security standards developed by important 
consortiums such as W3C, IETF, and OASIS which needs to be taken into ac- 
count. However there is no process to guide the developer in integrating security 
through the life cycle of the development. This issue was the focus of the work 
in [101], where the authors proposes a process for Web services security. This 
process designed on the basis of traceability and re-usability of the products. 
While the majority of works on Web service architecture is based on client/server 
models (centralized based), in [102] the authors proposes an interesting mecha- 
nism for fair exchanges between mutually distrustful yet collaborating web ser- 
vices, based on peer-to-peer settings. The authors propose that the system is 
useful both at the system level (to build higher-level services) and at the appli- 
cation level (to provide end-user functionality). 
The Multimedia Laboratories group at NTT DoCoMo developed a scalable 
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security description framework for mobile Web services [103], in which SAML is 
used as an `e-ticketing service token' that describes service information which in- 
cludes token issuer, user identifier, timestamp and the service context. Although 
this work refers to the use of XML encryption and XML signature to improve 
security, it does not address key security risks associated with such environment. 
For example WAP has been proposed but there was no reference to the issue 
of the WAP gap [9] and how to reduce such risk. The authors are treating the 
mobile device just as a computer terminal with limited computer powers and not 
taking any advantages of the security provided by the mobile environment. 
One of the key papers that analyse SAML from a security perspective is by 
Thomas GroB [104]. This paper gives general analysis of the security of SAML 
V LO Browser/artifact. The paper presents three attacks and it suggests possible 
countermeasures. The main attacks presented are, Replay attack, Man-in-the- 
Middle attack, and HTTP Referrer Attack. Although these attacks are different 
in nature their origin in SAML protocol V1.0 is the same. Because of the lack of 
authentication between the different communicating parties (i. e. User/Browser, 
Source, Destination), the impact of these attacks could be eliminated or greatly 
reduced by using SSL/TLS to secure the communication parties between the 
various entities. However, even with that [104] highlights possible vulnerability 
of the SSL/TLS Binding, specifically when an entity has several services on the 
same destination site. It is possible thenfor one service holder tries to cheat 
another. The above analysis was taken into consideration by the OASIS Security 
Service Technical Committee response (SSTC) in a committee draft [105]. In 
response to the papers analysis, the SSTC has incorporated some changes into 
the SAML V2.0 specifications. 
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Another issue associated with SAML is delegation. Delegation is an impor- 
tant aspect of commercial Web services. Current delegation systems such as 
X. 509 proxy certificates have the problem that commercial Web Services tools 
fail to recognize these certificates or process them properly. SAML has a broad- 
ening commercial support but lacks delegation capabilities. The work in [1061 
proposes a delegation framework that uses SAML assertion for both direct and 
indirect delegations. This delegation framework is based on the SAML Attribute 
statement and SOAP binding. 
Yuen-Yan JChan in [107] shows how it is possible to launch a "Weakest Link 
Attack" on a SSO system that uses SAML V2.0. This work exploits some of the 
optional requirements in SAML V2.0. A scenario is analysed where an adver- 
sary launches a concurrent service request at two service providers that require 
different authentication levels (e. g. one using X. 509 PKI based authentication 
and the other using a simple username password authentication). Assuming the 
adversary can legitimately have access to one of the SPs (e. g. the one that uses 
username password authentication), he will also be able to access the other SP. 
This attack can be launched if the following conditions are met: User redirection 
for request and response messages is required in the SSO system. And at least 
one of the following conditions in the response message is true: The level of au- 
thentication is not indicated or implied; the subject being authenticated is not 
indicated or implied; or there is not integrity for the message segment that binds 
the subject and the authentication level. 
This is mainly because the <AuthnContextClassRef> is contained in <AuthnContext> 
that is contained in <AuthnStatement> are not mandatory to be included in the 
<Assertion> in SAML V2.0. This means it is not mandatory to include the 
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indicator of the required authentication level nor to include the indicator of the 
authentication subject in the response. The proposed solution is to include the 
above indicators and to sign the response message. 
As it has been discussed in this thesis the process of integration of Web 
services and mobile network is not straightforward. Example of this is [108] where 
the authors propose a framework for mobile Web services based on a "Mobile 
Agent", to make Web services more convenient and efficient by taking advantages 
of the location information in the Web service. However, this proposal fails to 
address the basic security needs, such as authentication and privacy; also the 
"Personal Agent Server" is designed as WAP gateway, where translation between 
WAP and TCP take place. The authors also make use of the mobile operator 
ability to provide users' location based data, but does not suggest any measures 
to insure users' privacy. 
Another interesting approach of using "Agents" is proposed in [109]. The 
agent is run at the service host to minimis the work by the mobile device. How- 
ever; the paper fails to address important security risks such as passive and active 
attacks and is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks as no integrity protection in 
place. 
5.4 Global Mobile Telecom Industry Market Trends 
The growth in number of users using mobile phones in the last 10 years or so has 
been phenomenal. Now reaching 1.12 billion units world wide according to 2007 
data from Strategy Analytic, there are more mobile phones than PCs! 
Mobile phones are becoming more than just devices to make calls; most of 
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the latest new mobile phones have built in camera, personal organizer, radio, 
and dozens more applications. There are two main reasons for that. The first is 
that mobile phones processors are becoming more powerful with more memory 
built inside them; this has enabled the possibility to add more hardware and 
software into them, hence; more applications. The second reason which is more 
importantly is that in many regions in the world (especially the developed world) 
they have reached over 100 percent user penetrations, which means that the 
revenue from phone calls almost saturated. And therefore, the leading players 
in the telecom industry (network operators and handset manufacture) needed to 
find new streams of revenue. This has lead to the development of a new market 
known as Value Added Services or VAS. 
In telecommunication industry VAS is every service beyond core service such 
as voice calls and faxes (sometimes even Short Messaging Services SMS is consid- 
ered core service). Many operators offers their own VAS service however, many 
gets their VAS through VAS provider or content providers. Type of applications 
for VAS varies including: 
9 Mobile gaming 
" 
Mobile personalization (wallpaper, Ring Back Tones (RBT)) 
" 
Mobile music 
9 Mobile TV 
" 
Messaging (Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), Instant Messaging (IM)) 
" 
M-Commerce 
. 
Emails 
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The global VAS market is big; the following table demonstrate the size of the 
market. 
Region Mobile Subscribers in 07 Data Revenues in 07 
EMEA 785m USD54b 
US and Canada 235m USD18b 
Central Latin America 231m USD4b 
Rest of Asia 357m USD32b 
China 521m USD7b 
India 103m USD1b 
Source: Morgan Stanley, IDC 2005 
Screen Digest predicts that by 2011 mobile television will be the dominant 
service in Europe (generating revenues of 4.7 billion). In second place will be 
mobile gaming with 2.0 billion revenues and music comes in third with 1.47 
billion. 
According to the Informa Telecom and Media, in2004 UK ringtone sales 
reached 174m, 216 percent more than the 80m spent on CD singles. Ring tones 
currently account 34 percent of the mobile content revenues. The Figure 5.4il- 
lustrate the worldwide revenue from mobile personalization (Source: Informs 
Telecom and Media). 
According to Frost Sullivan, USD 25B global market for m-commerce by 2006 
representing 15 percent of the Global On-line Commerce. The Figure 5.5illustrate 
the scope of mobile commerce transaction. 
As the above figures shows the mobile telecom market is serious business and 
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Mobile Personalisation Revenues, Worldwide, 
2003-2008, E million 
CAGR 
7.033 
Mobile Graphics 1. i17 42% 
Ringtones 
2.645 
31S 6 Ni 17.5% 
L321 
2003 2008 
Figure 5.4: Mobile Personalization Revenue Worldwide 
is growing, and as mobile user penetration raises the trends is moving toward VAS. 
Innovative application in particular in M-Commerce will require the solutions to 
be more flexible and secure. For these reasons we believe mobile Web service will 
play a more leading role in M-commerce platforms; however, such applications 
will only succeed if they have the right level of security protection. Therefore, 
we do think that the topic of this thesis and its finding is very relevant not only 
to the research and academic community but also to the business sector, as it 
touch's key issue of potential future mobile Web services solutions. 
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Mobile Commerce Transaction Opportunity (US$ Billion) 
2009 9.7 27.13 34.6 
2008 7.2 2239 28.4 
2007 5.5 18.69 21.7 
. 
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Figure 5.5: Mobile Commerce Transaction Worldwide 
5.5 3GPP Generic Authentication Architecture 
(GAA) 
Authenticating users to application servers is a big security issue for most E/M- 
Commerce system. In the other hand, the GSM authentication infrastructure 
has proved itself to be a very successful system. Recently the 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP) started working on a framework that enables mobile 
operators to extend 3G authentication as a service, this framework is known as 
the Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA). We introduce the GAA in the 
next section. 
The main concept behind GAA is to use the 3GPP Authentication Center 
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(AuC), the USIM, and their 3GPP AKA protocol to enable application functions 
in the network and ont the user side to establish shared keys; the GAA has peen 
specified in [95]. 
5.5.1 GAA an overview 
The GAA specification uses a `reference model' to shows the entities involved in 
the bootstrapping operation. A simple representation of the `reference model' is 
shown in Figure 5.6. The system consists of four elements namely; Bootstrapping 
Server Function (BSF), Network Application Function (NAF), Home Subscriber 
System (HSS), and User Equipment (UE). These elements interact with each 
other using reference points; Ub, Ua, Zh, and Zn. This section will discuss the 
various elements of the system and their reference points. 
Figure 5.6: Bootstrapping reference model 
The NAF can be located at a different network from the BSF, in this case a 
Diameter Proxy (D-Proxy) element is added to the reference model which acts 
as a proxy between the visited NAF, and the subscriber "Home" BSF, if this is 
the reference model will be adjusted as shown in Figure 5.7. 
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Home subscriber system (HSS) 
HSS stores all the user security settings (USSs), HSS is the only persistent storage 
for GUSSs. The GUSS can contain application specific USSs. 
Bootstrapping server function (BSF) 
The BSF is used to generate the session keys that will be used between the UE 
and the NAF. This happens only after both the BSF and the UE are mutually 
authenticated using the AKA protocol. The BSF specifies the lifetime of the keys 
according to its local policy. The BSF will have access to the GBA User Security 
Setting (GUSS)from the HSS. This allows the BSF to select which User Security 
Setting (USS) from the GUSS is valid for which NAF. 
Network application function (NAF) 
NAF uses the session keys generated during the bootstrapping to communicate 
with the UE, and to be able to run the application specific protocol. It is assumed 
that the NAF does not have any security association with the UE, but it is able 
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to securely communicate with the BSF. The NAF can obtain the USS from the 
HSS via the BSF during the run of the application specific protocol. 
If the UE wants to communicate with a NAF that operates in another net- 
work, the visited NAF shall use a D-Proxy to communicate wiht the subscriber 
BSF. The D-Proxy must function as a proxy between the visited NAF and the 
home BSF and must able to communicate with it over secure channel. 
User Equipment (UE) 
The UE must be able to support the HTTP Digest Protocol [41], and should be 
able to derive the new key material from the Confidentiality Key (CK) and the 
Integrity Key (IK) to be used with the protocol over the Ua interface. Also, it 
should be able to support the NAF specific application protocol. 
Reference Point Ua 
This reference point is used between the UE and the NAF, the application proto- 
col is carried over this reference point. The communication in the Ua is secured 
using the keys generated between the UE and the BSF. The NAF should be able 
to indicate to the UE to use newer key if the key has expired. 
The Ua reference point can be secured using HTTPS as defined in TS 133.222 
[110]. The UE will establish a TLS tunnel with the NAF. The NAF is authen- 
ticated to the UE by means of a public key certificate which the user needs to 
verify (checks that the server certificate corresponds to the FQDN). The UE (i. e. 
the client in TLS terms) does not need to authenticate itself to the NAF. 
Once the tunnel is established the UE will indicate to the NAF that GBA 
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authentication is supported by adding a constant string "3gpp-gba" to the HTTP 
header. The rest of the messages used in this process are discussed in the boot- 
strapping procedure section. 
Reference Point Ub 
The Ub reference point is between UE and BSF. This reference point provides 
mutual authentication between the UE and the BSF. It allows the UE to use the 
3GPP AKA to bootstrap the session keys. 
The Ub reference point specifies some requirements, including; the BSF should 
be able to identify the UE and that both should be able to authenticate each other 
based on the AKA; the BSF shall be able to send a bootstrapping transaction 
identifier to the UE and be able to send (BSF to UE) the expiry time of the key. 
Reference Point Zh 
The reference pint Zh used between the BSF and the HSS to allow the BSF to 
fetch the required authentication information and all the Generic Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GBA) user security settings from the HSS through an internal 
interface to the 3G AuC. 
There are some requirements on the Zh reference point, including; the BSF 
to initiate all the procedures; mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity 
shall be provided; the BSF shall be able to send subscriber bootstrapping infor- 
mation; the HSS shall be able to send 3GPP AKA vectors and the complete set of 
the subscriber GBA USS to the BSF. Its important to note that if the subscriber 
GUSS is updated in the HSS, it will not be updated in BSF until the next time 
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the BSF fetches the authentication vectors and GUSS from HSS. 
Reference Point Zn 
This reference point is used by the NAF to fetch the key material agreed over the 
reference point Ub by the UE and the BSF. It can also be used to fetch application 
specific user security settings from the BSF if requested from the NAF. 
The Zn reference point will be secured according to NDS/IP [111] if both the 
BSF and the NAF are located within the same operator; if they are in different 
operator the Zn' reference point between the D-Proxy and the BSF will be secured 
using TLS [62,112]. The NAF will send a key material request to the BSF, 
containing the NAF's public hostname used by the UE's; the NAF should be 
able to indicate to the BSF if it requires the USSs for a single application or 
several applications. 
As with the Ub reference point the BSF should be able to indicate the lifetime 
of the keys, thus indicating the expiry time of the keys. This lifetime that must 
be identical to the lifetime sent by the BSF to the UE over the Ub. 
Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier 
The bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID) is used to bind the subscriber 
identity to the keying material in reference points Ua, Ub, and Zn. The B-TID 
must be globally unique and could be used as a key identifer in protocols used 
in the reference point Ua. The B-TID should inform the NAF about the home 
network and the BSF about the UE 
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5.5.2 Bootstrapping procedure 
The following list specifies the format of the bootstrapping procedure. Figure 5.8 
shows the. overall messages communication during the GAA bootstrapping pro- 
cedures: 
1. The UE will request communication with the NAF without any GBA related 
parameters. 
2. The NAF replies with a bootstrapping initiation message; both messages 1 
and 2 will be sent over the reference point Ua. 
3. The UE contact the BSF using HTTP request. 
4. Using the Zh reference point the BSF retrieves the complete set of GBA 
user security setting from the HSS, including one Authentication Vector 
(AV) (where AV= RANDIJAUTNIIXRESIICKIIIK). Where: 
" 
RAND: Random challenge generated by the AuC. 
" 
AUTN: Authentication Token, a 128 bit value generated by the AuC 
and used with RAND to authenticate the server to the client. 
9 XRES: Expected authentication response. 
" 
CK: Cipher Key used for encryption. 
" 
IK: Integrity Key used for integrity check. 
5. To perform authentication the BSF only forwards the RAND and AUTN 
to the UE. 
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6. The UE verifies the AUTN, and generates RES and the session keys IK and 
CK. Using RES the UE calculates the Digest AKA response and sends it 
to the BSF. 
7. The BSF authenticates the UE by verifying the Digest AKA response. 
8. The BSF generates Ks by concatenating CK and IK, and generating B-TID 
which is (base64-encode(RAND@BSFservers-domain_name). 
9. The BSF sends B-TID and the lifetime of Ks to UE using 200 OK message. 
The UE then generates Ks by concatenating CK and IK. 
10. This Ks will be used to generate Ks. NAF, where Ks-NAF= KDF(Ks, "gba- 
me", RAND, IMPI, NAF_Id; KDF is the key derivation function, and "gba- 
me" is just a fixed text. 
11. The UE sends the B-TID to the NAF. 
12. The NAF request from the BSF the UE key material corresponding to B- 
TID which will be sent in the request along with the NAF's public hostname. 
13. The BSF verifies the NAF hostname. If verification successful it will derive 
the keys required to protect the protocol used over the reference point Ua 
from the key Ks and the key derivation parameters, and supply the NAF 
with the requested Ks_NAF and the lifetime of the key. 
14. The NAF now can communicate with the UE over Ua securely. 
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1 Secure communication 
Figure 5.8: Bootstrapping procedure 
5.5.3 Bootstrapping procedure with UICC 
The TS 133.220 document [95] proposes an enhancements to the bootstrapping 
protocol by adding an interface between the ME and the UICC. The idea behind 
this addition is that only the UICC is trusted at the user side and therefore the 
3G AKA keys CK and IK shall not leave the UICC. 
The bootstrapping procedure only differs in the local handling of keys and 
Authentication Vectors in the UE and the BSF, all the messages exchanged over 
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the Ub reference point are identical [951. 
5.5.4 Issues not covered by the TS 133.220 
This section highlights some important security considerations that are not cov- 
ered by the TS 133.220. 
" 
The GBA does not guarantee the freshness of the key. It does not guarantee 
that the key was not used in the previous run of the Ua protocol. It is up 
to the UE and the NAF to ensure the key freshness in GBA. 
9 The BSF will not require the UE nor the NAF to refresh the key before 
the expiry time. This should be handled by the UE's and the NAF's local 
policy. 
" 
Any updates to the subscriber's GUSS in HSS will not be propagated to 
BSF or NAF until the next time the BSF fetches these GUSS from HSS or 
the NAF from BSF. 
9 The current system allows the BSF to send the private user identity (IMPI) 
to the NAF. This could effect the user privacy? 
5.6 The Generic Mobile Web Service Platform 
In this section we propose a generic platform for authentication and payment 
between a consumer and a Web Service Provider that builds upon the Mobile 
Operator relationship with the mobile subscriber. The proposed scheme enables 
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the Mobile Operator to provide a trusted authentication service that allows a 
third party to implement an environment where Web Service Providers gain direct 
commercial access to the Mobile Operator's subscriber base for the consumption 
of digital and physical products. 
The technical novelty of the protocol is that it builds on existing industry 
standards of GBA [95] from 3GPP and web services from Liberty to provide a 
scalable, intuitive and easy to use authentication solution capable of underpin- 
ning the delivery of interoperable web services direct to the mobile consumer. 
The non-technical novelty of the protocol concerns the potential business models 
arising from the delivery of interoperable and independent web services to mobile 
consumers in a scheme that is not operated by the mobile operator. 
But why should the Mobile Operator wish to encourage such access? It has 
long been noted [1131 that distribution structures, and specifically the consumer 
facing retailing function, evolve as industries mature. Many consider traditional 
Mobile Operators to be at the early stages of their development as retailers of 
digital content. The current distribution structures typified by Vodafone Live! 
from Vodafone, T Zones from T-Mobile, and e-mocion from Telefonica are exam- 
ples of "one stop shops". Vertically integrated, they source, market and advertise 
a range of goods to consumers who are encouraged to repeat purchase. They 
may be considered as analogous to a Department Store on the high street. The 
typical High Street has evolved, however, and in many cases is complemented (if 
not replaced) by the Shopping Mall. Comprising both Department Stores and 
specialist retailers the operator of the Shopping Mall benefits from a large num- 
ber of customers (i. e. traffic volume) whilst remaining independent from the cost 
and management of the retailed stock. As the commercial benefit from provision 
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of digital content to mobile consumers transitions from promotional to revenue 
generating, the "Shopping Mall" concept of digital content retailing may become 
an attractive model for the traditional Mobile Operator. 
5.7 The Web service requirement 
The proposal involves four main actors; the Consumer, the Mobile Operator, the 
IdP (e. g. Shopping Mall Operator) and the Service Provider. 
The consumer is assumed to access the scheme via a bandwidth-constrained 
Mobile Station, comprising mobile device and service-enabling SIM card con- 
nected to a GPRS or UMTS mobile network. Service latency should be mini- 
mal without the need to purchase new equipment, and the "purchase experience" 
should be consistent across all services, irrespective of the actual service provider. 
Payment for services should be through the normal on-phone and off-phone pay- 
ment mechanisms. Anonymity is an optional consumer requirement. Service 
consumption is ad hoc, irregular and transitory in duration. 
The Shopping Mall Operator is assumed to require the maximum number 
of consumers for the. available services, and the maximum number of available 
services for the participating consumers. Service Providers and Consumers should 
be capable of dynamically and asynchronously entering and leaving the system. 
The service should be available to consumers from various and disparate trust 
domains and the service must be terminal vendor independent and capable of 
being set-up using Over The Air (OTA) techniques. 
Finally, Mobile Operator and Service Provider entities will not want to de- 
velop new business processes solely for specific Shopping Mall Operators. These 
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entities must interact with the system using standard, internationally agreed pro- 
tocols. 
We base our proposed scheme on the assumption that these requirements are 
met with a Web Services architecture as described in the functional diagram of 
Figure 5.9, which describes the interaction of the main scheme actors where: 
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Figure 5.9: Interaction of Scheme Actors 
" the consumer service endpoint is an OTA installed application running on 
a mobile device that uses the SIM card as its security element, 
" the service content is provided by a Web Services Provider in accordance 
with internet standards, 
" the Mobile Operator provides the authentication service, and 
" the Shopping Mall Operator implements a co-located 3GPP Network Ap- 
plication Function and Liberty-enabled Identity Provider entity. 
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5.8 The proposed scheme 
In our proposal the Shopping Mall Operator acts as an Identity Provider between 
Web Service Providers and each of the Web Service consumers (Mobile Stations). 
The Mobile Operator owning the SIM deployed in the Mobile Station, acts as an 
Authentication Authority to the Shopping Mall Operator. 
We utilise the combined Liberty & 3GPP GAA model, as defined in [114], 
to combine the Service Orientated Architecture of Web Services with a Mobile 
End User end point. We target the provision of identity-consuming services where 
knowledge of the user (principal) is important. In this way we address the highest 
value scenario; specifically: 
" where the service is enhanced by knowledge of some data related to the 
identity of the principal (e. g. payment). 
" where privacy, trust and authentication are highly relevant. 
We consider a federated environment where it is in the principal's interest to 
re-use such assertions/validations/vouches for access to unrelated services. Our 
platform implements a permission based access control where the permission level 
is a function of the "quality" of the initial assertion. Further, we consider the 
general case where, although the consumer identity is provided by the Mobile 
Operator customer owning entity, they are given the freedom to attest for the 
identity of a particular consumer up to "a certain level" 
. 
Therefore not all asser- 
tions are necessarily considered to be of equal quality. 
Securing identity is fundamental for Web services security, and as the iden- 
tity of valid users must move around when information moves from one trust 
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domain to another, and the fact that Web services will be used to cross trust do- 
mains makes portable trust an important requirement for Web services security. 
Authentication credentials are defined in SAML vocabularies. 
In the GSM/3GPP mobile architecture, security and trust reside in two loca- 
tions. These are the network HLR (Home Location Register) of the HSS (Home 
Subscriber System) and the Operator issued tamper resistant SIM card. We 
therefore consider the network HSS as the customer owning entity. 
A client application needs to run within the user device in order to use the 
processing capabilities of the user device. However this user device is unlikely to 
be trusted by scheme entities to hold a valuable network level identity. [Note: This 
distrust is likely to increase as devices move from traditionally closed proprietary 
operating systems to more open operating systems capable of performing the file 
manipulation required by advanced 2.5G and 3G services]. 
The customer owning entity 
- 
the network HLR 
- 
attests the identity of 
a particular consumer up to "a certain level". Application layer credentials are 
bootstrapped from the (3G) cellular network mutual authentication process and 
provided to both the End User device and the Service Provider. This allows the 
Service Provider and End User to communicate securely as they now share the 
same secret. 
We use the GBA or Generic Bootstrapping architecture of GAA (Generic 
Authentication Architecture) as described in [114] to exploit the 3GPP Authen- 
tication and Key Agreement process to produce application credentials. The 
Mobile Station uses the Bootstrapping Server Function of the Mobile Operators 
Home Subscriber System to create these application layer credentials, i. e. GBA, 
over the Ub interface. These are then shared with the Identity Provider (IdP 
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or sometimes referred to as the Network Application Function) via the Zn inter- 
face. The Mobile Station client can then communicate directly with the Service 
Provider using these credentials. 
The scheme for a registered user is summarised with reference to Figure 5.10 
where the user posses user equipment (UE) comprising mobile equipment (ME) 
and a UICC SIM card (UICC) (User-dependent and user subscription-dependent). 
The Shopping Mall Operator implements the Network Application Function (NAF/IdP) 
with consumer web services provided by the Service Provider (SP). The Mobile 
Operator provides the Boostrapping Server Function and Home Subscriber Sys- 
tem (BSF/HSS). The use case for a non-registered user begins when the User 
attempts to purchase a service from an (SP). The (SP) advises the (NAF/IdP) 
who determines if User is registered. If not registered, the (NAF/IdP) deter- 
mines if User has the capability, i. e. the "User Agent", in the form of the MIDP2.0 
and Javacard application code. If the User Agent is not present then this appli- 
cation code is OTA (Over The Air) downloaded to the User Equipment in accor- 
dance with [115]. The User Agent then registers with the (NAF/IdP) for Single 
Sign-On service. 
1. Once registered, the User Agent of the(UE) performs GBA_U with (BSF) 
over Ub. 
2. The User Agent applet within the UICC is provided with Ub parameters. 
3. The UICC component of the User Agent calculates the K3 and provides the 
ME with the service layer credentials (K3_(int/ext)_NAF). The K9 always 
remains in the UICC. 
4. The User Agent makes contact with the (NAF/IdP) to obtain a "Shopping 
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Figure 5.10: Scheme Description 
Mall" identity. 
5. Service credentials appropriate to the User Agent are communicated via Zn 
to the (NAF/IdP) 
6. A SAML authentication token for the. "Shopping Mall" is provided to the 
User Agent from the (NAF/IdP) 
7. (UE) communicates with (SP) using service credentials and requests a 
service. 
8. (SP) confirms validity of (UE)'s service credentials. 
The (UE) can now purchase from (SP) using On-Phone billing (i. e. via HSS 
as the payment gateway) or Off-Phone billing (i. e. via a second Service Provider 
who performs a payment gateway service). The use case continues with (UE) 
accessing multiple Service Providers until the session is actively terminated either 
by the User or the (SP) 
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This process allows the service provider to deliver an identity consuming web 
service direct to the End User, without having to resort to the use of end user 
certificates or setting up its own identification system. 
The Mobile Station is assumed to implement a Security Agent function 
- 
an example of which is presented in [115]. The Security Agent comprises a de- 
vice executed MIDlet application for I/O and computationally intensive opera- 
tions, together with a tamper-resistant module (e. g. Trusted Programme Module 
(TPM) and/or SIM card) executed application for secure storage and crypto- 
graphic processing. The Shopping Mall Operator is assumed to implement a 
Token Distribution Centre. 
We adopt a push-based model [116] to exchange authentication and payment 
SAML authorisation tokens between the scheme entities. Tokens are pushed from 
the Shopping Mall Operator to the Mobile Station, for local storage. This allows 
a shopping basket of services to be assembled before the tokens are subsequently 
pushed from the Mobile Station to the Web Service Providers in exchange for 
their services. 
By storing the tokens on the Mobile Station we simulate a familiar shopping 
behaviour. We allow the consumer to pause (i. e. service interuption) between the 
phases of entering the Shopping Mall (i. e. authentication), browsing and selecting 
the goods (web service selection) and proceeding to the checkout (i. e. payment). 
It is considered good practice [117] to design mobile applications so that they can 
be interrupted by the user. 
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Web Services are defined [118] as software systems that support interoperable 
network interactions. They allow implementation of a service-orientated architec- 
ture incorporating the entities of Service Provider, Service Consumer and Service 
Registry. For information to be moved around the network it must be packaged 
in a format that is understood by these entities. SOAP supports information 
exchanges by specifying a way to structure XML messages. 
As in any open network environment, these exchanges are exposed to security 
threats of message leakage, tampering and vandalism. We propose protocol and 
token implementation options that are designed to resist masquerading, message 
tampering, replay, and denial of service attacks. Further, as the characteristic 
of a Web Service is a response to a message, perceived service quality is also 
dependent on latency between message and response. We therefore also consider 
the implementation options that affect this. 
We present both specific protocol exchanges and the structure and syntax of 
the authentication and payment tokens. 
5.9.1 Prerequisites for protocol 
Our protocol uses both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques to 
provide the authentication and integrity services required. 
The following requirements must be met prior to the use of the protocol. 
" 
All actors have agreed on a specific signature algorithm. The signature on 
data X using private key K is written sK(X). 
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" 
All actors have agreed on an asymmetric encryption algorithm, for which 
the encryption of data X using public key P is written ep(X). 
" 
All actors except the consumer have encryption key pairs for encryption 
scheme, and all the actors possess a trusted copy of the public key of the 
other actors. 
" 
All actors except the consumer have asymmetric key pair for a signature 
scheme, and all the actors possess a trusted copy of the public key of the 
other actors. 
We use asymmetric cryptography to provide the security services between the 
Shopping Mall Operator and the Web Service Providers. Our scheme assumes 
that a Web Service Provider may have a transitory relationship with multiple 
Shopping Mall Operators. In this topology it is best to avoid the necessity of es- 
tablishing a long term shared secret; we thus adopt an asymmetric cryptographic 
solution for provision of security services. The Shopping Mall Operator generates 
an asymmetric key pairs for the NAF/IdP Server and obtains certificates for the 
public keys from a Certification Authority. Likewise, the Web Service Providers 
generate key pairs for their Weh Service Servers, and obtain certificates for the 
public keys. The private keys will be used for digitally signing messages. Our 
protocol is based on the assumption that the Web Service Providers have access 
to a trusted copy of the public key of the Certification Authority used to sign the 
Shopping Mall Operator's public key certificates, and vice versa. We also assume 
that the Shopping Mall Operator's Server certificate is in a format processable by 
the Web Service Providers, and that the Web Service Providers certificate are in 
a format processable by the Shopping Mall Operator. It is further assumed that 
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the Web Service has access to the Shopping Mall Operator's certificate, prior 
to commencement of the protocol. Adoption of asymmetric cryptography and 
PKI enables the scheme to easily scale to multiple Web Service Providers for 
each Shopping Mall Operator and beyond to a multiple Shopping Mall Operator 
topology. 
5.9.2 Protocol 
We describe the critical protocol exchanges to address the threat model by con- 
sidering the authentication, service selection and payment phases of the protocol. 
Our description assumes that an authenticated key establishment process has 
taken place between the Mobile Operator and the Security Agent of a Mobile 
Station [115]. 
We adopt the following additional notation: 
SP 
= 
Service Provider 
IdP 
= 
Identity Provider 
NAF 
= 
Network Application Function 
BSF 
= 
Bootstrapping Server Function 
User 
= 
Mobile phone user 
WS 
= 
Web Service 
IMPI 
= 
IP Multimedia Private Identity 
We have divided the protocol into three sections; Authentication, Service 
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Selection, and Payment, the following subsections will describe each section. Fig- 
ure 5.11 provides an overview of the protocol message flow. 
Authentication: 
Figure 5.11: Proposed Protocol 
The security requirement for this protocol phase is to authenticate the Ilse]' with- 
out user entry of username and password combination or a preloadeed certificate 
in a manner that avoids the security threat of a man in the middle attack. 
1. User to NAF/IdP [RegAccess(IMPI)]. The User sends a request to access 
the "Shopping Mall" attaching with the request the User IMPI number. 
2. NAF/IdP to User [Init BSP]. Assuming the User has not been authenticated 
at this stage, the NAF/IdP will send a request to the User to initiate a new 
Bootstrapping Procedure (BSP) 
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3. User to BSF [StartBSP(IMPI)]. We assume at this stage that the User does 
not have a valid bootstrapping session or the freshness of the key material 
is not sufficient. The User will initiate the BSP with the BSF via the Ub 
interface, the details are defined in [110]. 
4. BSF to User [B-TID, Key lifetime]. The BSF will generate B-TID which 
is a string of base 64 random data and the BSF server domain name; it 
will also generate key material K3 which is the result of concatenating the 
Confidentiality Key (CK) and the Integrity Key (IK) resulting from the 
AKA protocol. The details of the generation of B-TID and the Ks are 
defined in [95]. The User will use the B-TID as the Username and the K3 
as the password to access the NAF/IdP. B-TID will be sent to the User 
via the Ub interface along with the Key Lifetime, the password Ke will be 
generated by the user based on the AKA protocol and it will be stored in 
the UICC. 
5. User to NAF/IdP [Login (B-TID)]. The User starts the login procedure by 
forwarding its `Username' i. e. the B-TID to the NAF/IdP 
6. NAF/IdP to BSF [B-TID, NAF hostname]. The NAF/IdP needs to obtain 
the User's password i. e. K8 that belongs to B-TID in order to be able to 
authenticate the User. This is done by the NAF/IdP sending the B-TID and 
its NAF hostname to the BSF via Zn interface, the details of this operation 
are defined in [95]. 
7. BSF to NAF/IdP [K8, Key lifetime]. In response to step 6 the BSF will 
send to the NAF/IdP the User password i. e. Ks and the key lifetime (Note: 
other related data will be sent in this message, these data were omitted 
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here for simplicity); the details of this operation are defined in [95) and the 
security of this message are defined in [110] 
8. NAF/IdP to User [Challenge (RAND)]. The NAF/IdP will challenge the 
User the possession of the password i. e. K8. This step is required to protect 
against re-play attack. The NAF/IdP generates a random number RAND 
and sends it to the User. 
9. User to NAF/IdP [ChallengeResponse]. After the User receives the RAND, 
the User will generate the ChallengeResponse and sends it to the NAF/IdP 
to prove the possession of the password i. e. K3. The challengeResponse is 
a function of the RAND and K8; ChallengeResponse = f(RAND, K3); this 
operation will take place in UICC as K. will never be reviled to the handset. 
It is assumed that both the User and the NAF/IdP uses the same function 
`f' to generate the ChallengeResponse. 
10. NAF/IdP to User [UserToken]. The NAF/IdP needs to verify the Chal 
lengeResponse received in step 9, and if not successful it repeat step 8; if 
successful it will generate a UserToken (UT) and sends it to the User. The 
UT will be generated as follows: the IdP part of the NAF/IdP will generate 
a Temporary User ID (TUID), this will be used to access the SSO system 
in which the IdP acts as the Authentication Server. The TUID is derived 
by the IdP from the User ID (UID). 
Note: the NAF IdP mapping is done using a `User map table', which maps 
the User's IMPI to the UID (or TUID). 
The UT will be built by concatenating the TUID to a date/time times- 
tamp (TS), and signing the TUIDI ITS with the IdP digital signature private 
144 
5.9 Implementation 
key IdPd,,: 
sk, and encrypting the result with the IdP encryption public key 
IdPe: pk, such that the UT=eldpe, PK(SIdpda: SK[TUIDI ITS]). 
This UT will be sent to the User encrypted using the password K. received 
in step 7. 
This protocol phase uses standardised GBA techniques to establish a shared 
secret between the UE and the Shopping Mall IdP. This concludes the authen- 
tication phase, all steps can happen at an earlier time before requesting access 
to any particular third party service provider, providing the lifetime of the keys 
have not been exceeded. 
Service Selection: 
The security requirement for this protocol phase is for the user to select a ser- 
vice without exposing their identity to the Web Service Provider. The proposed 
protocol for the Service Phase of the Figure described below: 
1. User to NAF/IdP [RequestService (SPID, UT)]. Once the User receives the 
UT he/she can now request access to any service provider (SP) in the Shop- 
ping Mall. However, to do that the User must first receive SP UserToken 
from the NAF/IdP. This is achieved by the RequestService message where 
the User sends the ID of the requested SP to the NAF/IdP concatenated 
with the UT. 
The RequestService message will be encrypted with K9 to protect the mes- 
sage confidentiality, the RequestService = eK, (SPIDIJUT). 
2. NAF/IdP to User [SPUT, tsKJ. The NAF/IdP now generates a specific 
UserToken for the User to be used only with the SP requested by the SPID 
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from the RequestService message; this UserToken will be referred to as the 
SPUT. The SPUT is built as follows: first a Temporary Session Key (tsK) is 
generated by the IdP, this will be concatenated with the SPID and the TUID 
and a new timestamp TS; these data then will be signed with the IdP digital 
signature private key IdPd9: SK, and encrypted with the SP encryption public 
key SPe: PK, such that the SPUT=eSPe: pK(SIdPdSK[TUIDIISPIDIItsKIITS]). 
The SPUT will be sent along with tsK to the User in a message encrypted 
using Ks. 
It is the creation of the service provider specific SPUT, from the user to- 
ken UT generated following successful authentication of the user by the 
NAF/IdP, that provides the user anonymity towards the SP. This is an 
important aspect of the proposed scheme. 
3. User to SP [CallService(UserRequest, SPUT)]. The User can now talk di- 
rectly with the SP requesting any services offered by this SP, the CallService 
message will contain the UserRequest and the SPUT. The UserRequest will 
be encrypted using the tsK to protect the User privacy. 
Note: it is assumed at this stage that when the User sends this message to 
the SP that the User is confirming his/her selection, which can be indicated 
in the UserRequest. 
4. SP to User [Invoice]. Once the SP receives the CallService message it de- 
crypts the SPUT using its encryption private key SPe, SK, it then verifies 
the signature of the SPUT, this is done by validating the SPUT using the 
NAF/IdP signature public key sldpd,: PK, to ensure the integrity of the con- 
tent of SPUT; if the validation is successful the SP compares the TUID 
(or UID) to its registered Users database if it exist, this option allows the 
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SP to give customized services to its customers. Then the SP gets the tsK 
from SPUT and use it to decrypt the UserRequest; the SP will reply with 
an `Invoice', this Invoice will contain a confirmation of the UserRequest, 
Price, and a method of payment (e. g. Credit Cards only). The Invoice will 
be signed by the SP digital signature private key and encrypted with tsK. 
Invoice= esp,, K 
(sspp. $K 
([UserRequest II Price II MethodOfPayment I ITS]) ) 
This protocol phase creates a Temporary Session Key (tsK) to provide a 
confidentiality service that ensures the users anonymity and protects their privacy 
with respect to the Web Service Provider. 
Payment: 
The security requirement for this protocol phase is to perform a confidential 
payment without a risk of "replay" attacks to any participating financial services 
operation. The payment vehicle could be either on-phone or off-phone billing. 
The proposed protocol for the Payment Phase of the Figure described below: 
1. User to NAF/IdP [RequestService (FSPID, UT)]. The User verifies the 
invoice by decrypting it using tsK, and verifies the content of it. If the 
Invoice verification process is successful, the User now starts the payment 
phase. It is assumed that the User has an account with a Financial Service 
Provider (FSP), who will charge the User and pay the SP. However for the 
User to communicate with the FSP the User must obtain a SPUT for this 
FSP; this is done the same way as in steps 11,12, and changing the SPID 
with the FSPID. 
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2. NAF/IdP to User [SPUT FSP, tsK_FSP], SPUTYSP=eFSPe: pK 
(5IdPdSK [TUID I IFSPID IjtsK 
. 
FSP I ITS]). 
3. User to FSP (CallService[Invoice, SPUT_FSP]). The User forward the In- 
voice and the SPUT_FSP to the FSP in a CallService message, to indicate 
the User confirmation for the FSP to charge the User and pay the SP indi- 
cated in the Invoice. 
4. FSP to SP [InvoiceConfirmation(Invoice)]. Similar to protocol message 14 
of Figure 3, the FSP will decrypt and validate the signature of SPUT_FSP 
(received in message 17) to obtain the tsK_FSP which will be used to de- 
crypt the Invoice, which if successful will indicate the User confirmation to 
process the Invoice. 
The FSP then charge the Users with the amount stated in the Invoice, and 
generate an InvoiceConfirmation, which is the Invoice concatenated with the 
FSPID and a status flag to indicate the statues of the charging, which can 
only be True (successful operation) or False (unsuccessful operation). The 
InvoiceConfirmation message will be signed with the FSP signature private 
key SFSPdsK to protect the integrity of the message and to act as a proof 
of payment. InvoiceConfirmation= SFSPd,: SK(InvoiceIFSPIDI I StatusFlag) 
5. SP to User [Service Delivery], once the SP receives the InvoiceConfirmation 
message from the FSP, it validates the message signature and then checks 
the StatusFlag, which if set to `True, the SP will deliver the service to the 
User; an optional message can be sent to the FSP to confirm service delivery. 
This protocol phase uses an IdP signed timestamp TS and Web Service 
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Provider identifier SPID to protect against replay attacks. User choice of Finan- 
cial Service Provider is ensured by the service provider specific user token SPUT, 
with the Temporary Session Key tsK providing the confidentiality service.. 
As mentioned above the scheme supports both On-Phone and Off-Phone pay- 
ment mechanisms. The protocol depicted in Figure 3 and described in detail 
above is for the Of Phone payment mechanism. The On-Phone payment mech- 
anism refers to the case when the user uses the Mobile Operator as a FSP by 
charging the user's phone bills. The payment protocol will be exactly as in the 
Off-Phone case, with the main difference that the FSP will be the MO 
- 
the 
entity that contains the BSF. 
5.9.3 Authentication & payment tokens 
Our platform creates a collaborative commercial environment. Central to this is 
the notion of portable trust, i. e. identity credentials issued in one domain being 
accepted as proof of the subject's claimed identity (authentication) in another. 
There exists, therefore many parallel authentication processes. Section 3 and sub- 
sequent explanations describe the process adopted for one of them, namely GBA 
leveraging the 3GPP mobile cellular credentials. To cater for this generic require- 
ment we implement the scheme tokens (e. g. UT) as SAML objects, whose quality 
rating is based on the value of the attestation that the authentication domain 
gave the subject. The SAML object, or token, UT is therefore an authentication 
assertion of the subject (single domain entity), that has been accepted by the 
NAF/IdP for use within the collaborative commercial environment of the Con- 
trolled Shopping Mall (CSM). By issuing a UT to the subject, the subject is 
now considered a principal (Liberty terminology) within the CSM. The UT is, in 
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essence, the portable identity authentication assertion of the subject. To provide 
the quality metric, the UT is signed by the NAF/IdP in a way that is appropriate 
for the attesting authority. This quality metric is a very important element of 
our platform as it allows many diverse SP's to decide how much to "trust" the 
principal. 
The following is a list of the various tokens deployed in "The Proposed 
Scheme" : 
" 
UserToken 
(UT=ejdpe, PK (SIdpde: SK [UIDIITSI)); used by the NAF/IdP only to identify 
the user in the "Shopping Mall". 
" 
SP UserToken 
(SPUT=eSPe. pK(SIdPdsx[TUIDII SPID II tsKI ITS])); user identifier that is unique 
for every SP inside the "Shopping Mall". 
" 
Invoice 
eSP 
RK 
(SSPda: 
SK 
([UserRequestI Price I MethodOfPaymentI ITS])); is the payment token. 
" 
InvoiceConfirmation 
SFSPd,. SK(Invoice I IFSPIDI IStatusFlag); used as proof of payment. 
These tokens are implemented as XML objects, as detailed below: 
9 UserToken 
<UserToken> 
<UID>String</UID> 
<TimeStamp>Timestamp</TimeStamp> 
</UserToken> 
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" 
SP UserToken 
<SPUserToken> 
<TempUID>String</TempUID> 
<SPID>String</SPID> 
<TempSessionKey>Key</TempSessionKey> 
<TimeStamp>Timestemp</TimeStamp> 
</SPUserToken> 
" Invoice 
<Invoice> 
<InvoiceNumber>String<InvoicecNumber> 
<UserRequest> 
<Item>String</Item> 
<Quantity>int</Quantity> 
</UserRequest> 
<Price>double</Price> 
<TimeStamp>Timestamp</TimeStamp> 
</Invoice> 
" 
InvoiceConfirmation 
<InvoiceConfirmation> 
<Invoice> 
<InvoiceNumber>String<InvolcecNumber> 
<UserRequeat> 
<Item>String</Item> 
<Quantity>int</Quantity> 
</UaerRequeat> 
<Price>double</Price> 
<TimeStamp>String</TimeStamp> 
</Invoice> 
<FinacialSP>String<FinacialSP> 
<Status>boolean<Statua> 
</InvoiceConfirmation> 
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These XML objects are incorporated in the SOAP messages that exchange 
information between scheme actors. Example SOAP messages arising from the 
scheme are presented in Appendix A. 
5.9.4 Proof of concept prototype 
To validate our proposal we have constructed a Proof of Concept model, based 
on the readily available open source tools: 
" 
BSF, NAFJdP, SP and FSP are deployed as Web Services in Axis (Apache 
Extensible Interaction System). Axis is a SOAP processor that has been 
developed as an Apache open source project. Apache Axis 1.3 is deployed 
on top of Jakarta Tomcat application server and the above Services are 
deployed in the Apache Axis 1.3. Those services are implemented in J2EE 
environment. 
.A J2ME Client performs the Mobile End User function and is emulated by 
the Wireless KToolbar [119] from Sun Microsystems, running our Security 
Agent MIDP 2.0 MlDlet on the reference J2ME implementation. The SIM 
card Security Agent function is provided by the JCOPS suite of tools for 
Java Card applet development. 
" 
Communication between Web Services as well as Web Services and Mobile 
client has been developed using SOAP messages over http. For authentica- 
tion SAML tokens were used and are added to the SOAP messages. Axis 
client is also included in some of the Web Services to invoke services in 
another Web Service. WSDL document for each web service is created by 
the Axis Engine. 
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" 
According to the protocol, communication between all the entities are se- 
cured using java. security and javax. crypto libraries. SOAP messages are 
signed by XML signature to ensure message integrity. VeriSign's Trust 
Services Integration Kit is used generate XML signatures. 
The demonstration environment of the proof of concept model is implemented 
in J2ME and J2EE. J2ME provides the necessary Mobile device simulation and 
J2EE provide the web service implementation and deployment. The model is 
designed so that each phase of a specific use case is initiated manually and mon- 
itored by visual feedback through the use of J2ME mobile simulator. The full 
code of the system is presented in Appendix 1. 
From this Proof of Concept we have identified the following technical and 
implementation bottlenecks to the acceptance of the scheme: 
1. The mobile operator must be considered as a trusted third party. The 
derived GAA credentials used to secure the application are always known 
to the mobile operator's BSF. 
2. GBA requires a GBA Bootstrapping Client within the ME for operation. 
This client is a native software object within the ME; it is neither imple- 
mented by, nor under the control of, the Shopping Mall Operator. For 
added security against tampering the UICC SIM must also GBA aware. 
All participating UEs must be GBA compliant. 
3. The BSF is a network operator service. The Mobile Operators of all par- 
ticipating users must implement a compliant BSF service. 
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5.10 Evaluation 
In this section we evaluate the novelty and originality of the protocol and include 
a security analysis section which identifies some possible security threats. 
The main novelty of the protocol can be summarized as follows: 
. 
The way in which the SIM been utilized, from the way we install the user 
agent OTA, and the storage of the security tokens. This is an improve- 
ment over other schemes, e. g. [78,79], where it is not clear how to get 
the SIM to behave as required and the ability to gain access to the SIM. 
In [66]the author proposes an end-to-end application-layer security solution 
for wireless enterprise applications using the J2ME. The proposed solution 
uses pure Java components to provide end-to-end client authentication and 
data confidentiality and integrity between wireless J2ME-based clients and 
J2EE-based servers. However, the proposal does not make use of the SIM 
and it places great trust on the mobile device which is an entrusted envi- 
ronment. Therefore we believe we add significant improvement by utilizing 
the SIM to handle the sensitive security credentials. 
. 
The way the "smart" tokens allowed to establish a relation between the 
NAF environment (i. e. the mobile environment) and the IdP environment 
(i. e. the SSO environment). 
" 
How the system allows the user to switch on and off from the anonymous 
mode. By linking (or breaking the link) the user account in the relation 
between the NAF and the IdP. In [77] it is only possible to use one mode of 
operation, and in [47] the author makes intensive use of certificates at the 
client side (i. e. user), which is an issue in mobile environment. 
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" Because of the architecture of the system, payments is just another service 
and financial service providers (including the mobile operator)can be treated 
as just another service provider in the system. 
5.10.1 System Simulation 
To further demonstrate and evaluate the solution, a proof-of-concept demonstra- 
tion has been developed. This section will present the operation of the demon- 
stration. In this scenario we have built a prototype for an M-Commerce case 
study, that simulate a virtual shopping mall. The user will enter the shopping 
mall using an on-device main page, from which he can choose his favorite store. 
Once inside the store the user can then browse for goods/services on offer. After 
that the user is presented with a payment option (e. g. paying using their phone 
bills or via bank transfer). Once the payment is confirmed the user will receive 
the good/service they requested. Figure 5.12 provides the welcoming screen of 
the Shopping Mall. 
Figure 5.13 demonstrate the purchasing process where the buyer select a store 
within the shopping mall. 
The conformation of the purchase is shown in Figure 5.14, where the user is 
presented with an invoice to confirm the purchase. 
The selection of the payment method is presented in Figure 5.15. In this 
case the user is presented with two options: paying through the user's mobile 
operator; or using a bank account. 
In Figure 5.16 the user receives the video clip he purchased. 
Both Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 give examples of the security tokens of the 
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Figure 5.12: ShoppingMall overview 
system both in the mobile and the shopping mall environment. 
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Figure 5.13: purchasing process 
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F, 
Figure 5.14: Conformation and Invoice 
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Figure 5.15: Selecting a payment rauet hod 
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Figure 5.16: Receiving the order 
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File Edit Project Help 
4 New Project 
... 
' Open Project 
... 
Q,, Settings 
... 
8u4d L'+p Run clear console 
Device: MediaControlSlon V 
Project "AspidataShoppingMall" loaded 
Running with storage root MedlaControlSkin 
Connecting with Identity Provider ; IMPI number : 1111 
Identity Provider to user ; initating a neu Bootstapping Procedc 
User to BSF ; Intieting the BSP; IMPI number : 1111 
Retrive B-TID from BSF 
B-TID : 7200dadc1f73846a0 
User to Identity Provider forwading the B-TID for login : 7200de 
Identity Provider to User ; Challenge(RAND) : 854eblel 
Generating Challenge Response : 6eldb9b7 
User to Identity Provider Challenge Response : 6eldb9b7 
Identity Provider to User UserToken : signnfo6Gs990tclv5v6gzwl 
SPv7CjvVug==/signdata656425c323db6864/data 
Calling Blockbuster Sports 
User to Identity Provider requesting the service from : Blockbue 
SPv7CjvVug==/signdata656425c323db6864/dataujarning: To avoid pote 
networking, should be performed in a different thread than the 
coetoandAction(J handler. 
Identity Provider to User Service Provider specific UserToken 
User Calling FootBall Clip from Blockbuster Sports by sending SF 
Response from Sport to User with the Invoice 
User Calling FootBall Clip from Blockbuster Sports by sending SF 
Response from Sport to User with the Invoice 
Figure 5.17: Mobile environment security tokens 
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Figure 5.18: Shopping mall security tokens 
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5.10.2 Security Analysis 
Security analysis of communication protocols is not a straightforward process and 
it very much depends of the objectives required. The threat analysis presented 
in this section is based on the security analysis principles presented in [10,94]. 
The centralization issue is a major security issue with NAF/IdP (i. e the shop- 
ping mall server). The IdP section is based on an SSO system, which could be a 
single point of failure. If the IdP fails, the whole system will fail. However it is 
assumed that the IdP will be held by a trusted third party which will ensure the 
overall protection of the system. 
Timing attack: the aim of this attack is to reveal the user identity or to 
understand user behaviours by monitoring the network traffic. This attack can 
be serious if not many users are using the system or the IdP doesn't change the 
"User Identity" regularly. An eavesdropper who is monitoring the network traffic 
can conclude with some probability that this User is trying to access a particular 
SP. More precise solution to this is to increase the time intervals between receiving 
and sending another message at the User and/or IdP side. 
Attack on the communication links: a network eavesdropper who captures 
any of the communication messages in the system will not be able to gain access 
to the information about the user as all the user related data are encrypted. 
Attack on the MS: all the security properties of the MS are stored in the SIM. 
If these properties can be extracted from the SIM, either by stealing or cloning 
the SIM, the attacker can claim to be the subscriber to the BSF. The user will 
be at risk until the SIM will be blocked. 
Attack on the Service Provider: if an attacker manages to get access to the 
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SP system or even the SP itself tries to gain information about the user it should 
not be able to do so, because the user is known to the SP by a random ID with 
no link to user true identity. 
Attack on communication links: an attacker may not be able to read the 
messages sent in the system, but it is still possible that he/she can modify the 
network traffic. Therefore integrity protection is fundamental to the operation of 
such a system. This problem can be overcome with the use of some established 
techniques such as SSL/TLS with client/server certificates [17]. 
5.11 Summary 
SAML is used in Web Service to address the issue of portable identity, and very 
likely to be adopted it in Mobile Web service. Care must be taken when designing 
a SAML protocol for Mobile Web service, to balance the requirements between 
protocol security and efficiency. 
When designing an authentication protocol with SAML for Mobile Web ser- 
vice, the network architecture must be taken into account to achieve the required 
balance between security and efficiency. 
This chapter introduced a generic platform for the direct consumption of Web 
services by a Mobile Station; we described how the Liberty Alliance ID-FF model 
can make use of the extended authentication services offered by 3GPP GAA to 
provide a secure infrastructure environment to mobile phone users and Service 
Providers. 
The main contributions of system architecture, protocols, and enabling data 
structures could form the basis to provides: 
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1. the user with a high level service discovery interface plus anonymity from 
Web Service Providers; 
2. the Mobile Operator with a pivotal role and a revenue generating opportu- 
nity in the provision of a web services security and payment platform; 
3. the Service Provider with a secure, scalable distribution channel. 
The proposed architecture allows developers and researchers to rethink cur- 
rent distribution structures and business models for the sourcing and delivery of 
digital services to mobile subscribers. 
More an more services are adopting Web service for their solution to benefit 
from the flexibility and other advantages that Web services offer. And with 
the service now available on mobile devices such as mobile phons and PDAs 
where users keep personal information; in addition to the huge number of service 
interactions, user privacy is of critical important to be protected and managed 
efficiently. 
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Privacy in Mobile Web Services 
6.1 Introduction 
Web services are increasingly being adopted as a viable means to access Web- 
based applications. This has been enabled by the tremendous standardization 
effort to describe, advertise, discover, and invoke web services. On the other 
hand, government agencies and other industrial entities collect, store, process, 
and share information about millions of people who have different preferences 
regarding their privacy. This naturally raises a number of legal and technical 
issues that must be addressed to preserve people privacy. The issue of privacy 
becomes even more important when addressing Web services in mobile environ- 
ment. People nowadays keep all sort of personal and work related data in their 
mobile phones and PDAs, in addition to the growing number of services that use 
location based services which could effect the privacy of the user if not managed 
properly. This section first looks at the issue of privacy then it looks at its effect 
on web services. 
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6.1.1 Privacy overview 
Before looking at privacy from a technical point of view it helps to define privacy 
in more general terms. People often think of privacy as some kind of right. 
The concept of a `right' is not correct, because a right seems to be an absolute 
standard. In addition, there is a difference between legal rights, on the one hand, 
and natural or moral rights, on the other. 
Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining a `personal space', 
free from interference by other people and organizations [120]. Also privacy is 
not a single interest, but rather has several dimensions: 
" 
Privacy of the person: This is concerned with the integrity of the individ- 
ual's body. 
Privacy of personal behaviour: This relates to all aspects of behaviour, but 
especially to sensitive matters, such as habits and political activities, both 
in private and in public places. 
" 
Privacy of personal communications: Individuals claim an interest in being 
able to communicate among themselves, using various media, without rou- 
tine monitoring of their communications by other persons or organizations. 
" 
Privacy of personal data: Individuals claim that data about themselves 
should not be automatically available to other individuals and organiza- 
tions, and that, even where data is possessed by another party, the individ- 
ual must be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over that data 
and its use. This is sometimes referred to as `data privacy' and `information 
privacy' 
. 
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The problem of privacy protection is that it has to be balanced against many 
other, often competing, interests. 
The privacy interests of one person or category of people may conflict with 
some other interest of their own, and the two may have to be traded off (e. g. 
privacy against access to credit, or quality of health care); and the privacy interest 
of one person or category of people may conflict with other interests of another 
person, category of people, organization, or society as a whole (e. g. creditors, an 
insurer, and protection of the public against serious diseases). 
Finding the balance between computer security and privacy is not always 
easy. In order to protect user's privacy, it is best not to give any information, 
however, in many cases computer users often asked to give some personal/private 
data such as in system authentication to gain access to a system or application. 
A common misuse of the term `privacy', particularly by security specialists 
and computer scientists, is to refer to the security of data against various risks, 
such as the risks of data being accessed or modified by unauthorized persons. In 
some cases, it is used even more restrictively, to refer only to the security of data 
during transmission. These aspects are only a small fraction of the considerations 
within the field of `information privacy'. More appropriate terms to use for those 
concepts are `data security' and `data transmission security'. 
The term `confidentiality' is also sometimes used by computer scientists to 
refer to `data transmission security', risking confusion with obligations under the 
law of confidence. 
The following are common privacy and security problems exist in a typical 
computer network: 
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9 Lack of privacy: Transmissions that can be sent over a network can be 
intercepted. 
" No proof of sender: It is possible for people to transmit data, and pretend 
to send it as someone else. 
. 
Data integrity: In a default setup, there is no way to check to make sure 
that data was not altered in transmission. 
9 Non-repudiation: In a default setup, there is no way to prove that a user 
really did send a given transmission (eg, a user can easily claim "I did not 
send that email 
- 
it must have been someone else! ") 
Because of the nature of WS where one entity will interact with many other 
entities at different level of security and trust; it is important to `manage' or 
`protect' privacy of the various entities in the system. This section looks at 
current standards/architectures that address privacy and its possible use in web 
services. 
6.1.2 The Platform for Privacy Preferences 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) is a W3C framework for web 
privacy management (www. w3. org/P3P/). It enables Web sites to express their 
privacy practices in a standard format that can be retrieved automatically and 
interpreted easily by user agents [121]. P3P uses XML policy files to describe a 
web sites privacy practices. These policies describe who collects what data and 
for what purpose. 
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The idea behind the system is that sites create P3P files describing their pri- 
vacy policies, which can easily be read by browser software. Visitors set their 
own privacy preferences on their browsers, and if those preferences and the poli- 
cies of visited sites match up, everybody is happy and the system stays in the 
background. If they don't match, the browser can point this out and ask the user 
what to do. It can also prevent actions that would otherwise happen automati- 
cally, for example it can block cookies if the user's preferences don't match the 
site's cookie policy. 
P3P 1.0 has mainly five goals as defined by the standard [121]: 
"A standard schema for data a Web site may wish to collect, known as the 
"P3P base data schema" 
.A standard set of uses, recipients, data categories, and other privacy dis- 
closures 
9 An XML format for expressing a privacy policy 
9A means of associating privacy policies with Web pages or sites, and cookies 
"A mechanism for transporting P3P policies over HTTP 
Though P3P is a very good tool for web privacy it has some serious issues. 
The main problem with P3P is that it cannot enforce the rules! If a site wants 
to say one thing but actually executes another policy, it can do that. Another 
problem is that P3P requires users to make privacy decisions in advance, without 
regard to specific circumstances in a particular site context. Though P3P is useful 
to address user privacy challenges, it has some issues that could effect its adoption 
by the industry such as [122]: 
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" 
The languages available to describe user privacy preferences are not suffi- 
ciently expressive 
9 P3P policies published by web sites are not trusted by users 
9 P3P framework does not provide a coherent view of available privacy pro- 
tection mechanisms to the user 
According to the Platform for Privacy Preference 1.1 Specification "Signif- 
icant sections were removed from earlier drafts of the P3P 1.0 specification in 
order to facilitate rapid implementation and deployment of a P3P first step. A 
future version of the P3P specification might incorporate those features after P3P 
1.0 is deployed. Such specification would likely include four major components 
that were part of the original P3P vision but not included in P3P 1.0: 
9a mechanism to allow sites to offer a choice of P3P policies to visitors 
9 mechanisms to allow for non-repudiation of agreements between visitors and 
Web sites 
9a mechanism to allow visitors (through their user agents) to explicitly agree 
to a P3P policy 
"a mechanism to allow user agents to transfer user data to services 
55 
171 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.3 Privacy in The Web services architecture 
The Web services architecture (WSA) [123] provides a conceptual model and a 
context for understanding Web services and the relationships between the com- 
ponents of this model; in addition the WSA describes a set of requirements [124] 
for a standard reference architecture for Web services; the one of interest here is 
the set or requirements which enables privacy protection for the consumer of a 
Web Service across multiple domains and services, which are(based on [123]): 
9 the WSA must enable privacy policy statements to be expressed about Web 
services. 
" advertised Web Service privacy policies must be expressed in P3P [1211. 
. 
the WSA must enable a consumer to access ä Web Service's advertised 
privacy policy statement. 
9 the WSA must enable delegation and propagation of privacy policy. 
. 
Web Services must not be precluded from supporting interactions where 
one or more parties of the interaction are anonymous. 
The issue with privacy policies is that they are typically much more of the 
obligatory form than access control policies. A policy that requires a provider 
agent to properly propagate P3P tags, for example, represents an obligation on 
the provider entity. However, it is not possible to prevent a rogue provider agent 
from leaking private information, for that the WSA also highlight some key se- 
curity considerations, here are the list of which may have direct impact with 
privacy: 
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. 
Distributed Policies: Security Policies can be used to define the access 
privileges of request and responses between parties. These polices can be 
validated at run time in the context of interaction. Each party in an inter- 
action validates its own policies. 
. 
Trust Policies: Distributed policies that apply to the environment of the 
other sides party in an interaction. Trust policies may be recursive. They 
may be defined against trust policies of involved parties and even whole 
domains. Distributed Identities, Policies and Trust can be described and 
processed by a machine. Trust mechanisms can be used to form Delegation 
and Federation relationships. These mechanisms can be used to facilitate 
secure interactions between web services across trust boundaries in a dis- 
tributed fashion. 
" 
Secure Discovery Mechanism: Secure Discovery Mechanism enforces 
policies that govern publication and discovery of a Service. When publish- 
ing a Service, an identity is usually necessary to assert Service publication 
policies, except for some cases of peer-to-peer discovery. When a requester 
entity discovers a Service, it may or may not provide an Identity; discovery 
may well be anonymous. 
" 
Trust and Discovery: The decision whether or not to trust a partic- 
ular Service arises when a requester entity chooses a Web Service from 
a previously unknown provider entity. This leads to an important differ- 
ence between manual discovery and autonomous discovery. When manual 
discovery is used, a human makes the judgement of whether to trust and 
engage a previously unknown Service that is discovered. Whereas with au- 
tonomous discovery, a machine makes this decision. Since people may not 
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trust a machine to make significant judgement decisions, agents performing 
autonomous discovery are often limited to using private discovery services 
that list only those services that have been pre-screened and known to be 
trustworthy by the requester entity. 
6.1.4 WS-Privacy 
WS-Privacy enables users and Web services to state privacy preferences and Web 
services to state and implement privacy practices. WS-Privacy is not yet pub- 
lished but it has been proposed within the context of Web Services Security. It 
will be using a combination of WS-Policy, WS-Security, and WS-'Dust, orga- 
nizations can state and indicate conformance to stated privacy policies. This 
specification will describe a model for how a privacy language may be embed- 
ded into WS-Policy descriptions and how WS-Security may be used to associate 
privacy claims with a message. Finally, this specification will describe how WS- 
Trust mechanisms can be used to evaluate these privacy claims for both user 
preferences and organizational practice claims [22]. 
WS-Privacy will allows web Service providers and requestors to stat their 
privacy preferences and organizational privacy practice statements. It is very 
likely that WS-Privacy will be similar to P3P to allow for privacy policy exchange 
and agreement for web services. 
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6.1.5 Related Work on Privacy 
The huge development of the number of Web services application over the past 
years meant that the use of personal information by these application has in- 
creased greatly. This has lead to the concerns of misuse of these personal data 
whether by malicious or accidental means. Which in turn lead various legal and 
technical bodies to come up with ways to address these privacy issues. However, 
a flexible, practical system for ensuring that these rights are respected in web 
services is still missing [125,126]. Existing privacy policy approaches for privacy 
protection, such as making the service providers privacy policy known to the 
user, or the use of P3P [121 privacy policies, are inadequate. In the former case, 
the user cannot know for sure whether or not the provider will honor its policy; 
in the latter case, there is no flexibility for the user to specify her own policy 
for governing her own personal information the providers policy is the only one 
offered. The work in [126] tries to address the above limitation by developing 
a flexible user-oriented privacy controller based system that preserves legislated 
user privacy rights expressed in the form of user privacy policies. The processing 
of the policies, as well as the enforcement of compliance to the policies, are the 
responsibility of privacy controllers. 
An important issue regarding privacy with Web services architecture was 
discussed in [127]. The WSA does not cover all the privacy issues that might 
arise in a real scenario; for example there are no consideration regarding the 
discovery agencies in web services. Discovery agencies provide a searchable set 
of web services descriptions in centralized our distributed UDDI registries [24]. 
Some of the problems comes from the fact that any entity in WSA can act in one 
or multiple roles. This can become an issue for privacy if for example a discovery 
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agencies also act as Service providers; or when discovery agencies can delegate 
tasks to other services, in such cases its not clear how the discovery agencies will 
protect the requestors sensitive information. 
One of the main topics associated with privacy is that of trust. However, 
the meaning of trust can be sometime ill-defined, the work in [128] describe 
six characteristics of trust: Implicitness, Asymmetry, Transitivity, Antonymy, 
Asynchrony, and Gravity. Each of these characteristics has different effects on 
trust depending in the environment. The work concludes that due to the above 
characteristics trust is difficult to measure. 
Another important issue related to privacy, in particular for Web Services is 
the ability to enforce and verify their compliance with privacy policies. Structured 
policy languages can play a major role by supporting automated enforcement of 
privacy policies and auditing of access decisions. In [129] the authors list the 
requirements for any standard structured language for supporting expression and 
enforcement of privacy policies. This includes: it should be able to describe 
the constraints and the purposes for which the data was collected, the language 
must enable the expression of directly-enforceable policies, it should be platform 
independent, and the language used for privacy policies must be the same as or 
integrated with the language used for access control policies. Also in [129] the 
author gives a brief overview of the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language 
(EPAL) from IBM [130] and OASIS Standard eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) [131,132], and then compares the two languages to show 
where they differ. Concluding that functionality of XACML 2.0 is a superset of 
EPAL 1.2 and provides more features. 
P3P is usually implemented as an agent working with the users web browsers 
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to manage/supervise users' privacy policy. In [133] the authors propose a P3P 
privacy enhancing agent to address the privacy concerns from the client side by 
helping users analyzing web site P3P policies. This agent will retrieve P3P policy, 
enforce user privacy preference, and handel the decision making and negotiation 
processes based on user preferences, transaction history with the particular web 
site and related privacy practice knowledge from other agents. 
6.1.6 Enabling Privacy with P3P in Federated Environ- 
ment 
The aim here is to utilize the benefit of P3P in assisting to protect the user privacy 
at the same time overcoming P3P enforcement limitation by deploy it in feder- 
ated system such as the Liberty Alliance. The novelty of the system lies in the 
integration of the Web Services technologies and P3P [121], with the Generic Au- 
thentication Architecture (GAA)from the Third Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) [95]. 
The rest of this chapter describes the architecture of the system and shows 
how this integration takes place. 
Generic Mobile Web Services Platform for Healthcare 
The architecture used is based on the Generic Mobile Web Service Platform 
described in 5.6, with some modifications. The platform consists of four main 
actors: 
" 
The Mobile Operator(MO): This is the Mobile Phone Network Operator 
, 
containing the Bootstrapping Function (BSF) that is part of the GAA. 
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" 
The Authentication Server: (AS) contains two main entities; the first is the 
Network Application Function (NAF) which is used to communicate with 
BSF. The other entity is the Iden-All P3P privacy policy files must comply 
with identity Provider (IdP), that is used as the identity the minimum 
standard set by the AS, which is provider for the SSO system. checked 
during the registration. 
" 
Service Providers: This refers to any service provider participating in the 
system that provides a service to the User. 
" 
The User: the user can be anyone with 3GPP UMTS Mobile Device (MD) 
who wants to access the system. 
The entities above interact with each other as described in Figure 6.1. When 
the User request access to the AS, the AS will request the user's GAA security 
credentials. The User will start the bootstrapping procedure with the BSF of 
the MO as described in [134]. Using the Ub interface the BSF will generate for 
the User a random identifier (B-TID), and using the AKA protocol both (the 
BSF and the USER) will generate a secret session key K9. The user will then 
use B-TID and K3 as user name and password to login to the NAF located at 
the AS. If successful the User will be authenticated to the IdP SSO system such 
as [52] to access the various services available that are registered with the AS. 
The privacy of the User is managed as follows: 
" 
All SPs to be part of the AS must have a P3P privacy policy file. These 
policies describe who collects what data and for what purpose. 
" 
All P3P privacy policy files must comply with the minimum standard set 
by the AS, which is checked during the registration. 
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Figure 6.1: System Architecture 
" 
The User must set their own P3P privacy file. When accessing a SP the 
two P3P files are compared (User and SP) if they match then the systein 
will just sit in the background; if not the User will be alerted and lie/she 
can make decision to accept the service or not. 
In addition to this, the privacy of the user will be protected by encrypting all 
the messages sent by the user as well as changing the identity of the user each 
time the user accesses different SP. The details are given in the next section. 
In our proposal the AS acts as an Identity Provider between, Web Service 
Providers and each of the Web Service Users (Mobile Stations). The Mobile Op- 
erator owning the SIM deployed in the Mobile Station, acts as an Authentication 
Authority to the AS. 
We utilize the combined Liberty & 3GPP GAA model, as defined in (1141, 
to combine the Service Orientated Architecture of Web Services with a Mobile 
End User end point. We target the provision of identity-consuming services where 
knowledge of the user (principal) is important. Iii this way we m1dress the highest 
value scenario: 
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9 where the service is enhanced by knowledge of some data related to the 
identity of the principal. 
" where privacy, trust and authentication are highly relevant. 
Privacy consideration 
This section examines User privacy in the proposed system, and identifies possible 
threats. 
It is assumed that both the AS and the MO are trusted entities and their 
system is very hard to compromise or break. 
" 
Privacy requirements and policies: This is achieved first by the AS setting 
a general privacy policy guidelines, which all the SP's must comply with 
in their P3P privacy policy files. The main issue here is that it is not easy 
to technically force the SP to comply with its P3P policy, however protec- 
tion can be put in place in a form of legal contract during the registration 
with the AS. This will take place when the SP register with the AS. An- 
other alternative is to deploy XACML [129,131] to assist with the policies 
enforcement. 
" 
User Identity: the User will access various SPs with different IDs only 
known to the AS (trusted entity), therefore for any one spoofing on the 
network will not be able to follow the User's activities even if more than 
one `bad' SPs joins and share their knowledge about the system users. This 
is achieved because of the SSO system used by the AS. 
. 
Communication privacy: all communication messages are encrypted and 
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can only be read by the intended receiver. 
" 
Single point of failure: the IdP server part of the AS is arguably the single 
point of failure in the system as it manages the Users identities, approve 
the policy files, and generate the security token for the system. If this is 
compromised then the system will collapse, however; we assumed that it 
was secure. 
6.2 Summary 
After an overview of the issue of privacy in this chapter, we reviewed key tech- 
nologies and related work that can be used to assist in protecting user privacy in 
mobile Web services. P3P was identified as a technology with great potential in 
this issue; we finally proposed a mechanism to enable the use of P3P in federated 
environment and limiting some of its drawbacks. 
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Authentication with Timestamps 
in Federated System 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the key factors in the process of determine the meaning of a message in 
authentication protocols are the "Time variant parameters". There is a need to 
have a method to ensure that the message is fresh before action upon it; and that 
the message is not a reply of an old instance. 
Time variant parameters may be used in authentication protocols to prevent 
replay and interleaving attacks, to provide uniqueness or timeliness guarantees, 
and to prevent certain chosen-text attacks. Time-variant parameters which serve 
to distinguish one protocol instance from another are also called nonces, unique 
numbers, or non-repeating values. In authentication protocols the commonly used 
time variant parameters are: timestamps, sequence numbers and nonce/random 
numbers [2]. 
182 
7.2 Motivation for using Timestamps in Authentication Protocols 
Authentication protocols based on timestamps and sequence numbers usually 
require one less message than protocols based on random numbers. In addition, 
the timestamp based protocol has the advantage that it is not required to maintain 
state information [2,135]. 
The understanding of how the freshness component works in the message is 
vital to the overall design of the authentication protocol. One of the essential 
requirements is that the freshness component should be bound together with the 
rest of the message in a way that it can not be later attached to a replayed 
message. 
7.2 Motivation for using Timestamps in Authen- 
tication Protocols 
The notion of time is fundamental for describing and verifying security properties 
related to the expiration of keys and the freshness of messages [136]. Timestamps 
are necessary in authentication protocols that support multiple authentication 
without multiple request to an authentication server [137]. The motivation for 
using Timestamps in Authentication protocols can be summarized as follows: 
" 
Timestamps may be used to provide timeliness and uniqueness guarantees, 
which guarantees the freshness of a message. 
9 As a result of the above point this helps to detect message replay; and to 
detect forced delays. 
" 
Timestamps may also be used to implement time-limited access privileges. 
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. 
Timestamps in authentication protocols offer the advantage of fewer mes- 
sages (typically by one) than other challenge-response protocols. This is of 
special importance in mobile networks such as GSM/UMTS where there is 
usually a cost associated with each message sent. 
7.3 Issues with using Timestamps in Mobile Web 
Services 
The topic of timestamps is not new in the security literatures. [135,138,139] 
highlight various issues when using timestamps in communication protocols. This 
section reviews the issues of concern to the Mobile Web services environment. 
7.3.1 Clock Synchronization 
Timestamp based protocols require that time clocks be both synchronized and 
secured. The possibility of adversarial modification of local time clocks is difficult 
to guarantee in many distributed environments such as in Web services. While 
technical solutions exist for synchronizing distributed clocks, if synchronization 
is accomplished via network protocols, such protocols themselves must be secure, 
which typically requires authentication; this leads to a circular security argument 
if such authentication is itself timestamp based [2]. 
As described in chapter one in section 1.3.3; if timestamps are used as fresh- 
ness guarantees by reference to absolute time, then the difference between local 
clocks at various machines must be much less than the allowable age of a message 
deemed to be valid. 
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7.3.2 Trusted Clocks 
As mentioned before, the timestamps based protocol can help to ensure freshness 
of messages. The freshness is usually achieved as follows. The party originating 
a message obtains a timestamp from its local clock, and cryptographically binds 
it to a message. Upon receiving a timestamped message, the second party ob- 
tains the current time from its own clock, and subtracts the timestamp received. 
The received message is valid provided the timestamp difference is within the 
acceptance window. 
Therefore, there is a need for a level of trust that the other party clock is 
functioning correctly. In a server/client communication it is generally assumed 
that the server clock is trusted to function as expected, however the same can't 
be easily assumed at the client side. This is an issue when mutual authentication 
is required and if the authentication protocol is timestamp based. The clocks in 
most clients handsets in GSM/UMTS systems can be easily modified by the users 
(for good reasons such as setting the time of their mobile phones). Therefore if 
such devices (e. g. mobile phone) are used in such protocol, there will be a need 
to establish the trust ensuring that all clocks are behaving as expected. 
7.4 Timestamp Authentication Protocols in Fed- 
erated System 
Federated systems such as Liberty [52] are suitable to adapt timestamp based 
authentication protocols for the following reasons: there exist a trusted entity 
(e. g. IdP) which can be used to manage clock synchronization, it is common for 
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the different entities in the system to interact with each other and in the case 
of GSM/UMTS devices the potential efficiency gains are considerable, since less 
messages are needed for authentication. 
However, these devices' clocks may not be trusted by all devices in the system 
as they are handled by users who have easy access to the clock in these devices. 
Again the trusted entities in the federated system can play important role to 
increase the level of trust. 
The protocol proposed in this work uses digital cryptography to protect the 
integrity and the confidentiality of the messages in the system, in a similar way 
as in [2]. It is possible to set the following assumptions in the federated system: 
" 
The system consists of three types of actors: Identity Provider (IdP), which 
acts a trusted third party where its main role is to act as an authentication 
server in the federated system; the User or the Mobile Device (MD) and is 
reference to GSM/UMTS mobile devices. the Service Provider (SP) who 
provides a service to MDs. 
" 
All actors have agreed on a specific signature algorithm. The signature on 
data X using private key K is written sK(X). 
9 All actors posses a trusted copy of the IdP public key used for verification 
in the signature scheme. 
In the proposed environment the following conditions hold (some are based 
on the work in [135]): 
9 It is important for the clocks used in the system to be synchronized but not 
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necessary to be correct. The important thing is that all devices agree on 
the current time for the purposes of authentication. 
9 The clocks used by the communicating devices are not precisely synchro- 
nized. The differences in clock values are less than some threshold value 
T. 
" 
Messages sent from one device to another are subject to a maximum transit 
delay of D. 
" 
Giving the current time t, and the timestamp in the message is tm,, then 
the message is considered `fresh' if t, 
-T-D< t<<t, +T. 
9 From the above the time of acceptance interval or the `window of accep- 
tance' is [tom T-D, tc+T]. 
"A timestamp based authentication protocol is used between pairs of devices 
in the system to guarantee the freshness of the messages, and that the 
protocol is designed in a way that the recipient of a timestamped protocol 
message can guarantee its origin and integrity by cryptographic means. 
7.4.1 The Proposed Scheme 
The concept behind the scheme is to increase the level of trust in the user's clock, 
by getting a trusted third party to approve the time from the user's clock. When 
the user (i. e MD) authenticates to the IdP to obtain a'user token' (UT) to access 
an SP. The IdP will attach a signed value of the MD current time tcMD and the 
IdP current time tc, dp to the UT. So when the user accesses an SP, the SP can 
compare the MD timestamps, the one attached with the UT and the timestamp 
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sent with the message t,,,,. This way the SP will be able to detect if the users clock 
has changed significantly since the session started (i. e. since the user authenti- 
cated to the IdP) to take an appropriate action. The proposed scheme takes the 
following steps in a federated system, also presented in Figure 7.1: 
Message 1 User 
--> IdP: tm, Access Info 
Message 2 IdP 
-- 
User: SSKIdP (tuner, tldp), UT 
Message 3 User -* SP: SSKldp(tUser, tldP), UT, tm 
----------------- ------- - -- Federated Envi 
f 
i1o 
Figure 7.1: Tiinestamp Authentication scheme in Federated System 
In message 1 the user will attach its current timestamp tm with its security 
credentials (i. e. Access Info) to access the federated environment through the 
IdP. The IdP will compare the user's t, with its local clock tJdp. If the different 
in times (both directions) is bigger than a threshold value T, the IdP will ask the 
user to adjust its clock by sending a reply message with the its current tirnestamp 
tldp. On the other hand if the difference in time is less than T and the verification 
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of the Access info (e. g. Username/Passowrd) is successful, then the IdP will do 
two things: 
" 
Generate a User Token UT. 
" 
Attach its timestamp tldp to the user timestamp tuber (note that at this 
stage t, = tuser) and sign them with the its signature private key SKIdp. 
In message 2 the IdP will send to the user the information generated above 
SSKIdP(tUser, t1 ), UT. 
In message 3 the User will try to access the SP by providing its UT, its current 
timestamp tm, and the message from the IdP SSKIdp(tUser, trdp). The SP now 
verifies the User's data in the following way (note: it is assumed that the SP 
clock is synchronized with the IdP clock): 
" 
Verify the UT (this is subject to the federated system deployed). 
" 
Verify the message SSKJdp(tUser) tldP) using the IdP signature public key 
PKIdp and if successful 
" 
Compare the User's timestamps; tUBer from the IdP message with t, which 
is the User current time. Message will be accepted if the difference between 
t,,,, and tu, is less than T. This will ensure to the SP that the User's clock 
is correct (i. e. synchronized with the IdP clock) 
If the above conditions are met then a timestamp based authentication pro- 
tocol can be used after this stage to authenticate the user to the SP. Note that 
no extra message were introduced, since these are the normal message exchange 
in the federated environment scenario [52]. 
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Some of the major issues with timestamp authentication protocols are the 
clock synchronization presented in section 7.3.1 and the trusted clock issues 
which were presented in section 7.3.2. The proposed scheme solves the User's 
trusted clock issue, where the SP can now trust the user's clock as its value 
has been tied to the IdP trusted clock at the beginning of the session. That 
enables the SP to detect any changes in value to the user's clock. The clock 
synchronization issue was also addressed, which showed that its important for 
the clocks used in the system to be synchronized but not necessary to be correct. 
The important thing is that all devices agree on the current time for the purposes 
of authentication. 
7.5 Security Analysis and Evaluation 
Experience based validation/verification approach together with the protocol de- 
sign principles presented in chapter one was the chosen methodology for evalu- 
ating the security in our proposed protocols. The aim of the security analysis 
presented in this section is to evaluate the security threats that could raises di- 
rectly from our protocol (i. e. the use of timestamp for authentication). The 
evaluation is considered over different security objectives as follows: 
7.5.1 Integrity of the clock values 
This is concern with the integrity of the messages in the system, mainly the values 
of tm, tUser, and tldp. The aim of this attack is to change the value of tm, tUser, 
or tldp. In message 2 the attacker will not be able to change the value of tUser 
or tldp without detection as these values are signed by the IdP. Therefore, any 
190 
7.5 Security Analysis and Evaluation 
changes will be detected either by the User or the SP. This is also true in part of 
message 3. However, both in message 1 and part of message 3 an attacker could 
change the value of tm without detection. Possible solution is for the User to sign 
tm. This was not introduced in the design to reduce the work load on the user, 
however depending on the application on which this could be deployed it may be 
necessary for the User to sign tm. 
7.5.2 Clock failures 
Weather it's caused by an attacker or not a clock failure in any of the system 
entities will cause the system to fail. By failure we mean the value of the clock 
has shifted by more than T. A failure in the User clock will denial the IdP from 
generating the user token, that the User needs to access the SP. Failure at the SP 
clock again will cause the system to fail, as the different between the tsp and tu9e, 
could be bigger than T, that will cause the SP to ask the User to try again. This 
will be the case until the SP resynchronizes its clock with the IdP. Note: we have 
assumed during the design of this protocol that the SP clock is synchronized with 
the IdP. It's more interesting case when the IdP clock fails. What will happen 
is this; the User will send its tu8er in message 1. Because of the failure in the 
IdP clock, the different between tuner and tldp will be bigger than T, the IdP will 
reply asking the User to adjust its clock value to tldp. The User will then adjust 
its value and resend message 1. After receiving message 2, the user will add tm 
to message 2 to create message 3, and send it to the SP. Now if the SP clock 
is synchronized with the IdP the authentication will succeed as the different in 
value between tsp and tjdp will be less then T. However, if the SP clock were 
not synchronized by when the SP receives message 3 the authentication will fail. 
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In our proposed scheme the IdP clock is assumed to be the master clock that all 
SPs in the system synchronizes their clock with. 
It's interesting to note that in this scheme a failure in the IdP clock will not 
fail the system, it will only cause some delay as the User will have to adjust its 
clock value and resend message 1. One possible solution to solve this problem 
is this: every time an SP synchronizes its clock with the IdP, if the different 
in value is bigger than T, then the SP notify the IdP. If the IdP receives many 
notifications for such error from many (many here will depend of the size of the 
network) different SPs the IdP could assume the there is an error with its clock. 
7.5.3 Denial of Service attack 
Unfortunately the system is subject to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. In 
essence clock failures are an accidental DoS attack. An attacker could change 
the value of tin in message 1. I the attacker manages to change the value of tin 
so that the different in value between tin and t jdp is bigger than the threshold 
value T, then the IdP will respond by asking the user to adjust its value of tin to 
make it equal to tldp. The attacker could repeat this attack every time the user 
requests the IdP to create its user token. The result the IdP will never be able 
to create the user token. Possible solution to this attack is for the user to sign 
message 1, however this will lead the user to manage its integrity keys which may 
or may not be an issue depending on the application its deployed in. another 
alternative is for the user to encrypt message 1, though an attacker will not be 
able to read the message it is still possible to change the network traffic in the 
message without been detected. 
The analysis in this section was mainly to consider possible security threats 
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to the system due to the use of timestamp for authentication, it did not consider 
other potential threats for two reasons; first the aim of this protocol is to see 
the viability of using timestamp for authentication in federated system, and the 
investigation suggest that yes it is possible but with some care as some potential 
security threats do exist. The second reason is that more detail security analysis 
which address security issues in federated system were presented in earlier chap- 
ters, which are still applicable here such as the failure if the IdP or SIM cloning 
(incase the user is mobile device). 
7.6 Summary 
Time variant parameters are important in all authentication protocols, which are 
used to prevent replay and interleaving attacks, to provide uniqueness or time- 
liness guarantees, and to prevent certain chosen-text attacks. One of the key 
advantages of timestamp based authentication protocol is that they usually re- 
quires one less message than protocols based on random numbers, in addition 
timestamp based protocol has the advantage of that its not required to maintain 
state information. This efficiency gain that timestamp based authentication pro- 
tocol can offer over other authentication protocols can be of great value, especially 
when mobile phones are used in the system, since there is usually an associated 
cost related to the number of messages sent. 
A list of motivations for using timestamp based protocols was given in sec- 
tion 7.2. Key challenges for timestamp based authentication protocols such as 
clock synchronization and trusted clocks were discussed in Section 7.3. We have 
demonstrated how to address these concerns and propose a mechanism to use 
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timestamp authentication protocol even if mobile devices with untrusted clocks 
are used. 
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Chapter 
Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusion 
Web services are becoming a model on which to build distributed applications that 
uses the Internet. These services predicate a set of standards that provide a simple 
and consistent way to access the functionality of diverse systems via the World 
Wide Web. As Web services are not just being used to integrate internal systems, 
but they are also integrating data sources from outside the organization. That 
was one of the main reasons that mobile commerce developers and researchers 
looked to benefit from Web service. However; one of the key issues with such 
environment is the security of the system, and this was the focus of this thesis. 
Web services security standards/solutions were developed with the fixed net- 
work in mind, and because of that current Web services security solutions are 
not practical nor secure enough to adopt in mobile environment. Furthermore, 
Mobile networks can offer various platforms/architectures in which Web service 
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security systems can use to secure mobile Web services applications. In this the- 
sis we have examined both Web services security mechanisms and the mobile 
networks security architectures/technologies. 
The basic specification of Web services completely ignored the need for secure 
services that are based on a authentication and authorization infrastructure [77). 
Federated systems have been identified as good mechanisms to deploy in mobile 
Web services application. As it simplify the authentication process and can assist 
to enforce privacy policy. 
The existing cryptographic mechanisms in GSM and UMTS networks do pro- 
vide some level of protection to the information security. However, some potential 
attacks as in DDoS attacks, or large-scale worm infection has not yet been quan- 
tified, this is particulary true in UMTS network. And with the introduction of 
new services, new types of mobile devices, and further evolution of the network 
architecture (e. g. IMS and 3G/WLAN interworking), will likely introduce new 
threats of the security of the network. The understanding of such security threats 
is essential when designing new services for these networks. One of the main is- 
sues we faced in this research is the lack of available public data of experimental 
investigation on such security threats that are carried on within the industry 
laboratories. 
Single Sing On is one of the mechanism that can assist with user authenti- 
cation in mobile environment. This is very important in mobile applications as 
it is inconvenient for the user to keep inputting username/password each time 
they access a service. However, registration for such systems have some security 
concerns in various Single Sign-On schemes. We have proposed a solution where 
a security token is used to address this issue, with a protocol that uses the GSM 
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system to protect user privacy in Single Sign-On scheme. The proposed protocol 
allow for the user to have full anonymity as far as the service providers are con- 
cerned; however it is possible for a trusted authority to reveal the identity of the 
user if he or she is suspected of illegal activities. 
SAML is used in Web Service to address the issue of portable identity, and is 
adopted it in Mobile Web service. Care must be taken when designing a SAML 
protocol for Mobile Web service, to balance the requirements between protocol 
security and efficiency. When designing an authentication protocol with SAML 
for Mobile Web service, the network architecture must be taken into account to 
achieve the required balance between security and efficiency. 
We have identified the 3GPP Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) as 
a useful tool in assisting in mobile Web service authentication. We have used 
that in the development of the generic mobile Web service platform. This generic 
platform is built on top of the 3GPP GAA and makes use of Liberty Alliance 
federated environment model. The system can be used to provide a base platform 
for mobile Web services applications and solutions. Initial results showed that 
the system is robust and flexible to allow for more investigations to be carried 
out to try to solve key privacy and security problems in mobile Web services. 
The proposed architecture allows developers and researchers to rethink cur- 
rent distribution structures and business models for the sourcing and delivery of 
digital services to mobile subscribers. The main contributions of system archi- 
tecture, protocols, and enabling data structures could form the basis to provides: 
1. the user with a high level service discovery interface plus anonymity from 
Web Service Providers; 
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2. the Mobile Operator with a pivotal role and a revenue generating opportu- 
nity in the provision of a web services security and payment platform; 
3. the Service Provider with a secure, scalable distribution channel. 
User privacy has always been important when dealing with users transactions 
over digital networks. In mobile Web service user privacy becomes critical, as 
people keeps all sort of personal and work related data in their mobile phones 
and PDAs, in addition to the growing number of services that uses location based 
services which could effect the privacy of the user if not managed properly. 
Chapter five also gives an overview of the issue of privacy, a review of key 
technologies and related work that can be used to assist in protecting user privacy 
in mobile Web services. P3P was identified as a technology with great potential in 
this issue. we finally proposed a mechanism to enable the use of P3P in federated 
environment and limiting some of its drawbacks. Though P3P is useful to address 
user privacy challenges, it has some issues such as the lack of trust by the sites 
who publish it and the ability to enforce its policies. 
We argue that the above issues can be addressed in federated environment 
where some degree of trust is available (e. g. circle of trust in the Liberty Alliance 
model). In the proposed system this is achieved by the AS (Authentication 
Server)setting a general privacy policy guidelines, which all the SP's must comply 
with in their P3P privacy policy files. The main issue here is that it is not easy 
to technically force the SP to comply with its P3P policy, however protection can 
be put in place in a form of legal contract during the registration with the AS. 
This will take place when the SP register with the AS. Another alternative is to 
deploy XACML to assist with the policies enforcement. 
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Reducing the number of exchange messages in mobile Web service protocol 
design is desirable for many reasons including reducing security risks (as less data 
will be flying around), cost saving both in terms of resources and financial cost 
(many mobile operator charge for most data traffic over its network). Timestamp 
based authentication protocols usually requires one less message than protocols 
based on random numbers, which makes it suitable for mobile Web services envi- 
ronment. This efficiency gain that timestamp based authentication protocol can 
offer over other authentication protocols can be of great value, especially when 
mobile phones are used in the system, since there is usually an associated cost 
related to the number of messages sent. In addition time variant parameters are 
important in all authentication protocols, which are used to prevent replay and 
interleaving attacks, to provide uniqueness or timeliness guarantees, and to pre- 
vent certain chosen-text attacks. However timestamp based protocols have their 
own challenges such as clock synchronization and trusted clocks. Chapter seven 
demonstrated how to address these concerns and propose a mechanism to use 
timestamp authentication protocol even if mobile devices with untrusted clocks 
are used through the use of trusted third party in federated environment. 
8.2 Achievement 
This section lists the main achievement of this research, which are driven from 
the motivation and the aims and objectives sections earlier. These are outlined 
as follows: 
1. Identify the limitations/weakness of current Web services security technolo- 
gies/techniques when applied in GSM/UMTS environment, which can be 
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summarized in: 
(a) Web service does not have clear entities to play the role of Authen- 
tication Server, this is an issue as the GSM/UMTS environment is 
a centralized architecture. Mobile operators are suitable to play this 
role. 
(b) Some of protocol structure and protocol vocabulary such as in SAML, 
are inefficient in GSM/UMTS environment, as they consume many 
messages and a large space within the message. There is a cost in 
most GSM/UMTS messages exchange. 
(c) The security registration process in SSO schemes can be improved. 
2. Identify the limitations/weakness of current security system in GSM/UMTS 
technology, to be addressed when developing Mobile Web services system. 
3. Develop novel protocols to address the issues of authentications and privacy 
in mobile web services environment. 
4. Design and build prototype to test the various techniques and protocols 
developed by this research. 
8.3 Limitation 
Though the thesis attempts to cover the topic of Authentication and Privacy in 
Mobile Web Service in some details, due to the nature of the PhD research work 
and the time constrains. The following is a list of the main limitation of the work: 
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" 
Proposed protocols could not been verified with the industrial, the mobile 
operator would not disclose the details of their security system (for security 
reasons). 
9 Important related topics were not covered due to time constrains; these 
include trusted computing techniques, and XACML 
9 Could not run formal security verification on a limited scale of the system, 
due to initial assumptions and research objectives. 
8.4 Future Work 
In the course of this research, several prospects for future work have become evi- 
dent and some issues may be the subject for further study. These are summarized 
below. 
" 
Vulnerability analysis: there is no formal analytical tool to assess the vul- 
nerability and strength of a system security proposal. In particular, the 
analysis on the interdependency among various system components and 
security operations. 
" 
Trusted third party: the most trusted element in the mobile ecosystem is the 
mobile operator, this is due to its role in the system. We have utilized this 
fact and used the mobile operator as a trusted IdP/AS in federated environ- 
ment that assist SPs to authenticate mobile devies/users. It is interesting 
to see if it is possible to address the issue of mobile users authentication to 
SPs in a secure and practical means without mobile operator involvement. 
201 
8.4 Future Work 
" 
SAML: the terminology for SAML is not suitable to be used in mobile net- 
works due to the length of its vocabulary, that makes it use extra resources. 
More work is needed to make SAML efficient to be used in mobile Web 
services systems. 
" 
GAA from 3GPP: As proposed in chapter 5, the GAA can be a great 
authentication tool to integrate mobile users with Web services applications. 
However; more work is needed to evaluate and improve efficiency of the 
system. Also its important to be specific on what it means that the user 
has been authenticated by the operator GAA system? 
" 
Trusted computing: TC is gaining considerable industrial support, though 
TC was looked at during the work of this thesis, not much time was spent on 
it due to the focuss of this thesis on other related issues and time constraint 
. 
XACML: Chapter six identified P3P as technology that could assist in pro- 
tecting user privacy in mobile Web service environment, due its wide use 
among web application. Another alternative is to deploy XACML to assist 
with the policies enforcement. In particular how it can be deployed within 
a federated system. 
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Appendix 
package sso; 
import javax. microedition. lcdui. *; 
import javax. microedition. midlet. *; 
import javax. microedition. io. *; 
import javax. microedition. media. *; 
import javax. microedition. media. control. *; 
import org. ksoap. ClassMap; 
import org. ksoap. Soap; 
import org. ksoap. SoapEnvelope; 
import org. ksoap. transport. HttpTransport; 
import org. k ml. parser. XmlParser; 
import org. ksoap. *; 
import org. ksoap. transport. HttpTransport; 
import org. kxml. parser. XmlParser; 
import stuGenSP. ServiceProviderService_Stub; 
import stuGeneretedNAFService. NAF_IdPService_Stub; 
import stubGeneretedstuMobileOperatorService. MobileOperatorService_Stub; 
import java. io. *; 
public class MlDletl 
extends MIDlet 
implements CommandListener, PlayerListener { 
private static MlDlet 1 instance; 
private Displayablel displayable = new Displayable 10; 
private List previousMenu; 
private Player player; 
private List musicMenu; 
private List oneBeforePrevious; 
private List blockbuster; 
Display display = null; 
// a menu with items 
List mainMenu = null; // main menu 
// textbox 
TextBox input = null; 
H command 
static final Command backCommand = new Command("Back", Command. BACK, 0); 
static final Command mainMenuCommand = new Command("Main", 
Command. SCREEN, 
1); 
static final Command exitCommand = new Command("Exit", Command. STOP, 2); 
static final Command orderCommand = new Command("Order", Command. OK, 3); 
static final Command cancelCommand = new Command("Cancel", 
Command. CANCEL, 
4); 
static final Command playCommand = new Command("Play Now", Command. OK, 5); 
String currentMenu = null; 
Object ServiceProviderService; 
int ServiceProviderServicelnt; 
String tl; 
String t2; 
String t3; 
Image im = null; 
String url = "http: //www. corej2me. com/midpbook_vIeI/chI4/duke. png"; 
String moRespone; 
String tid; 
String ks; 
Player audioplayer; 
String sk; 
String rad; 
String ut; 
String sput; 
String service = ""; 
inti=0; 
String respone; 
= String soapReqpMesg2 
"<soapenv: Envelope xmins: soapenv=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/envelope/\"" 
+ "xmlns: xsd=\"http: //www. w3. org/2001/XMLSchema\"" 
+ "xmins: xsi=\"http: //www. w3. org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\">" 
+ "<soapenv: Body><nsl: CallService 
soapenv: encodingStyle=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/encodingA"" 
+ "xmins: ns 1=\"http: //soapinterop. org/\">" 
+ "<ns 1: argO xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" ' 
"xmlns: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/encodingA">222</ns 1: argO>" 
+ "<nsl: argl xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" 
xmins: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/encodingA">" 
+ "test</ns l : arg 1><ns l : arg2 xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" 
xmlns: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmlsoap. org/soap/encodingA">" 
+ "test</nsl : arg2><ns1: arg3 xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" 
xmins: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmlsoap. org/soap/encodingA">" 
+ "test</ns 1: arg3></ns 1: CallService></soapenv: Body></soapenv: Envelope>"; 
String soapReqpMesg3 = 
"<soapenv: Envelope xmins: soapenv--\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/envelope/"" 
+,, xmins: xsd=\"http: //www. w3. org/2001/XMLSchema\"" 
+ "xmins: xsi=\"http: //www. w3. org/2001 /XMLSehema-instance\">" 
+ "<soapenv: Body><nsl: CallService 
soapenv: encodingStyle=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/encoding/"" 
+ "xmlns: ns 1=\"http: //soapinterop. org/\">" 
+ "<ns 1: argO xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\"" 
"xmins: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/encodingA">Football</ns l : argO>" 
+ "<nsl: argl xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" 
xmins: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmlsoap. org/soap/encoding/\">" 
+ "test</nsl: argl><nsl: arg2 xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" 
xmins: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmisoap. org/soap/encodingA">" 
+ "test</ns1: arg2><ns1: arg3 xsi: type=\"soapenc: string\" 
xmins: soapenc=\"http: //schemas. xmlsoap. org/soap/encodingA">" 
+ "test</ns1: arg3></ns1: CallService></soapenv: Body></soapenv: Envelope>"; 
H constructor. 
public MIDlet10 { 
} 
1** 
* Start the MIDlet by creating a list of items and associating the exit 
* command with the list. 
public void startAppO throws MlDletStateChangeException 
display = Display. getDisplay(this); 
try { 
mainMenu = new List("AspiData Shopping Mall", Choice. IMPLICIT); 
mainMenu. append("Connecting to the Shopping Mall", null); 
mainMenuO; 
NAF_IdPService_Stub naf = new NAF_IdPService_StubO; 
MobileOperatorService_Stub mo = new MobileOperatorService_Stubo; 
ServiceProviderService_Stub sp = new ServiceProviderService_Stub(); 
System. out. println( 
"Connecting with Identity Provider ; IMPI number : 1111 \n"); 
naf. reqAccess(" 1111 "); 
System. out. println( 
"Identity Provider to user ; initating a new Bootstapping Procedure\n"); 
System. out. printin( 
"User to BSF ; Intiating the BSP; IMPI number : 1111\n"); 
moRespone = mo. regAccess(" 1111 "); 
tid = moRespone. substring(29); 
System. out. println("Retrive B-TID from BSF"); 
System. out. println("B-TID : "+tid+" "); 
System. out. println("User to Identity Provider forwading the B-TID for login : "+ tid); 
rad = naf. reqLogin(tid); 
System. out. println("Identity Provider to User ; Challenge(RAND) : "+ rad); 
sk = moRespone. substring(5,19); 
int num1= sk. hashCodeO; 
int num2 = rad. hashCodeO; 
String LoginChallengeGenerated = Integer. toHexString(num 1- num2); 
System. out. println("Generating Challenge Response :"+ LoginChallengeGenerated); 
System. out. println("User to Identity Provider ; Challenge Response 
LoginChallengeGenerated); 
ut = naf. login(LoginChallengeGenerated, tid); 
System. out. println("Identity Provider to User ; UserToken : "+ ut); 
mainMenu. delete(0); 
mainMenu. append("Blockbuster Sports", null); 
mainMenu. append("Virgin MegaStore", null); 
mainMenu. append("Amazon", null); 
mainMenu. append("WaterStone", null); 
mainMenu. append("M&S", null); 
mainMenu. append("Vodafone Live! ", null); 
mainMenu. append("UEFA", null); 
mainMenu. append("Playboy", null); 
mainMenu. append("BBC", null); 
mainMenu. append("easyJet", null); 
mainMenu. append(" 8 88 
. 
com", null); 
mainMenu. addCommand(exitCommand); 
mainMenu. setCommandListener(this); 
mainMenuO; 
// System. out. println(sk + "sk"); 
//System. out. println("ddddddddddd" + nafreqService("222", ut)); 
H System. out. println("ee"+t3+"ww"); 
// mMessageItem. setText("oki"); */ 
catch (Exception ioe) { 
System. out. println("-->"+ioe. toStringO); 
public void pauseAppO { 
display = null; 
mainMenu = null; 
input = null; 
public void destroyApp(boolean unconditional) { 
notifyDestroyedo; 
// main menu 
void mainMenu( { 
display. setCurrent(mainMenu); 
currentMenu = "Main"; 
void intermediateMenu(List menu, String name){ 
display. setCurrent(menu); 
currentMenu = name; 
1** 
*a generic method that is called when any of the items on the list are 
* selected. 
*1 
public void prepareO { 
input = new TextBox("Enter some text: 5, TextField. ANY); 
input. addCommand(backCommand); 
input. setCommandListener(this); 
input. setString(" "); 
currentMenu = "text"; 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
this. previousMenu = (List) display. getCurrento; 
display. setCu rent(input); 
public void createChannel4MenuO { 
try{ 
System. out. println(' 1nCalling Blockbuster Sports"); 
NAF_IdPService_Stub naf = new NAF_IdPService_StubO; 
System. out. println("User to Identity Provider requesting the service from : 
Blockbuster Sports SPID : Blockbuster 4, UT : "+ut); 
String sptut = naf. reqService("Blockbuster Sports", ut); 
sput = sptut. substring(sptut. indexOf("@"), sptut. lengtho)" 
System. out. println("Identity Provider to User Service Provider specific UserToken : 
"+sput); 
List channel4Menu = new List("Blockbuster Sports", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
channel4Menu. append("Football £25", null); 
channel4Menu. append("Cricket £35", null); 
channel4Menu. addCommand(backCommand); 
channel4Menu. setCommandListener(this); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
this. previousMenu = (List) display. getCurrento ; 
display. setCurrent(channel4Menu); 
blockbuster = channel4Menu; 
) catch(Exception ex) { 
System. out. println(ex. toStringo); 
public void createMusicMenu() { 
musicMenu = new List("Virgin MegaStore", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
musicMenu. append("Classic", null); 
musicMenu. append("Rap", null); 
musicMenu. addCommand(backCommand); 
mus icMenu. setCommandListener(thi s); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
this. previousMenu = (List) display. getCurrento; 
display. setCurrent(musicMenu); 
ý** 
* Test item!. 
*1 
public void channel4() { 
this. createChannel4MenuO; 
currentMenu = "Sport"; 
/** 
* Test item2. 
/*public void createMenu(int h) 
{ 
if(h==222) 
{ 
this. createChannel4MenuO; 
currentMenu = "channel4"; 
else 
this. createGreenwicho; 
currentMenu = "greenwich"; 
} 
} */ 
public void music() { 
// prepareO; 
this. createMusicMenuO; 
currentMenu = "Music"; 
public void chosenSP(String ServiceProviderServiceStr) { 
System. out. println("www"); 
ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream( 
ServiceProviderServiceStr 
. 
getBytes()); 
InputStreamReader reader = new InputStreamReader(bis); 
XmlParser xp; 
SoapEnvelope envelope = new SoapEnvelope(new ClassMap(Soap. VERI 1)); 
try { 
xp = new XmlParser(reader); 
envelope. parse(xp); 
ServiceProviderService = envelope. getBodyo; 
HttpTransport k= new HttpTransport( 
"http: //localhost: 8080/axis/services/ServiceProviderService", 
"uurn: ServiceProviderService#CallService"); 
//System. out. println(k. call(ServiceProviderService). toString(); 
k. call(ServiceProviderService); 
} 
catch (Exception e 1) { 
System. out. println("-->"+e I 
. 
toString(); 
// TODO Auto-generated catch block 
ei 
. 
printStackTraceO; 
public void CallPaymentServiceO{ 
try{ 
NAF_IdPService_Stub naf = new NAF_IdPService_StubO; 
System. out. println("User to Identity Provider requesting the service for Finacial SPID 
Finacial, UT :"+ 
ut); 
String sptut = na. f. regService("Finacial", ut); 
sput = sptut. substring(sptut. indexOf("@'), sptut. lengtho ); 
System. out. println( 
"Identity Provider to User Finacial Service Provider specific UserToken :"+ 
sput); 
System. out. println("User to Finacial Service Provider : Invoice"); ) catch(Exception ex) { 
System. out. printl n("-->"+ex. to String( ); 
} 
public void ShowPaymentMethodsO{ 
List paymentMenu; 
if(currentMenu. endsWith("FootballInvoice") 
currentMenu. ends With("Cricketlnvoice")) { 
paymentMenu = new List("Blockbuster Sports", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
}else if(currentMenu. endsWith("RapInvoice") 
currentMenu. endsWith("ClassicInvoice")) { 
paymentMenu = new List("Virgin MegaStore", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
}else{ 
paymentMenu = new List("Payment Methods", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
paymentMenu. append("Pay from your Mobile Bill", null); 
paymentMenu. append("Barclays Payment Service", null); 
paymentMenu. addCommand(backCommand); 
paymentMenu. setCommandListener(this); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
display. setCurrent(paymentMenu); 
} 
1** 
* Test item3. 
public void vh10 { 
prepareO; 
currentMenu = "vhI"; 
public void DisplayFootBall(){ 
currentMenu = "Football"; 
this. playV ideo("http: //localhost/site/Football. mpg"); 
Form footballclip = new Form(""); 
footballclip. append(""); 
// footballclip. addCommand(backCommand); 
// footba11clip. setCommandListener(this); 
// 
// System. out. println("Service Provicer to User : Service Delivery"); 
// Image im = 
this. getImage("http: //upload. wikimedia. org/wikipedialcommons/thumb/7/7f/Generic_foot 
ball. png/ 180px-Generic_football. png"); 
// ImageItem ii = new Imageltem(null, im, Imageltem. LAYOUT_DEFAULT, null); 
// 
if (footballclip. sizeO != 0) 
// footbaliclip. set(0, ii); 
// else // Append the image to the empty form 
// footballclip. append(ii); 
// 
// this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
// //this. previousMenu = (Form)display. getCurrento; 
// currentMenu = "FootBall"; 
// 
// display. setCurrent(footballclip); 
} 
private void playVideo(String URL){ 
try { 
VideoControl vc; 
defplayerO; 
// create a player instance 
player = Manager. createPlayer(URL); 
player. addPlayerListener(this); 
// realize the player 
player. realizeo; 
vc = (VideoControl)player. getControl( 
"VideoControl"); 
if(vc != null) ( 
Item video = (Item)vc. initDisplayMode( 
vc. USE_GUI_PRIMITIVE, null); 
Form v= new Form("Playing Video... "); 
v. addCommand(backCommand); 
v. setCommandListener(this); 
StringItem si = new StringItem("Status: ", 
"Playing... "); 
v. append(si); 
v. append(video); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
display. setCurrent(v); 
} 
player. prefetchO; 
player. startO; 
} 
catch(Throwable t) { 
reset); 
public void DisplayCricketO{ 
currentMenu = "Cricket"; 
this. playVideo("http: //localhost/site/shoaib l 
. 
mpg"); 
Form cricketClip = new Form("")" 
// 
cricketClip. append(""); 
// 
cricketClip. addCommand(backCommand); 
// cricketClip. setCommandListener(this); 
/1 
// System. out. println("Service Provicer to User : Service Delivery"); 
II Image im = 
this. getlmage("http: //www. gametronik. com/site/rubriques/megadrive/Jeux/Shane%20 Wa 
me%o20Cricket/Shane%2OWame%2OCricket. png"); 
Imageltem ii = new Imageltem(null, im, ImageItem. LAYOUT_DEFAULT, null); 
// 
// if (cricketClip. size() != 0) 
cricketClip. set(O, ii); 
// else // Append the image to the empty form 
// cricketClip. append(ii); 
// 
// this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
// //this. previousMenu = (Form)display. getCurrent(; 
// currentMenu = "Cricket"; 
// 
// display. setCurrent(cricketClip); 
private Image getImage(String url) { 
Image im = null; 
try { 
InputStream iStrm 
= (InputStream) Connector. openlnputStream(url); ByteArrayOutputStream bStrm 
= new ByteArrayOutputStreamo; int ch; 
while ( (ch = iStrm. readO) !_ 
_I) 
bStrm. write(ch); 
II Place into image array 
byte imageData[] = bStrm. toByteArray(; 
II Create the image from the byte array 
im = Image. createlmage(imageData, 0, imageData. length); 
} 
catch (Exception ex) { 
ex. printStackTraceO; 
} 
finally { 
// Clean up 
if (iStrm != null) 
// iStrm. closeo ; 
return (im = null ? null : im); 
public void getFootBallO { 
try { 
System. out. println("User Calling FootBall Clip from Blockbuster Sports by sending 
SPUT : "+sput ); 
//chosenSP(soapRegpMesg3); 
System. out. println("Response from Sport to User with the Invoice" ); 
Form footballclip = new Form("Blockbuster Sports"); 
footballclip. append("duration 2 min"); 
footballclip. append("\nInvoice For Football Clip"); 
footballclip. append("\nPrice £ 25.00"); 
footballclip. append("If u wish to continue please confirm Order now"); 
footballclip. addCommand(backCommand); 
footballclip. addCommand(orderCommand); 
footballclip. setCommandListener(thi s); 
/* Image im = this. getlmage(); 
Imageltem ii = new Imageltem(null, im, Imageltem. LAYOUT_DEFAULT, null); 
if (footballclip. sizeO != 0) 
footballclip. set(0, ii); 
else 
H Append the image to the empty form 
footballclip. append(ii); 
*1 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
this. previousMenu = (List) display. getCurrento; 
currentMenu = "Footballlnvoice"; 
display. setCurrent(footballclip); 
} catch(Exception ex) { 
System. out. println(ex. to StringO); 
public void GetCricketO{ 
try { 
System. out. println("User Calling Cricket Clip from Blockbuster Sports by sending 
SPUT : "+sput ); 
//chosenSP(soapRegpMesg3); 
System. out. println("Response from Blockbuster Sports to User with the Invoice" ); 
Form cricketclip = new Form("Blockbuster Sports"); 
cricketclip. append("duration 2 min"); 
cricketclip. append("\nlnvoice for Cricket Clip"); 
cricketclip. append("\nPrice £ 35.00"); 
cricketclip. append("If u wish to continue please confirm Order now"); 
cricketclip. addCommand(backCommand); 
cricketclip. addCommand(orderCommand); 
cricketclip. setCommandListener(this); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
this. previousMenu = (List) display. getCurrent(; 
currentMenu = "Cricketlnvoice"; 
display. setCurrent(cricketclip); 
}catch(Exception ex){ 
System. out. println(ex. toStringo ); 
public void GetClassicO{ 
try{ 
System. out. println("User Calling Classic Music from Virgin MegaStore by sending SPUT : @26334cf8" ); 
//chosenSP(soapRegpMesg3); 
System. out. println("Response from Music to User with the Invoice" ); 
Foren classicclip = new Form("Virgin MegaStore"); 
classicclip. append("duration 3 min"); 
classicclip. append("\nlnvoice for Music"); 
classicclip. append("\nPrice £ 15.00"); 
classicclip. append("If u wish to continue please confirm Play now"); 
classicclip. addCommand(backCommand); 
classicclip. addCommand(playCommand); 
classicclip. setCommandListener(thi s); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
this. previousMenu = (List) display. getCurrento; 
currentMenu = "Classiclnvoice"; 
display. setCurrent(classicclip); 
}catch(Exception ex){ 
System. out. println(ex. toSüingo ); 
} 
private void resetO { 
player = null; 
private void stopPlayero { 
try { 
defplayerO; 
} 
catch(MediaException me) { 
reseto; 
} 
* Handle events. 
*I 
public void commandAction(Command c, Displayable d) { String label = c. getLabel(); 
if (label. equals("Exit")) { 
destroyApp(true); 
} 
else if (label. equals("Back")) { 
this. previousMenu = this. oneBeforePrevious; 
if (currentMenu. equals("Sport") 
11 currentMenu. equals("Music") 
currentMenu. equals("vhl")) { 
go back to menu 
mainMenuO; 
System. out. println("Goto main menu"); 
} 
else if(currentMenu. equals("Cricket") 11 currentMenuequals("Football")){ 
this. stopPlayerO; 
intermediateMenu(blockbuster, "Sports"); 
} 
else if(currentMenu. equals("Music 
- 
Classic") 11 currentMenu. equals("Music 
- 
Rap")){ 
{ try 
this. audioplayer. stopO; 
}catch(Exception ex){ 
System. out. printin(ex. toStringO); 
} 
intermediateMenu(musicMenu, "Music"); 
} 
else if(currentMenu. equals("Cricketlnvoice") ýI 
currentMenu. equals("FootballInvoice")) { 
intermediateMenu(blockbuster, "Sports"); 
} 
else if(currentMenu. equals("Classiclnvoice") 11 currentMenu. equals("Raplnvoice")){ 
intermediateMenu(musicMenu, "Music"); 
else { 
mainMenuO; 
} 
display. setCurrent(thi s. prev iousMenu); 
// } 
} 
else if(label. equals("Order")){ 
this. ShowPaymentMethodso ; 
} 
else if(label. equals("Play Now")){ 
this. ShowPaymentMethodsO; 
} 
else { 
List down = (List) display. getCurrentQ; 
switch (down. getSelectedlndexO) { 
case 0: 
if (down. getString(O). compareTo("Blockbuster Sports") = 0) { 
channel4Q; 
//chosenSP(soapReqpMesg3); 
else if (down getString(0). compareTo("Football £25") = 0) { 
service = "Football"; 
this. getFootBallO; 
//invokeWebServiceo; 
} 
else if (downgetString(0). compareTo("Classic") == 0) { 
service = "Classic"; 
System. out. println("Classic"); 
this. GetClassicO; 
} 
else if(down. getString(O). compareTo("Pay from your Mobile Bill") = 0) { 
if(service. compareTo("Football") = 0){ 
this. DisplayFootBallO; 
}else if(service. compareTo("Cricket") = 0){ 
this. DisplayCricketo; 
}else if(service. compareTo("Classic") = 0){ 
this. playMusico; 
}else if(service. compareTo("Rap") = 0){ 
this. playMusicO; 
break; 
case 1: 
if (down. getString(0). compareTo('Blockbuster Sports") = 0) { 
musicO; 
//chosenSP(soapReqpMesg2); 
} 
else if (down. getString(0). compareTo("Classic") = 0) { 
service = "Rap"; 
System. out. println("Rap"); 
this. GetClassicO; 
} 
else if (down. getString(0). compareTo("Football £25") = 0) { 
service = "Cricket"; 
this. GetCricketO; 
// i= 1; 
// invokeWebServiceO; 
} 
else if(down. getString(O). compareTo("Pay from your Mobile Bill") = 0) { 
this. Cal lPaymentServiceO; 
if(service. compareTo("Football') = 0) { 
this. DisplayFootBallO; 
}else if(service. compareTo("Cricket") = 0){ 
this. DisplayCricketO; 
}else if(service. compareTo("Classic") 0){ 
this. playMusico; 
)else if(service. compareTo("Rap") = 0){ 
this. playMusicO; 
} 
break; 
public void playMusicO{ 
try { 
Form musicClipForm = new Form(""); 
musicClipForm. addCommand(backCommand); 
musicClipForm. setCommandListener(this); 
System. out. println("Service Provicer to User : Service Delivery"); 
this. oneBeforePrevious = this. previousMenu; 
if(service. compareTo("Classic")=0) { 
currentMenu = "Music - Classic"; 
musicClipForm. append("Now You are listening to Classic"); 
this. audioplayer = Manager. createPlayer("http: //Iocalhost/site/barebear. wav"); 
this. audioplayer. startO; 
)else{ 
currentMenu = "Music - Rap"; 
musicClipForm. append("Now You are listening to Rap"); 
this. audioplayer = Manager. createPlayer("http: //localhost/site/scooby. wav"); 
this. audioplayer. startO; 
} 
display. setCurrent(musicClipForm); 
catch (Exception e) { 
System. out. println("-->"+e. toStringO); 
private void defplayerO throws MediaException { 
if (player != null) { 
if(player. getState() = Player. STARTED) { 
player. stopo; 
} 
if(player. getState(= Player. PREFETCHED) { 
player. deallocateO; 
} 
if(player. getState() = Player. REALIZED 
player. getStateO = Player. UNREALIZED) { 
player. closeO; 
player = null; 
} 
private Image getImageO { 
Thread t= new Thread() { 
public void rung { 
try { 
InputStream iStrm = (InputStream) Connector. openlnputStream(url); 
ByteArrayOutputStream bStrm = new ByteArrayOutputStream(; 
int ch; 
while ((ch = iStrm. readO -1) 
bStrm. write(ch); 
II Place into image array 
byte imageData[] = bStrm. toByteArrayo; 
II Create the image from the byte array 
im = Image. createlmage(imageData, 0, imageData. length); 
catch (Exception e) { 
System. out. print(e. getMessageo); 
e. printStackTraceO; 
} 
t. startp; 
return (im = null ? null : im); 
} //end getlmag 
public String invokeWebServiceO { 
System. out. println("dddddddddd" + i); 
Thread t= new ThreadO { 
public void rung { 
try { 
if (i = 1) { 
List channel4Menu = new List("You ", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
SoapObject rpc = new SoapObject 
("urn: Channel4Crickete", "getCricket"); 
respone = ("" + new HttpTransport 
("http: //Iocalhost: 8080/axis/services/Channel4Cricket", 
"uurn: Channel4Crickete#getCricket"). call(rpc)); 
currentMenu = "channel4"; 
channel4Menu. append("you can download your image from", null); 
channel4Menu. append(respone, null); 
channel4Menu. addCommand(backCommand); 
display. setCurrent(channel4Menu); 
} 
if (i=2) { 
SoapObject rpc = new SoapObject 
("urn: GreenwichMiliSeconds", "getMiliseconds"); 
respone = ("" + new HttpTransport 
"http: //localhost: 8080/axis/services/GreenwichMiliSeconds", 
"uurn: GreenwichMiliSeconds#getMiliseconds"). call(rpc)); 
List channel2Menu = new List("GreenwichMiliSeconds ", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
currentMenu = "channel4"; 
channel2Menu. append("time in miliseconds is", null); 
channel2Menu. append(respone, null); 
//channel2Menu. addCommand(backCommand); 
display. setCurrent(channel2Menu); 
} 
if (i = 3) { 
SoapObject rpc = new SoapObject 
("urn: GreenwichDate", "getDate "); 
respone = ("" + new HttpTransport 
("http: //localhost: 8080/axis/services/GreenwichDate", 
"uurn: GreenwichDate#getDate"). call(rpc)); 
currentMenu = "channel4"; 
List channel4Menu = new List("GreenwichDate ", 
Choice. IMPLICIT); 
channel4Menu. append("date iss", null); 
channel4Menu. append(respone, null); 
channel4Menu. addCommand(backCommand); 
display. setCurrent(channel4Menu); 
if (i = 4) { 
catch (Exception e) { 
System. out. print(e. getMessageO); 
e. printStackTraceO; 
} 
t. startO; 
return respone; 
} //end getlmage 
public void playerUpdate(Player player, 
String event, Object data) { 
if(event = PlayerListener. END_OF_MEDIA) { 
try { 
defplayerO; 
catch(MediaException me) { 
} 
resetO; 
